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Jula Wildberger

BODIES, PREDICATES, AND FATED TRUTHS:
ONTOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS AND THE TERMINOLOGY
OF CAUSATION IN DEFENSES OF STOIC DETERMINISM
BY CHRYSIPPUS AND SENECA

Abstract

This paper will demonstrate the need to pay attention to the conceptual distinctions of Stoic ontology when analyzing arguments proffered by Stoics in defence of their deterministic compatibilism. It is necessary to frame the issues in Stoic terms, at least as a first step before we begin to discuss them in our modern terminology. Such an approach enhances our understanding in that it helps us to see more clearly which problems single Stoics were addressing and to note differences between versions, both those due to errors on the part of the reporting intermediary and those that point to philosophical innovation. The advantages of the approach will be illustrated with readings of Cic., *fat.* 20 and 26 (Chrysippus' proof of causal determinism by the principle of bivalence) and Stoic replies to the Lazy Argument in Eus., *P.E.* 6.8.25-38; Cic., *fat.* 28-30 and Sen., *nat.* 2.37-38.

Keywords: Bivalence of Future Statements, Cause, Effect, Fate, Kinesis, Lazy Argument.

There are many approaches to the riddle of Stoic determinism.¹ In this paper I wish to take one of the minor and less frequently trodden paths and argue that it is necessary 1) to spell out problems in Stoic terms first of all and 2) to take heed of Stoic ontological distinctions. I will demonstrate the usefulness of these two principles in readings of arguments that have not yet been fully understood precisely because the method I wish to advocate was not applied. The discussion will focus on Chrysippus' argument that the principle of bivalence implies full causal determinism and *vice versa*, and on Stoic replies to the Lazy Argument, one given by Chrysippus (and transmitted in works of Cicero and Eusebius) and another that we read in Seneca's *Naturales quaestiones*. The suggested method will enable us to delimit the purpose of the Stoic arguments, in particular which questions and objections they do *not* an-

¹ Earlier literature is thoroughly recorded in Schallenberg 2008. Recent publications not yet taken account of there include Wiener 2006; Maso 2007; Fischer 2008; Mikeš 2008; Mayet 2010; Koch 2011; Willms 2011; Gourinat 2012; Williams 2012, 295-334; Beckeld 2013.

swer. We will also arrive at a much closer fit between logical and physical conceptions. This will be a safeguard against equivocations suggested by the homonymous Latin term *fatum* both for Fate and that which is fated. Finally, we will be able to identify more precisely the degree and nature of variation or progress between the times of Cicero and Seneca.

1. Basic tenets and ontological distinctions

Before I can begin my readings, I must clarify a few basic tenets.²

Firstly: Stoics agree that Fate – Latin *Fatum* and Greek Εἰμαρμένη – is identical with the active principle God (θεός; τὸ ποιοῦν; ἀρχή) insofar as all its activity happens by way of a nexus of causes (εἰρμὸς αἰτιῶν) in such a manner that all its activity is causally determined. God is a self-mover and the only active principle in the cosmos. As such he is Αἰτία, the single ultimate cause of all. Causal determinism, at this level, describes a certain manner in which God organizes his own activity, both his overall activity as soul and mind of the cosmos and the activities of each part-body that God permeates, having created it out of himself and matter. Saying that God is Fate is equivalent to saying that for every state and motion or change (both: κίνησις) there is a cause and that the effects caused are fully determined in such a way that *ceteris paribus*, whenever a cause is active, it only has the effect it is actually having and, under these particular circumstances, could not have an effect different from the one it is having.³

Second: since God is a body,⁴ Fate too is a body.

Third: causes are bodies as well. Being a body is a necessary condition both for being a cause and for being the suffering recipient of causal activity. This is so because causation happens through touch, and only bodies can touch or be touched. Effects, on the other hand, are not bodies, and accordingly bodies themselves are not caused. Rather, Stoics distinguish the ‘cause’ (αἴτιον), a body, which is also called δι’ ὃ,⁵ and the effect, ‘that of which [a cause] is the cause’ (ὃ ἔστιν αἴτιον). This effect is an incorporeal predicate, a κατηγορημα which obtains or ‘belongs’ (ὑπάρχει) to the body suffering the effect. What suffers the effect is also a body, which can be the same as the body causing the effect. It seems that a term for the suffering body was ‘that for which [a cause] is the cause’ (ὃ ἔστιν αἴτιον).

² Documentation of the evidence and a digest of secondary literature is provided in Wildberger 2006. Unless indicated otherwise, this account reports what is more or less consensus in current scholarship.

³ More precise formulations of this causal principle as a special case of the general principle that nothing happens without a cause are proposed by Bobzien 1998, 43 (Chrysippus) and 373 (Philopator).

⁴ This is still a moot point, although a majority of scholars now tend toward regarding God as a body in the full sense instead of just something corporeal or an aspect of a body. There is also disagreement about the exact meaning of the term ‘body’ (σῶμα). See Wildberger 2006, 5-7 with notes and, for a more recent discussion, Gourinat 2009.

⁵ See also below, n. 16.

Fourth: it cannot be overstressed that, *qua* predicates, effects are sayables (λεκτά), just like the predicates that occur in the meaning (σημαινόμενον) of an utterance and as part of a statement (ἄξιωμα). Predicates are also that which we bring about with our actions as the intended effects at which our impulses are directed in a «rushing of the soul toward something in action» (φορά ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι ἐν τῷ πράττειν).⁶

For, finally, we must be clear about what terms used in modern discussions of Stoic determinism, such as ‘event’, ‘occurrence’ or ‘motion’ could mean in the Stoic system. An ‘event’, for example, could be the effect, *i.e.* the incorporeal predicate (as, *e.g.*, ‘to be wise’ in the account of Zeno’s definition of cause).⁷ If we take events to be a species of facts, they could be the equally incorporeal true statements (ἄξιωματα) that correspond to an effect such as the statement «This man is wise», which belongs to the body for whom wisdom is the cause of being wise and also subsist at the utterance or thought meaning and expressing that fact. On the other hand, what we call an ‘event’ could also be identified with what a Stoic calls κίνησις, or with a state (of which Stoics distinguish three types: διάθεσις, ἔξις, and σχέσις). This kind of ‘event’ would be a body, *i.e.* that for which some cause is a cause of its moving and changing or being in a certain state. Ricardo Salles underscores that «[...] events, as construed in modern event theory, are for the Stoics bodily states» (2005b, 99), to which I would add that motions are not just bodily, but bodies *tout court*, namely the body that is thus in motion.⁸ This is why an honorable action, for example, can be regarded as a good even though goods are bodies – which they must be since goods are defined as something that benefits, *i.e.* something which causes for other bodies the effect of being benefited.

2. Chrysippus’ proof for causal determinism by the principle of bivalence

The use of bearing in mind these essential tenets becomes immediately apparent when we consider an argument in which Chrysippus famously connected fate to the principle of bivalence:⁹

Concludit enim Chrysippus hoc modo:

[1] “*Si est motus sine causa, non omnis enuntiatio, quod ἄξιωμα dialectici appellant, aut uera aut falsa erit;*

[2] *causas enim efficientis quod non habebit, id nec uerum nec falsum erit;*

[3] *omnis autem enuntiatio aut uera aut falsa est;*

[4] *motus ergo sine causa nullus est.*

[5] *Quod si ita est, omnia quae fiunt causis fiunt antegressis;*

⁶ Stobaeus 2.7.9, p. 86-87 Wachsmuth and 9b, p. 88 Wachsmuth.

⁷ Stobaeus 1.13.1c, p. 139-40 Wachsmuth (Ar. Did., *frg.* 18).

⁸ This is a moot point. Further evidence is presented in Wildberger 2006, 595 n. 445 and 163-70.

⁹ Cic., *fat.* 20. The English translation is that of Bob Sharples (1991) with minor changes to make it even more literal and align the terminology with the usage in this paper.

- [6] *id si ita est, fato omnia fiunt;*
 [7] *efficitur igitur fato fieri quaecumque fiant.*"

Chrysippus argues to his conclusion as follows:

- [1] "If there is movement without a cause, not every statement (what the dialecticians call an *axiōma*) will be either true or false.
 [2] For that which does not have any causes that bring it about will be neither true nor false.
 [3] But every statement is either true or false;
 [4] so there is no movement without a cause.
 [5] But if this is so, all the things that come about do so through antecedent causes;
 [6] and if this is so, all things come about through fate.
 [7] So it is brought about that whatever things come about do so through fate."

Formal analyses of the argument have been proposed in recent years,¹⁰ and so I need not go into details here. Let me just quickly summarize that Chrysippus introduces complete causal determinism as a necessary condition of the principle of bivalence [1] and – assuming the truth of the principle of bivalence [3] – concludes by *modus tollendo tollens* that there must be complete causal determinism, *i.e.* that there is «no motion without cause» [4]. There follow two enthymemes, the first of which singles out a subclass of causes and concludes in *modus ponens* that «everything happens by antecedent cause» (this statement is the implied conclusion of [4] and [5]). With the second, again by *modus ponens*, Chrysippus concludes that everything happens by fate ([7], following from the implied conclusion of [4] and [5] and from [6]).

The real problem with the argument is the truth of its premises [1], [5] and [6]. In this paper I will only address premise [1] and the explanation that is supplied for it in statement [2]. This explanation has baffled modern readers, even to the degree that they wondered whether it might not be spurious.¹¹ Susanne Bobzien (1998, 63-64), who regards it as Chrysippean, translates it thus:

- (2) For that which will have no causes that bring it about, (that) will be neither true nor false.

This she interprets as follows: «Logically, 'that which' must refer to a class of things that at least encompasses motions, and the context, *i.e.* (1), suggests that it is restricted to motions. Taking the future tense in (2) to indicate counter factuality, we then can understand the sentence as

- (2') If a motion had no causes, it would be neither true nor false.»

¹⁰ To name but a few: Bobzien 1998, 61; Sharples 2007, 59 n. 21; Schallenberg 2008, 169-72.

¹¹ Duhot 1989, 196-97; Sharples 1991, 147.

Bobzien realizes, of course, that a motion cannot be either true or false. Accordingly, she assumes that there is a «blurring» of the «distinction» between physics and logic, and suggests to take sentence (2') «as brachylogy for something like:

- (2'') If a motion had no causes, a proposition correlated to that motion would be neither true nor false.»

Bobzien then looks for something that could constitute a link between a motion and a true proposition and finds it in the fact that their occurrence is related to the occurrence of what she calls 'actualized predicates', *i.e.* predicates that 'belong' (ὀπάρχει). According to Bobzien, a «motion is the actualization of a predicate at a corporeal object during a time t_m to t_n » (64), while according to the Stoic definition of ἀξίωμα, a statement is true if it 'belongs' (ὀπάρχει), or in Bobzien's terms, is 'actualized'. This is the case when the predicate in it 'belongs' to the body of which the statement predicates it.

The problems with Bobzien's solution, which is on the whole the best I am aware of, are two. First, it is based on a *wrong* definition of motion. Motion, κίνησις, is a body insofar as it moves (see above, 105), not any immaterial actualization. In fact, it is the body to which the 'actualized' predicate belongs. Second, Bobzien's solution presupposes sloppy reasoning on the part of Chrysippus, an assumption that should be made only as a last resort.

Ricardo Salles (2005a, 7-8) regards premise [1] as a claim for which no argument is supplied. His interpretation is belabored by the same uncertainty as to what exactly Chrysippus is talking about. Bobzien thinks it is a motion (in her sense of the word); Salles uses the term 'event' and assumes that the true or false statements ('propositions' in his terminology) are statements about the occurrence of an event. He suggests the following interpretation of premise [2] in Chrysippus' argument:

- [...] for any proposition asserting the occurrence of an event, its falsity requires the non-occurrence of the event. So given that the event does occur, the proposition cannot be false. [...] As for the claim that the proposition cannot be already true, one possible reason would be: (T'') For any event S that occurs at some future time t , the proposition *S occurs at t* cannot be true now, unless there is a cause now (that is, a causal chain stretching from the present to the future time t) for S's occurring at t .

Another piece to the jigsaw puzzle is provided by Karin Mayet (2010, 172-73). She realizes that the clue to the enigmatic premise lies in the Stoic conception of a cause and explains that just as a predicate is due to the activity of causes (*Ursachen*), since it obtains as an effect the cause has on the body, thus a true statement must have a reason (*Grund*) for it to be true. Here again a modern reader conceptualizes Stoic ideas with anachronistic terminology, without clarifying how it could correspond to the Stoic system. Later, Mayet comes even closer to the correct solution when saying that «eine Aussage besitzt nur dann einen Wahrheitswert, wenn sie die Wirkung einer vorhergegangenen Ursache darstellt» (179). In fact, statements are

true only when they *are* effects of causes, but there is no need for those causes to be antecedent. Quite on the contrary, the cause of a true statement must be contemporaneous to the time at which the statement is truly asserted. For the statement to be true, the predicated effect must obtain at the same time as the statement predicating that effect of the body to which both the effect and the true statement belong.

The correct solution, I think, will become accessible after we have performed a necessary step of transformation omitted by the authors quoted so far (or at least performed incompletely). We must re-translate what Cicero has adapted into his own language and world view both into Greek and into Stoic terminology. Assuming that *motus* is κίνησις, and also assuming that Chrysippus is talking about statements (ἀξιώματα) and causes (αἰτία), we get something like the following:¹²

- [1] Εἰ ἔστι τις ἀναίτιος κίνησις, οὐ πᾶν ἀξιωμα ἔσται ἢτοι ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος
 [2] οὗ γὰρ αἰτία αὐτοτελεῆ οὐκ ἂν ἦ, ἐκεῖνο οὐτ' ἀληθές ἔσται οὐτε ψεῦδος
 [3] ἔστι δὲ πᾶν ἀξιωμα ἢτοι ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος
 [4] οὐκ ἄρ' ἔστι κίνησις ἀναίτιος.

- [1] If there is some cause-less movement, not every statement will be either true or false.
 [2] For that of which there are no efficient causes, will be neither true nor false.
 [3] But every statement is either true or false;
 [4] so there is no cause-less movement.

The protasis of statement [1] refers to a hypothetical motion, *i.e.* a body that is moving, for which there would be no cause (for it to be moving). The phrase κίνησις ἀναίτιος comes closest to *motus sine causa*. Cicero did not have an adjective 'cause-less' in Latin, but *sine* mirrors the alpha privativum even against the Latin preference for modifying nouns with attributes rather than adverbial expressions. If the original phrase had been ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτιον,¹³ Cicero could have translated it literally as *cui non est causa*.

Statement [2] does not refer to a motion, but to an effect. As I wish to contend, Cicero's *causas ... habet* translates the Stoic term 'of which [a cause] is the cause' (οὗ ἔστιν αἰτιον), which indicates an effect (see above, 104). Cicero seems not to have recognized the technical term. Instead, he took the phrase for a possessive expression (*cuius* or *cui est causa*) and preferred the construction with *habere*. If an effect is caused, it 'belongs' (ὑπάρχει) to the body for which the causes are causes of the effect. True statements also 'belong'. As I have argued elsewhere in more detail, this means that the true statements and their predicates subsist at a specific body (or set of bodies), namely the body or bodies to which direct or indirect reference is made in the statement and of which the belonging predicates are predicated.¹⁴ Now,

¹² The English translation is adapted from the one given above for the Latin version with changes corresponding to the difference in meaning between the original Greek and Cicero's version.

¹³ This was my solution in Wildberger 2006, 324.

¹⁴ Wildberger 2006, 110-11, 172-73.

predicates belong to a body when they are effects of causes acting upon the body in question. Without causes no belonging predicates, and thus also no belonging true statements.

According to this reading, there would remain only one – slight – irregularity in statement [2]: Chrysippus uses the term for the effect of a cause, *i.e.* the belonging predicate, in order to refer to the belonging statement that contains such a predicate. But it may be that Chrysippus actually made such an identification.¹⁵ Unfortunately, the text of Stobaeus is corrupt, but we can still recognize that Chrysippus not only discussed causation itself but also talked about explanation (αἰτία), the discourse giving an account of causation. So it may not be completely absurd to assume that in this context he also made a distinction similar to Aristotle's famous antithesis of knowledge that (*i.e.* knowledge of facts) and knowledge why (*i.e.* knowledge of causes). If this was so, we should probably read the corrupted statement in the report of Chrysippus' conceptions with the particles at the end of each colon inverted, so that Chryippus would be distinguishing between the cause as 'because of what' and the effect as 'that'.¹⁶ In this case, the term 'that of which [a cause] is the cause' (οὗ ἔστιν αἰτιον) would have been used not only to refer to the belonging predicate φ, the effect a cause has on the body for which it is the cause, but also to indicate the corresponding statement «This body φ».

It now also becomes clear why Chrysippus had to state explicitly that the causes are 'sufficient' (αὐτοτελεῆ).¹⁷ If they were not, the predicate would not belong, nor would the corresponding statement. However, it is important to note the plural: one single effect-predicate can have several causes at once. Chrysippus is not talking about only one sufficient cause, nor does he specify the nature of those causes in any way, *e.g.* whether they are antecedent or not, or what and where they are. The only necessary condition for a corresponding statement to be true is that the predicate belongs, *i.e.* that all causes sufficient to bring it about are active at the same time when the statement is being made.

To summarize my reading of premises [1] and [2]: the two statements combine conceptions from two different Stoic theories, the definition of true statements from logic with the definition of cause from physics. If there were changing bodies without causes acting upon them, then there would be no effects belonging to these bodies – since the effects are effects of causes – so that the predicates in statements made about these bodies could not belong and thus could not be true or false.

The lesson to be learned from this partial reconstruction of Chrysippus' argument is the following. Since effects (the predicates belonging to the suffering bodies) are

¹⁵ This identification is also suggested in an unpublished paper by Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 'Les causes sont causes de prédicats'. *Sur un aspect de la théorie stoïcienne de la cause*, Paris 2013.

¹⁶ Reading καὶ αἰτιον μὲν διὰ τί, οὗ δὲ αἰτιον ὅτι («and cause 'because of what', but of which [it is] the cause 'that'») instead of the transmitted text καὶ αἰτιον μὲν ὅτι, οὗ δὲ αἰτιον διὰ τί at Stobaeus 1.13.1c, p. 139, line 2 Wachsmuth. The same source tells us that already Zeno called the cause 'because of which' (ὅτι ὅ). See also Mansfeld 2001 with a detailed discussion of the textual problems.

¹⁷ On this term Bobzien 1999, in particular 219-20; Natali 2009, 25 n. 31.

at the same time also the predicates of statements (or even these statements themselves, if my conjecture concerning the text in Stobaeus is correct), Chrysippus was able to discuss physical problems in logical terms. Having established that there is an activity of sufficient causes whenever effects belong, he may just discuss these effects in a way that we, not expecting logic at this point, may easily mistake for a description of the causal activity itself.

Similarly, when interpreting the argument in Cic., *fat.* 26, there is no need to speculate about specific processes of causation.¹⁸

"Quia [8] futura uera" inquit "non possunt esse ea, quae causas cur futura sint non habent;

[9] habeant igitur causas necesse est ea quae uera sunt;

[10] ita, cum euenerint, fato euenerint."

"Since," says he, [8] "those things cannot be true in the future that do not have causes because of which they will be;

[9] so those things that are true necessarily have causes:

[10] and thus when they have come about, they will have done so through fate."

At least in statements [8] and [9], Chrysippus¹⁹ is talking about effects, not about causes. Again, Cicero's text allows us to reconstruct the original Greek version, which must have been something like the following and thus contained only terms (μέλλοντα ἀληθῆ,²⁰ ἃ ἀληθῆ ἐστί) which clearly refer to statements, *i.e.* to sayables and effects, and not to bodies that could be causes.

[8] ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι μέλλοντα ἀληθῆ ὧν αἴτια δι' ἃ ἔσται οὐκ ἐστί·

[9] ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα εἶναι αἴτια ἐκείνων ἃ ἀληθῆ ἐστί.

So we need not follow Suzanne Bobzien (1998, 67) in positing a future motion *m* to which a statement *p* is correlated and present causes responsible for *m*, such that *p* is true in the present. What we need are presently active causes that effect a predicate φ-future that is true *now* and now belongs to a body or a set of bodies in the world.

The difference may be illustrated with this example: let *p* be the statement «This one recovers». Then according to Bobzien there is a future motion *m* (the sick person recovering) to which *p* correlates. And there are already now causes present for the

¹⁸ English translation from Sharples 1991 with changes to make it more literal.

¹⁹ According to Sedley 2005, 245, this second version should not be attributed to Chrysippus. But the passage is part of a Carneadean reply to Chrysippus' argument in Cic., *fat.* 20-21, *developing* the Epicurean approach of distinguishing causes that are not part of fate. Compare Koch 2011, 389-92.

²⁰ For μέλλοντα ἀληθῆ and the omission of the word ἀξίωμα in such contexts compare Arr., *Epict.* 2.19.1 (in an account of the Master Argument): πᾶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθές; Simp., *in Cat.* p. 406-07 Kalbfleisch ὡς γὰρ τὰ περὶ τῶν παρόντων καὶ παρεληλυθότων ἀντικείμενα, οὕτως καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτὰ τε, φασίν, καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ἔσται ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ τὸ οὐκ ἔσται, εἰ δεῖ ἤτοι ψευδῆ ἢ ἀληθῆ εἶναι (ἄρισται γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς τὰ μέλλοντα).

motion *m* that will take place in the future. It is for this reason, according to Bobzien's reading, that the corresponding statement *m* has a truth value already now. According to my reading, on the other hand, there is one statement *p* «This one recovers», but also another one, namely *r* «This one will recover». If *r* is true *now*, then there are causes active *now* which at the sick man *now* have the effect corresponding to the future-predicate 'will recover' in statement *r*. In the terms of the argument reported by Cicero: the future-statement (or future-predicate) is an effect ('that of which [a cause] is the cause'), and already now there are causes because of which this effect 'will recover' belongs to the sick person at the moment when the statement about the sick person's future is made.

Again, Chrysippus very wisely avoids having to clarify which exactly the causes or the suffering bodies may be and only talks about causes active now to effect presently belonging future-predicates. He does not discuss causal chains but presently active causes having an effect, which is at the same time the predicate of a true statement, only that the statement is about the future and therefore has a future-predicate.

3. Chrysippus' reply to the Lazy Argument

The same argumentative strategy can be observed in Chrysippus' reply to the Lazy Argument. The argument itself has been preserved for us by Origen in Greek, and in Latin by Cicero and Seneca.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀργὸς καλούμενος λόγος, σόφισμα ὧν, τοιοῦτός ἐστι λεγόμενος ἐπὶ ὑποθέσεως πρὸς τὸν νοσοῦντα καὶ ὡς σόφισμα ἀποτρέπων αὐτὸν χρῆσθαι τῷ ἱατρῷ πρὸς ὑγίειαν, καὶ ἔχει γε οὕτως ὁ λόγος·

[1] εἰ εἴμαρταί σοι ἀναστήναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου, ἐάν τε εἰσαγάγῃς τὸν ἱατρὸν ἐάν τε μὴ εἰσαγάγῃς, ἀναστήσῃ·

[2] ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ εἴμαρταί σοι μὴ ἀναστήναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου, ἐάν τε εἰσαγάγῃς τὸν ἱατρὸν ἐάν τε μὴ εἰσαγάγῃς, οὐκ ἀναστήσῃ·

[3] ἦτοι δὲ εἴμαρταί σοι ἀναστήναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἢ εἴμαρταί σοι μὴ ἀναστήναι·

[4] μάτην ἄρα εἰσάγεις τὸν ἱατρὸν.

But also the so-called Lazy Argument, which is a sophism, is of this kind. It is spoken in hypothetical fashion to some sick man and, sophism that it is, attempts to discourage him to consult a physician for his health. And it runs like this:

[1] if it is fated for you to recover from the disease, you will recover, whether you call in the doctor or do not call [him] in.

[2] But also if it is fated for you not to recover from the disease, you will not recover, whether you call in the doctor or do not call [him] in.

[3] And it is either fated for you to recover from the disease or it is fated for you not to recover.

[4] In vain, therefore, do you call in the doctor.²¹

²¹ Orig., *Cels.* 2.20, lines 62-71 (my translation).

Cicero's version in *fat.* 28-29 is a literal translation of the Greek text attested in Origen, only that Cicero has shortened the third premise, probably because he felt that he had repeated *ex hoc morbo conualescere* already often enough. It would not be the first time that Cicero prioritizes stylistic elegance over precision and clarity of expression. On the other hand, Cicero also presents a second type of the argument in which the result of a person's action is not fated but instead «true since all eternity», and a simplified version of that second type is the basis for Seneca's discussion in the *Naturales quaestiones*.²²

Luckily, Chrysippus' reply is also extant, again in Cicero's *De fato*, and in a Greek version, as part of the criticism leveled against Chrysippus by the Epicurean Diogenianus, which Eusebius quotes in the *Praeparatio evangelica*.²³ The table provides an overview of the two versions.

²² Cic., *fat.* 28-29: [1'] "Si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo conualescere, siue tu medicum adhibueris siue non adhibueris, conualesces; [2'] item, si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo non conualescere, siue tu medicum adhibueris siue non adhibueris, non conualesces; [3'] et alterutrum fatum est; [4'] medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet." Recte genus hoc interrogationis ignauum atque iners nominatum est, quod eadem ratione omnis e uita tolletur actio. Licet etiam immutare, ut fati nomen ne adiungas et eandem tamen teneas sententiam, hoc modo: [1''] "Si ex aeternitate uerum hoc fuit 'Ex isto morbo conualesces', siue adhibueris medicum siue non adhibueris, conualesces; [2''] itemque, si ex aeternitate falsum hoc fuit 'Ex isto morbo conualesces', siue adhibueris medicum siue non adhibueris, non conualesces;" deinde cetera; Sen., *nat.* 2.37.3: [3'''] "Aut futurum" inquit "est aut non. [1'''] Si futurum est, fiet, etiamsi uota non suscipis. [2'''] Si non est futurum, etiamsi susceperis uota, non fiet."

²³ Eus., *P.E.* 6.8.25-38; Cic., *fat.* 30. Diogenianus is most probably not a Peripatetic, as Eusebius writes: see Isnardi-Parente 1990 and Hammerstaedt 1993.

Fated (*καθειμαρμένον, <i>fatum</i>)		
[not "out of us"]	"out of us" (26 ἐξ ἡμῶν)	
fated simply	fated not simply, but together with our also wanting and doing ...
27, 35 ἀπλῶς καθειμαρτο	27, 29 οὐχ ἀπλῶς καθειμαρτο,	... καὶ ἡμᾶς βούλεσθαι [καὶ
30 simplex res	ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ...	πράττειν] τι
30 copulata res et confatalis *συνκαθειμαρμένα (compare 26 συγκαθειμαρθαι)		
Examples		
A human being will die. Cicero: Socrates will die on that day.	A coat will not get lost.	The owner of the coat will guard the coat.
A human being will be susceptible to pain.	A man will escape the enemy.	The man flees from the enemy.
	A child will be born. Cicero/Orig., <i>Cels.</i> 2.20: Oedipus will be born to Laius.	The parent <i>wants</i> to have intercourse with a woman. Cicero: Laius will have intercourse with Iocasta; Orig., <i>Cels.</i> 2.20: has intercourse.
	Hegesarchus will come off the fight without suffering a single blow. Cicero: Milo will fight at the Olympic games.	Hegesarchus will have his guard up. Cicero: Milo will have an adversary.

Latin quotes from Cic., *fat.* 30; Greek quotes and examples, unless indicated otherwise, from Eus., *P.E.* 6.8.25-38.

Again, modern discussions have been belabored by fruitless attempts to reconstruct the exact causal relation that scholars thought Chrysippus must be describing. And in fact, the Lazy Argument in the form quoted above invites such a reading, insofar it draws an inference from assertions about a fated and future state of affairs *p* to an evaluation of a human action ϕ as happening 'in vain' (μάτην/*nihil attinet*). Unless one reads this expression in the tautological sense that the performance of ϕ is irrelevant for the occurrence, or truth, of *p*,²⁴ the argument is invalid. It confuses behavior with deliberate action. In the premises, ϕ could be any activity that may or may not have a result, irrespective of whether that result is intended or not.²⁵ Inten-

²⁴ Compare Bobzien's reconstruction of a valid version of the argument (1998, 185-86), according to which the last premise is synonymous to «Therefore, with regard to *p*, it is futile to ϕ »; similarly also, e.g., Schallenberg 2008, 199.

²⁵ This is true even in a formulation of the premises that retains the second person, i.e. the idea that it is a particular individual human being that would be ϕ -ing, as suggested in Bobzien 1998, 187 and

tional action is introduced only in the conclusion with the word μάτην, which is derived from a noun referring to folly and used to describe either fruitless or unreasonable behavior of persons.²⁶ In addition, the argument implies a hidden premise that the agent's sole motivation for φ-ing is a desire to bring about *p*, and a Stoic might not have subscribed to such an extreme consequentialist attitude.

It is therefore remarkable that Chrysippus seems not to have contested the validity of the argument. In fact, he *heals* the defect I have just outlined and expressly clarifies that it is not just φ-ing that is at issue but our wanting to φ.²⁷ Instead he contests the truth of the premises [1] and [2], or more precisely the truth of the generalized premises

[1^g] If it is fated for you to ψ, then you will ψ, whether you φ or whether you do not φ.

[2^g] If it is fated for you not to ψ, then you will not ψ, whether you φ or whether you do not φ.

Instead, he argues that there are cases in which it is fated that you (or another person) both φ and ψ, and in such a case the generalized statements [1^g] and [2^g] would be inconsistent and therefore false.

According to information provided by Diogenianus in his critique of Chrysippus' refutation,²⁸ Chrysippus discussed the Lazy Argument in the second book of his treatise *On fate*, in a context in which he tried to prove the compatibility of fate with responsible human action. This might induce us to expect some argument for the possibility of human agency. However, we should not confuse the overall context with the purpose of this particular part of the discussion, which even Diogenianus himself describes as an attempt to address the apparently paradoxical consequences of determinism.²⁹ The Lazy Argument proposes such a paradox, and Chrysippus shows that it is not sound: at least this paradox does not exist.

Chrysippus refutes a specific argument, and explains neither the nature of human responsibility nor which kind of causal interaction might take place when humans act. Instead, he contests the truth of two premises. Susanne Bobzien notices this (1998, 181) but does not fully take it to heart when she asserts that Chrysippus assumes «that relations of (causally relevant) necessary condition hold between actions and outcomes» (232). Rather, as already John M. Rist argued and later, independently of each other, Michele Alessandrelli and I,³⁰ Chrysippus discusses the argument at

226: «If it is fated that *p*, then, whether or not you φ, *p*.» For example, the variable φ could stand for 'encounter a doctor'.

²⁶ See *LSJ* s.v. and, for example, Salles's translation «there is no point in ...» (2005a, 11).

²⁷ Donini 1979, 216, and Beckeld 2013, 114, note Chrysippus' insistence on this point. Brennan 2005, 270-87, accuses Chrysippus of unfairly ignoring the argument's concern with deliberation. However, deliberation as conceptualized by Brennan himself (see his recasting of the Lazy Argument on 284) cannot fit into a determinist world view in which nothing is left unfated, and thus begs the question.

²⁸ At *Eus.*, *P.E.* 6.8.25.

²⁹ *Eus.*, *P.E.* 6.8.25: λύειν πειράται τὰ ἀκολουθεῖν δοκοῦντα ἄτοπα τῷ λόγῳ.

³⁰ Rist 1969, 120; Alessandrelli 2007; Wildberger 2006, 328-31.

the level of statements and in logical terms. However, unlike Alessandrelli, I would further argue that this is a serious and relevant refutation and not just a light-handed counter to what Chrysippus perceived as a sophism. For Chrysippus logical terms are at the same time physical terms, since true statements are effects which causes have on bodies. This means that when he clarifies the logical form of what is fated, Chrysippus explains an important fact about the physical world.

For this purpose, Chrysippus introduces συγκαθειμαρμένα ('what is fated together'),³¹ a special class of 'what is fated', which are at the same time a certain type of statements. Whereas the Lazy Argument assumes that what is fated is fated in a simple form, Chrysippus asserts that what is fated are not always 'simple statements' (ἀξιώματα ἀπλᾶ), the equivalent to modern 'atomic propositions'.³² Even if the authors of our sources probably no longer understood the difference, they preserve traces of the terminology: *simplicia* in *De fato* and ἀπλῶς καθειμαρται ('fated simply') in the excerpt from Diogenianus.

Chrysippus asserts that not all that is fated is a simple statement. Some of the fated statements are statements like, e.g., «This human being will die». Sooner or later, all humans die, whatever they might do or not do to prevent it.³³ Much of what is fated, however, is fated in form of *complex* statements, or οὐχ ἀπλᾶ in the technical terminology of Stoic logic.³⁴ Premises of types [1^g] and [2^g] in the Lazy Argument are therefore not true in all cases. A statement included in the second half of these complex premises might be fated as well, *together* with the first statement. The statement «You will (eventually) die, whether you call a doctor or not» is true. There is nothing that could prevent the death of a mortal animal; that it dies is fated simply. But statements such as «You will recover» in the Lazy Argument as reported by Origen, are likely to be fated together with other statements such as «You call a doctor» or «A god comes and heals you». For Chrysippus it is not necessary to show that this particular statement is fated together with another one; it suffices to show counterexamples to the general premises [1^g] and [2^g] by demonstrating that there are at least certain cases in which the simple statements «You ψ» and «You φ» are, in fact, fated together in a complex statement.

There are indications in the sources that the complex statements fated in such cases are conjunctions: Diogenianus quotes Chrysippus as saying that one is fated «together with» (μετὰ τοῦ) another.³⁵ Cicero repeats the expression *copulata res*, which could be the Latin equivalent to Greek συμπλεγμένον, and uses the double con-

³¹ *Eus.*, *P.E.* 6.8.26.

³² See on the distinction between simple and non-simple statements Bobzien in Algra *et al.* 1999, 96-97 and 103-05. Arguing mostly on the basis of Cicero's version, Alessandrelli 2007, 93, contrasts *simplex* (ἀπλοῦν) with *copulatum* (συμπλεγμένον), but the latter is only a species of non-simple statements.

³³ *Eus.*, *P.E.* 6.8.35. At *fat.* 30, Cicero also uses the word *res*, which might translate the Greek πράγμα, which was used by Stoics as a term for sayables.

³⁴ *Eus.*, *P.E.* 6.8.27: οὐχ ἀπλῶς καθειμαρτο.

³⁵ *Eus.*, *P.E.* 6.8.27 and 29.

junction «both ... and» (*et ... et*).³⁶ In general, Chrysippus tended to construct arguments with negated conjunctions and, according to Cicero, wanted mantic predictions to be expressed in negated conjunctions to avoid the assertion of a μάχη or 'conflict', which is part of the definitory features of a Stoic συνημμένον or implication.³⁷ Framing what is fated non-simply as conjunctions would also be the most neutral way to indicate a connection between two statements without committing oneself to any detailed physical theory how that connection comes about. Finally, fate itself is sometimes described as ἐπιπλοκή and at least once also as συμπλοκή in the extant sources on Stoic determinism.³⁸ Thus Chrysippus – very wisely and economically – again refuses to discuss causes and causation itself, talking only about the effects of whatever causes may be at work in the most non-committal manner possible in Stoic logic terminology.

Cicero did not understand this strategy and therefore provides us with an unsatisfactory account in which condensation combined with adaptation for a Latin readership lead to sometimes nonsensical results. For example, he seems to have substituted the more prominent Milo for Hegesarchus, whom his Roman readers would not have known. When adapting the sample statement to the other athlete, Cicero no longer refers to any action or volition on Milo's part. That Milo has an adversary is, indeed, co-fated with his fighting at the Olympics. However, Chrysippus selects co-fated statements that include a statement about human action. This is so because he wishes to show that there are fated statements that are, as he calls it, 'out of us' (ἐξ ἡμῶν).³⁹

Even worse is the distortion that has happened with the only example that Cicero gives for a fated simple statement, namely that Socrates will die on a certain day.⁴⁰ That Socrates, *qua* human being, will eventually die some day is fated simply, but that he dies on a certain day may very well depend of his own or someone else's actions. The error probably came about because Cicero made a point of referring only to famous individuals (Socrates, Laius, and Milo), whereas Diogenianus' account shows that Chrysippus himself must have combined references by name with anonymous illustrations. Having before him an example according to which humans in general will die, Cicero probably decided to make that assertion more specific, and so first introduced an individual, Socrates, and then, mistakenly, thought that he might make the example just a little bit more specific by speaking of a certain day of death.

³⁶ Cic., *fat.* 30: *et concubitorium [...] Laium et [...] procreaturum*; Alessandrelli 2007, 93.

³⁷ Cic., *fat.* 15; Bobzien 1998, 156-79.

³⁸ Compare also Brunschwig 1978a (1994) on the importance of conjunctions for the Stoic world view.

³⁹ See also above 114. Donini 1979, 215-16, regards this as a case of deliberate distortion to suppress the idea that even human volition is fated. Alessandrelli 2007, 99, assumes that Cicero changed the example in order to demonstrate the sophistic nature of the Lazy Argument by «smascherarne la sostanziale estraneità al problema della confatalità» since it reduces the problem to a matter of logical form.

⁴⁰ Noted in Sharples 1991, *ad loc.* Sedley 1993 tries to save the example.

4. The ambiguity of 'fatum'

Another lesson to be learned from our analyses so far is the ambiguity of the word *fatum*, which we always must keep in mind when working with our Latin sources. Sometimes the word is used as a noun. As such it is identical with God. *Fatum* in this sense is a name of God in a specific function. But *fatum* or *fata* also occur as part of a verb phrase, e.g. when Cicero says at *fat.* 30: *At si ita fatum sit* («But if it is fated in this way»). In such a context, it is not difficult to distinguish the two uses. However, there are a host of Latin passages, where it requires much more careful attention not to confuse the name *Fatum*, which is sometimes also used in the plural, just as *deus* and *dei* tend to be used interchangeably, and the participle *fatum*.

The distinction is important because it has ontological implications. God-*Fatum* is a body and a cause; *fatum* in the sense of what is fated, is an effect and statement, and as such an incorporeal sayable. It is only in the latter sense that an identification of *fatum* ('something fated') and *uerum* ('something true', i.e. a true statement) is possible. One might wonder, for example, what is to be changed by vows, when Seneca, presenting a version of the dilemma raised by the Lazy Argument, discusses the question whether *fata* are changeable by religious rites or not (*Sen., nat.* 2.35.1). Assuming the voice of a stark determinist, Seneca describes *Fatum* (also called *Fata*) thus:⁴¹

Fata aliter ius suum peragunt nec ulla commouentur prece. Non misericordia flect<i>, non gratia sciunt. Cursum irreuocabilem ing<ress>a ex destinato fluunt.

The Fates pursue their rights in a quite different manner: they are not moved by any prayers; they cannot be swayed by pity, or by favoritism; they have started an irreversible course and surge ahead according to plan.

In *nat.* 2.36 he reports a definition of *Fatum* as «a necessity governing all events and all actions, which no force can disrupt». Analogies used in that passage are a torrent and the mind of a sage. Clearly, Seneca is talking of bodies and active causes. *Fatum* and *Fata* in this section are thus nouns referring to God, and apart from the fact that Seneca also uses the plural form, the description conforms to orthodox Stoicism. Nor does Seneca himself reject the definition, but explicitly says that the Stoic compatibilism he wishes to present does not imply «any infringement of the power and influence of Fate» (*nat.* 2.37.1). It is therefore not true that Seneca gives us «two opposing standpoints» as Gareth Williams insists (2012, 319), at least not in the sense that we would be dealing with two different philosophical positions. Rather, we get two opposing viewpoints or aspects of the same theory. Seneca's stark determinist looks at *Fatum* (the noun, God); the compatibilist talks in terms of *fatum*, the verb form, i.e. he discusses the statements which are fated.

⁴¹ *Sen., nat.* 2.35.2. Unless indicated otherwise, translations of the *Naturales quaestiones* are those of Hine 2010.

Thus also in *nat.* 2.34.2-4, the passage that gives rise to the question posed at *nat.* 2.35.1. Here, the word *fatum* stands for 'what is fated'. Seneca distinguishes corporeal signs and that which they portend, *i.e.* the incorporeal true statements that are fated. When Etruscans say that a lightning-bolt can undo another, weaker sign, they err, says Seneca,

because nothing is more true than *what is true*. If birds have sung *a future thing*, this auspice cannot be invalidated by a lightning-bolt; otherwise it was not *a future thing* that they sang about. For I am not now comparing a bird and a lightning-bolt, but two signs of *what is true*, which, if they indicate *what is true*, are of equal standing. [...] It makes no difference which thing has the grander appearance or the more powerful nature; if they both give indications of *what is true*, in this respect they are of equal standing. If you should say that flame is more powerful than smoke, you will not be mistaken; but as indications of fire, flame and smoke are equally significant. [...] If they are saying, "Although one of them had predicted what is true, the strike of the lightning-bolt did away with the previous signs and won acceptance for itself," that is false. Why? Because it does not matter how many auspices there are: there is only one *thing fated*, and if that is properly understood from the first auspice, it is not annulled by the second.

Here I had to change Harry Hine's otherwise excellent translation to bring out the terminological use of *uerum* ('what is true') and *futurum* ('a future thing'). These expressions, which are marked by italics, all refer to statements. These statements are the incorporeal things signified (σημαίνόμενα) by the corporeal signs, just as signified sayables subsist at meaningful utterances or thought (both: λόγος) and thus also at the mind that is the bearer of such thoughts – or also at God in his function as the divine Account (Λόγος). Similarly, what is fated (*fata*) subsists at God in his function as Fate. Lightning and other such signs are bodies, but the fated sayables they portend are incorporeal.

We will not be able to make head or tail of Seneca's discussion of divination and expiation, if we do not take account of these two different ontological categories. For example, in a recent discussion of the passage (Williams 2012, 313), we read that it illustrates a unified cosmic viewpoint in contrast to the local, particularizing approach of Etruscan seers. I do not find fault with this thesis in general, but only with the way in which Williams adduces *nat.* 2.34 to substantiate it. He writes:

For Seneca, by contrast, the truth is *simplex*, a oneness without gradations ("nothing is truer than truth," 2.34.2), just as fate is single (*fatum unum est*, 2.34.3) [...].

In fact, Seneca only asserts that one true statement is not truer than another true statement and then clarifies that it was just one thing that was truly predicted, that the debate is about one single future-statement that is either true or false. The passage is just a piece of evidence for Seneca's adherence to the Stoic tenet that the principle of bivalence pertains to future-statements as well.

However, Seneca continues his discussion in a manner which is confusing to the degree that one could accuse him of an equivocation. For he says at 34.4:

[...] *non refert an aliud sit per quod quid[em] quaerimus, quoniam de quo quaeritur idem est. Fatum fulmine mutari non potest. Quidni? Nam fulmen ipsum fati pars est.*

[...] it does not matter if we are searching for something by a different means, because what we are searching for is the same. Fate/What is fated cannot be altered by a lightning-bolt. Of course not, for the lightning-bolt is itself a part of Fate/what is fated.

Either we assume that Seneca uses *fulmen* in the last sentence as shorthand for a statement like *hoc fulmen fieri*, so that we would have to read 'what is fated' in both instances, or he now moves on to discuss Fate itself, of which all existing bodies and causes are, indeed, a part since all individual bodies are parts of God.

5. Seneca's refutation of the Lazy Argument

In his refutation of the Lazy Argument at *nat.* 2.37-8, Seneca again refers to what is fated, the incorporeal statements, and not to Fate, the body, when he says that «this too is comprised in what is fated.»⁴² I have published a fuller discussion of this refutation elsewhere;⁴³ here I only wish to close my paper with two final points.

First, it is important to bear in mind that Seneca presents a refutation that is logically different from the one attested for Chrysippus. This becomes apparent in a tabular presentation of the text. The left two columns here are the counterpart to the right two columns in the table visualizing Chrysippus' refutation (113). Seneca does *not* make a formal distinction between what is fated simply or not, *i.e.* between simple and non-simple statements. Without calling them 'non-simple', he exclusively discusses non-simple cases as something fated with an «exception clause.»⁴⁴

⁴² Sen., *nat.* 2.38.1: *hoc quoque fato esse comprehensum*; compare also 38.2: *eodem fato continetur*; 38.2: *hoc quoque in fato est*; probably also in 38.2: *in illo fati ordine quo patrimonium illi grande promittitur, hoc quoque protinus adfatum est* [...].

⁴³ Wildberger 2006, 333-36.

⁴⁴ Sen., *nat.* 37.3: *exceptio*.

Fated		True	
<i>Fatum est</i> It is fated.	<i>Hoc quoque affatum est ut q.</i> This too is fated with it that q.	<i>Ideo: q</i> Therefore: q	[sc. p]
<i>Futurum est, sed si uota fiunt.</i> It will happen, but only if vows are undertaken.	<i>... ut fiant uota.</i> ... that vows are undertaken.	<i>Fient uota.</i> Vows will be undertaken.	[<i>Futurum est.</i>] It will happen.
<i>Hic disertus erit, sed si litteras didicerit.</i> This man will be eloquent, but only if he learns to read.	<i>... ut litteras discat.</i> ... that he learns to read.	<i>Docendus est.</i> He must be taught.	[<i>Disertus erit.</i>] He will be eloquent.
<i>Hic diues erit, sed si nauigauerit.</i> This man will be wealthy, but only if he goes to sea.	<i>... ut nauiget.</i> ... that he goes to sea.	<i>Nauigabit.</i> He will go to sea.	[<i>Diues erit.</i>] He will be rich.
<i>Effugiet pericula, si expiauerit praedicatas diuinitus minas.</i> Someone will escape the dangers if he expiates the divinely predicted threats.	<i>... ut expiet.</i> ... that he expiates.	<i>Expiat.</i> He will expiate.	[<i>Effugiet pericula.</i>] He will escape.

The exception is expressed with the conjunctions *sed si*: «It is fated that p, but only if q.» Logically this amounts to a bi-conditional and not just a simple implication.⁴⁵ A bi-conditional is a form that does not occur among the classical junctors of Stoic propositional logic, but it could, of course, be translated into such terms, as a conjunction of two implications. Furthermore, according to Chrysippus, what is co-fated is only one single, albeit non-simple statement. Seneca, on the other hand, introduces a complex fated statement plus another simple statement, which he calls 'ad-fated' (*affatum* = *προσεμαρμένον).⁴⁶ Finally, if a conjunction is true, then its component statements are also true. However, if a bi-conditional or an implication are true, it does not follow that any of their component statements are true as well. This is why, together with the bi-conditional, there must be another fated statement in Seneca. And this also explains why Seneca explicitly addresses the truth of this

⁴⁵ In this respect Seneca's solution differs from the distinction reported by Servius on Verg., *Aen.* 4.696, according to which there are *fata denuntiativa* (similar to Chrysippus' simply fated statements) and *fata condicionalia*, such as «If Pompeius reaches the shore of Egypt after the Pharsalian war, he will die». Here we have a simple conditional, not a bi-conditional. It should be noted however, that Seneca sometimes treats conditionals as if they were bi-conditionals (Wildberger 2006, 143-44).

⁴⁶ Hine 2010 translates *protinus adfatum* at 38.2 with «necessarily included».

second simple statement, the truth of which is the necessary condition for that which is fated with an exception to come true as well.

My second and last point is yet another reason why Seneca needs to state explicitly that the exception will be true. For it is remarkable that what is 'ad-fated' is not expressed as a statement. Instead we encounter directives, a gerundive, and purpose clauses to express indirect orders. Similarly, at the end of the passage, Seneca talks of a law, a *lex fati*, and thus resumes the legal imagery introduced with the reference to an exception clause at the beginning of his reply. This is a reference to God as Law, while the ad-fated directives in Seneca's argument exemplify the content of legal prescriptions made by God as Law. As Law, God is the account «that prescribes what is to be done and prohibits what is not to be done».⁴⁷ Since humans do what God prescribes in this function, the question of what is *iuris nostri*, what our legal rights are, and what it is that is in our power (ἐφ' ἡμῶν) thus surfaces again in a more precise and therefore aggravated form.

As Pier Luigi Donini has observed, already Chrysippus underscores the fact that what is fated pertains to human volition (see above, n. 27). And Diogenianus also tells us that Chrysippus regarded this volition as fated «by the management of the whole».⁴⁸ Yet Seneca's version goes much further than that. Causal determinism is now set in the context of an extra-human intentionality. Fate is a description and a mechanism of causality, but Law is intentional and prescriptive: it needs to be turned into fact and description by our obeying it. It makes a huge difference whether it is true or causally determined that we will act in a certain manner or whether a divine Law ordains that we *shall* act in a certain manner, and then we actually do it.

Thus we can correct the current standard view, most lately defended by Gareth Williams (2012, 322-23), who in this assessment follows the deservedly authoritative study of Susanne Bobzien when he writes that «Seneca effectively asserts [...] the Chrysippean position on co-fated occurrents. [...] he studiously follows the Chrysippean precedent [...] in dealing only with the *confatalia* question» (323). Seneca presents both a more complex and a more problematic refutation of the Lazy Argument, and this is evidence that the debate about that argument was still alive and susceptible to innovation in his times.

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Stobaeus 2.7.11d, p. 96 Wachsmuth; Clem. Al., *strom.* 1.25.166.5.

⁴⁸ Eus., *P.E.* 6.8.26: τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἡμῶν πολλὰ γίνεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἥττον συγκαθεμιάρθαι καὶ ταῦτα τῆ τῶν ὄλων διοικήσει. Most likely διοικήσει is here a synonym for διοικητῆ and a dative of agent, not a dative object of συγκαθεμιάρθαι, as Donini 1979, 217, and Gourinat 2005 seem to think. Otherwise διοικήσει would have to refer to an incorporeal and thus be a term for some sayable describing the management of the whole.

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