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Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief

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Abstract

I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.

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Notes

  1. There are deviant assertions in which I do not aim to make you think I am sincerely telling the truth. But once Moore-paradoxical, these assertions are pointless for other reasons. See Williams 2007, 110–112.

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Correspondence to John N. Williams.

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Williams, J.N. Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief. Acta Anal 27, 9–12 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0122-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0122-4

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