

**GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND
THE ISSUES OF OUR AGE**

VOLUME I

EDITED BY
KONSTANTINE BOUDOURIS
& MARIA ADAM



ATHENS 2009

ROBERT ZABOROWSKI

FEELING - THOUGHT LINKAGE AND ITS FORMS IN THE ANCIENT AND MODERN TIMES

The word *linkage* has been used in the title to stress strongly the idea of a basic inseparability of feeling and thought one from another. But it is not quite satisfactory. All I can attain by using the word *linkage* is to stick together feeling and thought again, while, as a matter of fact, I would like to emphasize that they form unity that cannot be dichotomized. One needs one word and one concept for both, because, as it seems to me, they constitute one phenomenon. As we will see, I hope, at the very end, this is the Greek way of viewing things – the way I believe to be the right one.

If this remark seems necessary it is because an ordinary and every day approach is to perceive feeling (or emotion) and thought (or reason) as separate, or even quite opposite and conflicting. Moreover, we are accustomed to the term *irrationality*, a concept rather broad but negative in itself. The realm of affectivity is often included into irrationality and understood as negative as well. This was rightly observed for instance by A. Schopenhauer who wrote: (...) *all that which the reason collects under the wide and negative concept of feeling* (...)¹ and: (...) *All possible efforts, excitements, and manifestations of will, all that goes on in the heart of man and that reason includes in the wide, negative concept of feeling* (...)².

It is frequently stated that the dichotomy of affectivity and rationality originates from David Hume who put both of them into opposition. For example according to H. Buczyńska-Garewicz the opposition between reason and feelings as two different and conflicting axiological sources had been sketched by Hume and has remained ongoing until today³. However, it is not quite true. In reality, Hume states that *passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompany'd with some judgment or opinion*⁴. Thereby I infer that if two different psychic functions are to be compared at all, they must be of the same nature. If not, neither the comparison nor parallel are possible because they don't fit.

That is what can be called the principle of Hume and paraphrased as follows: two phenomena can be compared, be in accord or in discord, if and only if their generic nature is the same (and different are their individual natures)⁵. Therefore, we are speaking about conflict between feeling and thought, between reason and affectivity in vain. It is either absurd as they can not be in conflict because of their different natures, or, what we call by the names – feeling and thought – are in fact two similar phenomena or two tendencies of the same generic nature but different only in view of particular, individual features and being on the point of disagreement. Again, two solutions are then possible: either they are two equal, let say, tendencies, of the same level and their conflict results in ambiguity, ambivalence or ambivalence, or they are of different levels, one is stronger and other is weaker⁶. The first point of view is horizontal, the second one vertical. But in both instances we are mistaken, when we call one of forces *feeling* and the other *reason*, especially when we understand by these two names two different, that is different in kind and not only in degree, entities.

The phenomenon in question – *feeling–thought unity* – has an *a-tomic* structure. C. G. Jung used a comparison to a *molecule*: *The elements of psychic life, sensation, ideas, images and feelings, are given to consciousness in the form of certain entities, which if one may risk an analogy to chemistry, can be compared to a molecule.*⁷ I would say: less than a molecule – *an atom* – because it is indivisible in itself. Thus, when we speak about feeling or thought (or will), this is only by virtue of a merely technical description. But these elements, distinguished for such a purpose, are in fact inseparable, not to be removed or extracted. I would reject for this reason the notion of *constituent parthood* used by M. C. Nussbaum: *the cognitive elements as part of what the emotions “is”*⁸. It can be separated so far as this parthood is conceptual but not ontological, because these cognitive or affective elements do not exist by themselves and there are no separate elements in this *feeling–thought* phenomenon. *Feeling* and *thought* understood by and for themselves are only conceptual abstractions or hypostases. And as such they can be used only for a *temporary* description. But actually there is nothing like *pure feeling* or *pure thought*, just as there is no *une montagne sans vallée*⁹. They are a single and indissociable phenomenon *feeling–thought*.

Nowadays we observe a growing interest in the term *emotional intelligence*. This is the concern of several psychologists and journalists¹⁰. Now, in order to produce a first element of the comparison between Ancient and Modern times, let me give only some examples of how recent philosophers deal with this topic. After that I will pass on to my second and final point, that is a presentation of

cient Greek standpoint and the comparison of both. What I am going now to refer to will be presented in reverse chronological order. I would like to underline as well that I will give only few examples of a larger panorama.

In 2001 M. C. Nussbaum wrote: *Emotions, I shall argue, involve judgments about important things (...)*¹¹, and: *(...) I shall argue that emotions always involve thought of an object combined with thought of the object's salience or importance (...)*¹². This is, as she acknowledges, a *modified Stoic view, according to which emotions are forms of evaluative judgment that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person's own control great importance for the person's own flourishing*¹³. We can be sure that she understands emotions as *reasoning or thinking* also because, when she refers to an *adversary view of emotion*, she describes it as a position according to which emotions are *non-reasoning movements, "unthinking energies"*¹⁴. Later on, she speaks about *their aboutness, their intentionality, their basis in beliefs, their connection with evaluation* and she points out that *All this makes them [emotions] look very much like thoughts, after all (...)*¹⁵. She refers to A. Damasio, *Descartes' Error*¹⁶: *According to him emotion/reason distinction is inaccurate and misleading; emotion are form of intelligent awareness*¹⁷.

One year earlier, P. Goldie published his book *The Emotions. A Philosophical Exploration*. Answering the question *what emotions are* Goldie said: *An emotion is complex in that it will typically involve many different elements: it involves episodes of emotional experience, including perception, thoughts, and feelings of various kinds, and bodily changes of various kinds; and involves dispositions, including dispositions to experience further emotional episodes, to have further thoughts and feelings, and to behave in certain ways.*¹⁸ Goldie describes a *conscious person as capable of thought and feelings*¹⁹. His notion contains, among others, thoughts and: *The emotions are intentional. By this I mean that the thoughts and feelings involved in an emotion have a directedness towards an object.*²⁰ And, finally: *feelings towards is thinking of things with feelings (...), or even more precisely: Feelings towards, as it is thinking of things with feeling, is a sort of thinking of.*²¹ One should be reminded that in reality this standpoint had already been represented by Ch. S. Peirce: *Now every emotion is a subject. (...) In short, whenever a man feels, he is thinking of something.*²²

In 1993 Michel Guérin published his essay on *affectivity of thought*²³. He tells a comeback to Plato, Descartes and Kant. He points out that *La pensée est "émue", non pas au sens où elle mélangerait des motifs rationnels avec des émotions provenant de la sensibilité particulière du sujet, mais bien en tant que*

*le réel s'impose à elle, qu'elle s'en affecte (...) Ainsi, la pensée prend sens depuis l'émotion qui l'anime et dont elle tire ses intérêts. (...) Or, l'intérêt, en tant qu'il témoigne d'une réalité qui importe à la raison, s'accompagne à chaque fois d'une émotion.*²⁴

In 1980 Ronald de Sousa took the rationality of emotions as granted. He dealt with three specific issues, (a) *Whether the rationality of emotions is of the cognitive or the strategic kind*, (b) *what are the object(s) of emotions*, (c) *What application can be made to emotion of the principle of minimal rationality*²⁵. De Sousa is interested in *another streak of conceiving emotions*, in opposition to those who consider them as *threats to rationality*²⁶. He sums up: (...) *in terms of the paradigm scenario alone, the emotion (...) is by definition rational*²⁷.

Here I stop my list of examples²⁸. Now we can ask why Nussbaum does speak about *emotions as reasoning* and not about *reason as feeling*, why Damasio does say that *certain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for rationality* and not that *certain aspects of rationality are indispensable for the process of emotion and feeling*, why Guérin refers to *affectivity of thought* and not to *reflexivity of feeling* and why, according to de Sousa, (...) *we speak (...) of "reasonable" emotion*²⁹ or *rationality of emotion(s)* rather than of *emotional reason* or *emotionality of reason*. Is it accidental or deliberate?

This question is relevant because, after all, why opt for this or that solution. Here I can find an illuminating albeit an older example. The book of J. Macmurray, *Reason and Emotion* was published in 1935³⁰ as a collection of a *number of lectures about emotional rationality*³¹. His position is to be confronted with the *intelligence of emotions/emotionality of intelligence* position, especially when Macmurray says: *The field in which emotional reason expresses itself most directly is the field of art. The artist is directly concerned to express his emotional experience of the world. His success depends upon the rationality of his emotions.*³² It is evident that Macmurray passes without any additional qualification from *emotional reason* to *rationality of emotion*. It seems important to know whether Macmurray uses both *emotional reason* and *rational emotion* interchangeably or not³³. To end with, I remind the title of Ribot's book *La logique des sentiments*. This expression has been borrowed from Auguste Comte, *Système de politique positive ou Traité de sociologie, Instituant la Religion de l'Humanité*, t. 2, 1852³⁴. And what about Greeks? Are they advocates of *reasonable emotion* or of *emotional reason*? Neither or, if you prefer, both of them, as I am going to argue now.

One may wonder whether Goldie's step to avoid the over-intellectualization

of emotions doesn't produce an opposite effect – an over-emotionalization of thoughts. And if yes, how to find an equilibrium. It seems to me that ancient Greek point of view does offer a convenient solution. That is why having presented the issue now I pass on to the second part: the answer. In Greek philosophy the feeling–thought linkage can be observed at two levels – analytic, in Greek language and synthetic, as a psychological model among various Greek thinkers. However, in both cases the solution is not the same for all Antiquity. I start with Homer and Presocratics.

The psychology of Homer is broadly discussed and of Presocratics we know only disparate fragments. But almost always, more for Homer, less for the Presocratics, the scholars agree that such words as θυμός, φρόνη, νόος, grasp simultaneously different psychological aspects: feeling, will and thought. This is a well known fact, even for a beginning student of Greek. For this reason Greek terms are difficult to translate because, I would say, of the close connection between what will be perceived in modern languages separately as affectivity and rationality. Concerning Homer the data were collected by several scholars, e. g. by T. Zieliński, *Homeric Psychology* [1922]³⁵. Now let me only remind the *locus classicus* concerning *noos* as *non-intellectual*: *wrath bursts opens the noos in the chest of even very wise people*³⁶ and another one pertaining to *thumos* as *intellectual*: *he [Menelaus] knew in his thumos that his brother was suffering*³⁷.

In the Presocratics a good evidence is to be found in Antiphon the Sophist, one of the latest Presocratics. There is a passage from the Oxyrhynchus papyri where we read: (...) και ἐπὶ τῷ νῶι, ὧν τε δεῖ αὐτόν ἐπιθυμεῖν και ὧν μή. (...) (DK 87 B 44, A 3). It is obvious that here *noos* is the subject of *epithumein* (desire). I add two of rare commentaries. The first one comes from Untersteiner: τῷ νῶι: *il νοῦς in quest'epoca era sentito «come un organo del corpo»*³⁸. In the second Pendrick explains: *The appetitive function (ἐπιθυμεῖν) here ascribed to noā might seem surprising, at least from the standpoint of Platonic and Aristotelian psychology. But already in Homer, the νόος is the locus of emotions such as fear, anger, and joy as well as of intellectual functions. (...) And in ordinary language, the association of desire with νοῦς in the wider sense of "mind" is unproblematic.*³⁹ Very well then. But if so, we can ask what about other philosophers anterior to Antiphon but posterior to Homer. Parmenides for example? Do his *noos* and his *noein* grasp the *unproblematic* and then combined meaning, let me say, affective, volitional, and rational?

On a more synthetic level, a model level, the solution of the issue comes from Plato's model, or, what is more accurate to say, from his two models of the soul.

The first one, presented in the *Republic*, is static and explicit. The second, implicit (because metaphorical) but dynamic, is developed in the *Phaedrus*. In the well known but often seriously distorted allegory of charioteer and two horses the charioteer is not only rational, but also possesses other psychic functions, such as the ability to perceive and to feel. The mid part of the soul – white horse – is not only (the) affective one (and is not the only one feeling), and the lowest part of the soul – the black horse – is not only desiring one (and is not the only one desiring). Each of three elements is akin to sense, sensation, feeling, thought and desire⁴⁰.

Moreover, in his last dialogue Plato describes the activity of the soul as follows: *Yes, very true; the soul then directs all things in heaven, and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are described by the terms – will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and other primary motions akin to these; which again receive the secondary motions of corporeal substances, and guide all things (...)*⁴¹. But here, Plato gives us particular acts of soul without using general category like thought or feeling.

If I may carry on I should say that the changement begins with Aristotle and becomes obvious in Hellenistic philosophy, the fact strange in itself when one thinks that the majority of works on affectivity in Greek philosophy are devoted to Aristotle and to Hellenistic philosophy. Aristotle argues that (...) *and the reasoning faculty is a principle controlling not reasoning but appetite and passions; therefore he must necessarily possess those parts*⁴². Hence, we see that on the one hand Aristotle distinguishes verbatim three functions, but on the other hand the distinction between them is not elaborated thoroughly. Similar things can be found in Hume, who states that in order to control something the controlling power has to have similarity with what is controlled. Eventually, in Stoics there is an opposition between what is *logic* and what is *alogic*. Feeling, *pathos* in their terminology, is on *alogic* side. For this lack of reason, feeling must be extirpated, hence a postulate of *apatheia*. *Apatheia* is a lack of *alogic* element in the soul⁴³.

Who does contrast the Ancient view with the Modern view, the integrating one with separating one must ask the following question: who is right? and who is wrong? Does Greek language reproduce well the world or not at all? Is it the *primitive language* that doesn't befit the psychic world? Are thought and feeling separate phenomena or are they in inseparable union and speaking of them is relevant only in terms of analysis or technical description? I would sustain this

last suggestion because in fact it is difficult to give an example of pure feeling without any content of thought or pure thought with no feeling at all. Or, if one prefers, a pure spontaneity without any reflection, however small its quantity may be, or a pure reflection without any ingredient of spontaneity⁴⁴. I refer again to Descartes' image of *no mountain without a valley*.

If this is correct, we see how important is to underline Greek contribution in this respect. The problem is that these facts are often neglected by contemporary philosophers or distorted by classicists. Actually, contemporary philosophers sustaining the integrating position and referring in this matter to Greek philosophers are few. Here is one of them: *The only one of the great philosophers who recognized this parallelism between thought and feeling, and who maintained that our feelings could be true or false, was Plato. He insisted on it both in the Republic and in the Philebus. This view of Plato's has usually been treated by commentators as a forgiveable eccentricity in Plato's thought (...) It seems to me not merely true but of much more profound significance than Plato himself recognized. It is not that our feelings have a secondary and subordinate capacity for being rational or irrational. It is that reason is primarily an affair of emotion, and that the rationality of thought is the derivative and secondary one. (...)*⁴⁵. As it is not only the issue of historical account, this neglect creates a serious problem. In fact, if we agree that the integrating position is right, we can take advantage of what we learn from the ancient Greeks.

Another point is that this integrating position appears in the early period of Greek philosophy as well as in Homer. A clear distinction between feelings and thoughts or emotions and reason becomes a more general tendency only later, let say after Aristotle. The Ancient perspective is fuller and, as it may be expected, can provide us with efficient tools. If, as some scholars believe⁴⁶, it is true that the divorce of thought and feeling lies at the roots of violence, we can learn from Greeks how to avoid it. Hence, any attempt to understand the early Greek philosophy in this respect has not only a historical value but reveals an anthropological and practical dimension as well.

NOTES

1. A. Schopenhauer, *The world as will and idea*, transl. by R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London 1883, p. 335.
2. A. Schopenhauer, *The world as will and idea*, p. 339. This passage had been taken again by F. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* § 16, transl. by W. Kaufmann, Vintage Books, New York 1967, p. 101: (...) *All possible efforts, excitements, and manifestation of will, all that*

goes on in the heart of man and that reason includes in the wide, negative concept of feeling (...).

3. Cf. H. Buczyńska-Garewicz, *Uczucia i rozum w świetle wartości* [*Feelings and reason in the light of values*], Ossolineum, Wrocław 1975, p. 21.
4. D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* II, III, III, (ed.) L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch, [2nd ed.], Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978, p. 416.
5. I refer here to the Stoic theory of categories. Cf. J. Brunschwig, *Stoic Metaphysics* in: *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, (ed.) B. Inwood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp. 227–232.
6. The example of this is the case of Leontius described by Plato, *Rep.* 439 e 7 ff.
7. C. G. Jung, *Ueber die Psychologie der Dementia praecox*, Halle 1937, p. 43 (after J. Hillman's translation in: J. Hillman, *Emotion. A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and Their Meaning for Therapy*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1972, p. 60).
8. M. C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of thought. The Intelligence of Emotions*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, p. 35.
9. R. Descartes, *Méditations métaphysiques* V [1647] in: *Oeuvres de Descartes*, (ed.) Ch. Adam & P. Tannery, t. 9, J. Vrin, Paris 1957, pp. 52–53.
10. However, as they refer seldom to philosophy, I agree with a recent label *pop-psychologists* coined by D. M. Gross, *The Secret History of Emotion*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2006, p. 27.
11. M. C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of thought ...*, p. 19.
12. M. C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of thought ...*, p. 23.
13. M. C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of thought ...*, p. 22.
14. M. C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of thought ...*, p. 24.
15. M. C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of thought ...*, p. 33.
16. A. Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*, Putnam, New York 1994.
17. M. C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of thought ...*, p. 115. She quoted Damasio's, *Descartes' Error ...*, p. xv: *emotions are "just as cognitive as other percepts"*. The text in A. Damasio's book (I quote after a new edition, Vintage, London 2006) runs as follows: *Contrary to traditional scientific opinion, feelings are just as cognitive as other percepts. They are the result of a most curious physiological arrangement that has turned the brain into the body's captive audience.* (p. xxv) and: (...) *certain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for rationality.* (...) *Emotion, feeling, and biological regulation all play a role in human reason.* (p. xxiii). See also p. 245: (...) *feelings are a powerful influence on reason.*
18. P. Goldie, *The Emotions. A Philosophical Exploration*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2000, pp. 11–12.
19. P. Goldie, *The Emotions ...*, p. 1. And on p. 16 he speaks about "aboutness or ofness" of the emotions.
20. P. Goldie, *The Emotions ...*, p. 16.
21. P. Goldie, *The Emotions ...*, p. 19. See also *Understanding Emotions. Mind and morals*, (ed.) P. Goldie, Ashgate, Burlington 2002.

22. Ch. S. Peirce, *Some Consequences of Four Incapacities* [1868] in: *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a chronological edition*, t. 2, (ed.) E. C. Moore, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1984, p. 229.
23. M. Guérin, *L'affectivité de la pensée*, Actes Sud, Arles 1993. He uses also the expression "raison sensible" (pp. 19 and ff.).
24. M. Guérin, *L'affectivité de la pensée*, p. 33 & p. 37.
25. R. de Sousa, *The rationality of emotions* in: A. O. Rorty (ed.), *Explaining Emotions*, pp. 127–151.
26. R. de Sousa, *The rationality of emotions*, p. 127.
27. R. de Sousa, *The rationality of emotions*, p. 149. See also R. de Sousa, *The rationality of emotion*, MIT Press, Cambridge 1987, p. xv where he stresses the distinction proposed in Plato's *Eutyphro* (we love something because it is loveable or we call it loveable because we love it – cf. below J. Macmurray's distinction between *object* and *subject*).
28. I could quote many others and among them C. G. Jung because of his statement that *The essential basis of our personality is affectivity. Thought and action are only, as it were, symptoms of affectivity* (C. G. Jung, *Ueber die Psychologie der Dementia praecox*, p. 42 – quote after: J. Hillman, *Emotion ...*, p. 59).
29. R. de Sousa, *The rationality of emotion*, p. 1.
30. Macmurray is not quoted by any of scholars mentioned above. One may wonder whether this omission is not strange given that John Macmurray (1891–1976), was one of the important 20th century British philosophers, *perhaps the last of the great Scottish humanists*. He is quoted several times by J. Hillman, *Emotion ...*.
31. J. Macmurray, *Reason and Emotion*, Faber & Faber Limited, London 1935, p. 7. This is the topic mainly of the first chapter *Reason in the Emotional Life*, pp. 13–65. He writes, pp. 15–16: (...) *Our lives belong to a stage in human development in which reason has been dissociated from the emotional life and is contrasted with it. (...) Reason means to us thinking and planning, scheming and calculating. (...) reason is just thinking (...) emotion is just feeling (...) these two aspects of our life are in the eternal nature of things distinct and opposite; very apt to come into conflict and requiring to be kept sternly apart. (...)*. He calls attention, p. 16, to the fact that if so, *it can hardly be the whole truth about the stage of human development to which we belong*. That is the reason why we wonder whether we are right in dissociating the two aspects of our experience.
32. J. Macmurray, *Reason and Emotion*, p. 30 [emphasis mine].
33. On the next page he speaks again about *Emotional reason that is our capacity to apprehend objective values*.
34. For a recent historical overview see R. Zaborowski, *La logique des sentiments* in: *La logique des émotions*, (ed.) E. Cassan, J.–M. Chevalier, R. Zaborowski, special issue of *Organon* 36, 2007, pp. 23–35.
35. T. Zieliński, *Gomerowskaja psychologija* in: *Iz Trudow Razrjada Izjaszcznoj Slowesnosti Rossijskoj Akademii Nauk*, Petersburg 1922, pp. 1–39, English transl. *Homeric Psychology [1922]*, transl. by N. Kotsyba in: *Organon* 31, 2002, pp. 15–46 [also on-line: <http://www.ihnpan.waw.pl/redakcje/organon/31/ZIELINSK.pdf>].
36. *Iliad* IX, 553–554: οὐδ'ἀνεὶ ἐν στήθεσσι νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντων.

37. *Iliad* II, 409: ἦδεε γὰρ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀδελφεὸν ὡς ἐπονεῖτο.
38. Sofisti, *Testimonianze e frammenti*, t. 2, (ed.) M. Untersteiner, La «Nuova Italia» Editrice, Firenze 1949, pp. 81–82.
39. G. J. Pendrick in: Antiphon the Sophist, *The Fragments edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary* by G. J. Pendrick, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 331.
40. For a more detailed analysis see R. Zaborowski, *Sur le sentiment chez les Présocratiques. Contribution psychologique à la philosophie des sentiments*, STAKROOS, Warszawa 2008, pp. 140–144. Cf. also M. Stocker, *Psychic Feelings. Their Importance and Irreducibility* in: *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61, 1983, p. 5, n. 1: (...) *Plato suggests in the later parts of the Phaedrus (253ff.), Symposium (205ff.), and Republic (580ff.) [that] reason is said to require for its perfection its own proper desire, pleasure and feeling* and A. W. Price, *Mental Conflict*, Routledge, London – New York 1995, p. 78: *It is the charioteer who 'catches sight of the light of his beloved', which fills him 'with tickling and pricks of longing' (253e5–254a1). Here a cognitive experience is itself intensely felt; indeed the feeling is integral to the cognition (...).*
41. Transl. by B. Jowett, *Laws* 896 e 8–897 a 4: Ἐἴεν, ἀγχι μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν ταῖς αὐτῆς κινήσειν, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστιν βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλευέσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς ψευσομένως, χείρουσαν λυπούμενην, θαρροῦσαν φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν στέργουσαν, καὶ πάσαις ὄσαι τούτων συγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτοῦργοὶ κινήσεις τὰς δευτεροῦργοὺς αὐ παραλαμβάνουσαι κινήσεις σωμάτων ἄγουσι πάντα (...).
42. Transl. by H. Rackham, *EE* II 1, 1219 b 40–1220 a 2: ἀρχεὶ δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ' ὀρέξεως καὶ παθημάτων, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῦτ' ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. Plato also respects this principle, because in his psychology each of three parts of the soul has similar functions: thinking, feeling and willing.
43. However in her recent book, *Stoicism and Emotion*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago – London 2007, M. R. Graver demonstrates that such an interpretation of Stoic theory of emotions (*pathe*) is inaccurate. According to this *another look*, p. 2: *The founders of the Stoic school did not set out to suppress or deny natural feelings; rather, it was their endeavor, in psychology as in ethics, to determine what the natural feelings of humans really are (...) not to eliminate feelings as such from human life, but to understand what sorts of affective responses a person would have who was free of false belief. Further, they sought to develop plausible psychological explanations for affective responses (...).*
44. More on this in R. Zaborowski, *Du temps en tant que du facteur différenciant le sentiment et la pensée – deux passages d'Aristote et d'Antiphon le Sophiste* in: *Kategorie i funkcje czasu w ujęciu starożytnych*, (ed.) J. Czerwińska & al., Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2008 [in print].
45. J. Macmurray, *Reason and Emotion*, pp. 25–26.
46. Cf. E. Drewermann, *Der Krieg und das Christentum. Von der Ohnmacht und Notwendigkeit des Religiösen*, [3rd ed.] Pustet Friedrich KG, Regensburg 1991 and J. Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam. Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, Atheneum, New York 1994 & J. Shay, *Odysseus in America. Combat Trauma and the Trials of*

Homecoming, foreword by M. Cleland, J. McCain, Scribner, New York 2002. See also R. Zaborowski, *Le meilleur des Achéens (aristos Achaion) contre l'homme aux mille tours (aner polytropos) – deux niveaux de la violence chez Homère* in: *Aggression and Violence in the Ancient World*, (ed.) J. Styka, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2006, pp. 217–227.

DR ROBERT ZABOROWSKI
PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF WARNA AND MAZURY
DOCENT AT THE POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
WARSAWA