

4

University of Chicago Library Scan and Deliver



ILLiad TN: 1832395

TN:1832395



Journal Title: Feminist Interpretations of Rousseau

Volume:

Issue:

Month/Year: 2002

Pages: 277-314

Article Author:

Article Title: Une Maitresse Imperieuse

Cited In:

Notes:5/22/2015 3:32:38 PM (System) Error creating RAPID request: ERROR Book Chapter borrowing is disabled for CGU.
5/22/2015 3:34:02 PM (System) 1. No Matching Bib/2. Invalid ISSN.

Print Date:5/26/2015 9:18 AM

Call #: B2137 .F395 2002 c.1

Location: JRL / Gen

Barcode:60556614



ODYSSEY REQUEST

Linda Zerilli
lmgzerilli@uchicago.edu

5-29-15
Sent

ODYSSEY REQUEST

Notice: This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 US Code)



WOMEN'S STUDIES / PHILOSOPHY

A progenitor of modern egalitarianism, communitarianism, and participatory democracy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau is a philosopher whose deep concern with the relationship between the domains of private/domestic and public/political life has made him especially interesting to feminist theorists, but also has made him very controversial. The essays in this volume, representing a wide range of feminist interpretations of Rousseau, explore the many tensions in his thought that arise from his unique combination of radical and traditional perspectives on gender relations and the state.

Among the topics addressed by the contributors are: the connections between Rousseau's political vision of the egalitarian state and his view of the "natural" role of women in the family; Rousseau's apparent fear of the actual danger and power of women; important questions Rousseau raised about child care and gender relations in individualist societies that feminists should address; the founding of republics; the nature of consent; the meaning of citizenship; and the conflation of modern universal ideals of democratic citizenship with modern masculinity, leading to the suggestion that the latter is as fragile a construction as the former.

Overall this volume makes an important contribution to a core question at the hinge of modernism and postmodernism: how modern, egalitarian notions of social contract, premised on universality and objective reason, can yet result in systematic exclusion of social groups, including women.

Contributors are Leah Bradshaw, Melissa A. Butler, Anne Harper, Sarah Kofman, Rebecca Kukla, Lynda Lange, Ingrid Makus, Lori Marso, Mira Morgenstern, Susan Moller Okin, Alice Ormiston, Penny Weiss, Elie Wiestad, Elizabeth Wingrove, Monique Wittig, and Linda Zerilli.

LYNDA LANGE is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Toronto at Scarborough.

LYNDA LANGE
FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU



B
2137
.F395
2002
c.1
Gen



RE-READING THE CANON

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS
UNIVERSITY PARK, PENNSYLVANIA
WWW.PSUPRESS.ORG

RE-READING THE CANON

FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU

EDITED BY LYNDA LANGE



RE-READING THE CANON

Nancy Tuana, General Editor

This series consists of edited collections of essays, some original and some previously published, offering feminist re-interpretations of the writings of major figures in the Western philosophical tradition. Devoted to the work of a single philosopher, each volume contains essays covering the full range of the philosopher's thought and representing the diversity of approaches now being used by feminist critics.

Already published:

- Nancy Tuana, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Plato* (1994)
Margaret Simons, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir* (1995)
Bonnie Honig, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt* (1995)
Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel* (1996)
Maria J. Falco, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Mary Wollstonecraft* (1996)
Susan J. Hekman, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault* (1996)
Nancy J. Holland, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Jacques Derrida* (1997)
Robin May Schott, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant* (1997)
Celeine Leon and Sylvia Walsh, eds., *Feminist Interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard* (1997)
Cynthia Freeland, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle* (1998)
Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall, eds., *Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche* (1998)
Mimi Reisel Gladstein and Chris Matthew Sciabarra, eds., *Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand* (1999)
Susan Bordo, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of René Descartes* (1999)
Julien S. Murphy, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Paul Sartre* (1999)
Anne Jaap Jacobson, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of David Hume* (2000)
Sarah Lucia Hoagland and Marilyn Frye, eds., *Feminist Interpretations of Mary Daly* (2000)
Tina Chanter, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas* (2001)
Nancy J. Holland and Patricia Huntington, eds., *Feminist Interpretations of Martin Heidegger* (2001)
Charlene Haddock Seigfried, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey* (2001)
Naomi Scheman and Peg O'Connor, eds., *Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein* (2002)
Lynda Lange, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (2002)

FEMINIST
INTERPRETATIONS
OF
JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU

EDITED BY LYNDA LANGE

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS
UNIVERSITY PARK, PENNSYLVANIA

Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Feminist interpretations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau / edited by Lynda Lange.

p. cm.—(Re-reading the canon)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-271-02200-0 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN 0-271-02201-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1712-1778.

2. Feminist theory. I. Lange, Lynda, 1943- II. Series.

B2137 .F395 2002

194—dc21

2002001693

Copyright © 2002 The Pennsylvania State University

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

Published by The Pennsylvania State University Press,
University Park, PA 16802-1003

The paper used in this publication is both acid-free and totally chlorine-free (TCF). It meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.

Contents

Acknowledgments	vii
Preface	ix
<i>Nancy Tuana</i>	
Introduction	1
<i>Lynda Lange</i>	
1 Rousseau and Modern Feminism	24
<i>Lynda Lange</i>	
2 Rousseau's Political Defense of the Sex-Role Family	42
<i>Penny Weiss and Anne Harper</i>	
3 Rousseau on Civic Virtue, Male Autonomy, and the Construction of the Divided Female	65
<i>Leah Bradshaw</i>	
4 The Fate of Rousseau's Heroines	89
<i>Susan Moller Okin</i>	
5 Women, Power, and the Politics of Everyday Life	113
<i>Mira Morgenstern</i>	
6 Developing a Feminist Concept of the Citizen: Rousseauian Insights on Nature and Reason	144
<i>Alice Ormiston</i>	
7 Empowerment Inside Patriarchy: Rousseau and the Masculine Construction of Femininity	169
<i>Else Wiestad</i>	

8	The Politics of "Feminine Concealment" and "Masculine Openness" in Rousseau <i>Ingrid Makus</i>	187
9	Rousseau and the Politics of Care <i>Melissa A. Butler</i>	212
10	Rousseau's Phallographic Ends <i>Sarah Kofman</i> <i>Translated by Mara Dukats</i>	229
11	Rousseau's Subversive Women <i>Lori J. Marso</i>	245
12	"Une Maitresse Imperieuse": Woman in Rousseau's Semiotic Republic <i>Linda Zerilli</i>	277
13	Republican Romance <i>Elizabeth Wingrove</i>	315
14	The Coupling of Human Souls: Rousseau and the Problem of Gender Relations <i>Rebecca Kukla</i>	346
15	On the Social Contract <i>Monique Wittig</i>	383
	Select Bibliography	393
	Contributors	397
	Index	399

Acknowledgments

My heartfelt thanks to Nancy Tuana for original encouragement, and to her and Sanford Thatcher of Penn State Press for unfailing assistance and courtesy. Warm thanks and respect to all the contributors to this volume. Each reading of their work in the process of thinking about the volume yielded something more. Omissions of excellent feminist interpretations of Rousseau are entirely my responsibility—I am sure they are not all included, and also that there will be more to come. Thanks for the support and patience that seem so necessary for books to come into being, to my husband and best friend, Dan Proudfoot.

LYNDA LANGE, "Rousseau and Modern Feminism" is reprinted by permission from *Social Theory and Practice* 7 (1981): 245–47. The essay also appeared in *Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory*, edited by Mary Lyndon Shanley and Carole Pateman (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1991).

PENNY WEISS and ANNE HARPER, "Rousseau's Political Defence of the Sex-Role Family" is reprinted by permission of the authors and Indiana University Press from *Hypatia* 5, no. 3 (1990).

SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, "The Fate of Rousseau's Heroines" is chapter 8 of *Women in Western Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), reprinted by permission of the author and Princeton University Press.

MIRA MORGENSTERN, "Women, Power, and the Politics of Everyday Life" is an abridgement of chapter 4 of *Rousseau and the Politics of Ambiguity* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1996), printed by permission of the author and Penn State University Press.

SARAH KOFMAN, "Rousseau's Phallocratic Ends," translated by Mara Dukats, is reprinted by permission of Indiana University Press from *Hypatia* 3, no. 3 (1988).

LINDA ZERILLI, "Une Maitresse Imperieuse: Women in Rousseau's Semiotic Republic" is slightly abridged from chapter 2 of *Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Reprinted by permission.

ELIZABETH WINGROVE, "Republican Romance" appeared in *Representations* 63 (1998): 13–38. Reprinted by permission of the University of California Press. Copyright © 1998 by the Regents of the University of California.

REBECCA KUKLA, "The Coupling of Human Souls: Rousseau and the Problem of Gender Relations" is reprinted by permission of the author and Editions Rodopi BU from *Political Dialogue: Theories And Practices*, edited by Stephen L. Esquith, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 46 (1996).

MONIQUE WITTIG, "On the Social Contract," from *The Straight Mind and Other Essays* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), is reprinted by permission of Beacon Press, Boston. Copyright © 1992 by Monique Wittig.

Preface

Nancy Tuana

Take into your hands any history of philosophy text. You will find compiled therein the "classics" of modern philosophy. Since these texts are often designed for use in undergraduate classes, the editor is likely to offer an introduction in which the reader is informed that these selections represent the perennial questions of philosophy. The student is to assume that she or he is about to explore the timeless wisdom of the greatest minds of Western philosophy. No one calls attention to the fact that the philosophers are all men.

Although women are omitted from the canons of philosophy, these texts inscribe the nature of woman. Sometimes the philosopher speaks directly about woman, delineating her proper role, her abilities and inabilities, her desires. Other times the message is indirect—a passing remark hinting at women's emotionality, irrationality, unreliability.

This process of definition occurs in far more subtle ways when the central concepts of philosophy—reason and justice, those characteristics that are taken to define us as human—are associated with traits historically identified with masculinity. If the "man" of reason must learn to control or overcome traits identified as feminine—the body, the emotions, the passions—then the realm of rationality will be one reserved primarily for men,¹ with grudging entrance to those few women who are capable of transcending their femininity.

Feminist philosophers have begun to look critically at the canonized texts of philosophy and have concluded that the discourses of philosophy are not gender-neutral. Philosophical narratives do not offer a universal perspective, but rather privilege some experiences and beliefs over others. These experiences and beliefs permeate all philosophical theories whether they be aesthetic or epistemological, moral or metaphysical. Yet this fact has often been neglected by those studying the traditions of

philosophy. Given the history of canon formation in Western philosophy, the perspective most likely to be privileged is that of upper-class white males. Thus, to be fully aware of the impact of gender biases, it is imperative that we re-read the canon with attention to the ways in which philosophers' assumptions concerning gender are embedded within their theories.

This new series, *Re-Reading the Canon*, is designed to foster this process of reevaluation. Each volume will offer feminist analyses of the theories of a selected philosopher. Since feminist philosophy is not monolithic in method or content, the essays are also selected to illustrate the variety of perspectives within feminist criticism and highlight some of the controversies within feminist scholarship.

In this series, feminist lenses will be focused on the canonical texts of Western philosophy, both those authors who have been part of the traditional canon, as well as those philosophers whose writings have more recently gained attention within the philosophical community. A glance at the list of volumes in the series will reveal an immediate gender bias of the canon: Arendt, Aristotle, de Beauvoir, Derrida, Descartes, Foucault, Hegel, Hume, Kant, Locke, Marx, Mill, Nietzsche, Plato, Rousseau, Wittgenstein, Wollstonecraft. There are all too few women included, and those few who do appear have been added only recently. In creating this series, it is not my intention to rectify the current canon of philosophical thought. What is and is not included within the canon during a particular historical period is a result of many factors. Although no canonization of texts will include all philosophers, no canonization of texts that excludes all but a few women can offer an accurate representation of the history of the discipline, as women have been philosophers since the ancient period.²

I share with many feminist philosophers and other philosophers writing from the margins of philosophy the concern that the current canonization of philosophy be transformed. Although I do not accept the position that the current canon has been formed exclusively by power relations, I do believe that this canon represents only a selective history of the tradition. I share the view of Michael Bérubé that "canons are at once the location, the index, and the record of the struggle for cultural representation; like any other hegemonic formation, they must be continually reproduced anew and are continually contested."³

The process of canon transformation will require the recovery of "lost" texts and a careful examination of the reasons such voices have been

silenced. Along with the process of uncovering women's philosophical history, we must also begin to analyze the impact of gender ideologies upon the process of canonization. This process of recovery and examination must occur in conjunction with careful attention to the concept of a canon of authorized texts. Are we to dispense with the notion of a tradition of excellence embodied in a canon of authorized texts? Or, rather than abandon the whole idea of a canon, do we instead encourage a reconstruction of a canon of those texts that inform a common culture?

This series is designed to contribute to this process of canon transformation by offering a re-reading of the current philosophical canon. Such a re-reading shifts our attention to the ways in which woman and the role of the feminine is constructed within the texts of philosophy. A question we must keep in front of us during this process of re-reading is whether a philosopher's socially inherited prejudices concerning woman's nature and role are independent of her or his larger philosophical framework. In asking this question, attention must be paid to the ways in which the definitions of central philosophical concepts implicitly include or exclude gendered traits.

This type of reading strategy is not limited to the canon, but can be applied to all texts. It is my desire that this series reveal the importance of this type of critical reading. Paying attention to the workings of gender within the texts of philosophy will make visible the complexities of the inscription of gender ideologies.

Notes

1. More properly, it is a realm reserved for a group of privileged males, since the texts also inscribe race and class biases that thereby omit certain males from participation.
2. Mary Ellen Waithe's multivolume series, *A History of Women Philosophers* (Boston: M. Nijoff, 1987), attests to this presence of women.
3. Michael Bérubé, *Marginal Forces/Cultural Centers: Tolson, Pynchon, and the Politics of the Canon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 4-5.

seek through him a self of her own. The key to her education lies in the control if not the repression of her imagination" (28).

7. Tracy Strong, *The Politics of the Ordinary* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage University Press, 1994), 84.
8. Strong, *The Politics of the Ordinary*, 54.
9. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 83, my emphasis.
10. Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 233.
11. Rousseau, *Politics and the Arts: Letter to D'Alembert*. trans. Allan Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), cited within the text as LD'A, followed by page number.
12. Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York: Vintage, 1974), 115.
13. Dean Goodman, *The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), 74.
14. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile et Sophie; ou, Les solitaires*, vol. 4 of *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1969). I thank Roger Hagedorn for his skill in helping me to translate this piece.
15. Judith Sklar, *Men and Citizens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 235.
16. Marshall Berman, *The Politics of Authenticity: Radical Individualism and the Emergence of Modern Society* (New York: Atheneum, 1972) and Alessandro Ferrara, *Modernity and Authenticity: A Study of the Social and Ethical Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
17. Linda Zerilli, *Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 44-45.
18. This quote is taken from Rousseau, *Julie, or the New Eloise*, trans. Judith McDowell (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968), II: XV, 198.
19. Jean Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 99.
20. Joel Schwartz, *The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 125.
21. Lisa Disch, "Claire Loves Julie: Reading the Story of Women's Friendship in *La Nouvelle Héloïse*," *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy* 9, no. 3 (1994): 37.
22. Luce Irigaray, "This Sex Which Is Not One," in *This Sex Which Is Not One*, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 27.
23. Susan Bickford, "Why We Listen to Lunatics: Antifoundational Theories and Feminist Politics," *Hypatia* 8, no. 2 (1993): 104-23; at 114.
24. Michel Foucault, "Is It Useless to Revolt?" *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 8, no. 1: 3-9, quoted in Bickford, "Why We Listen to Lunatics," 15.
25. Unless, of course, we agree with Joel Scharzt that women's passive and indirect citizenship (their contribution to the private sphere) is just as important and highly valued as the male contribution as public and active citizenship (Aristotle lives!).
26. Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London: Everyman's Library, 1973), 214, hereinafter cited as SC.
27. Wendy Farley, *Eros for the Other: Retaining Truth in a Pluralistic World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 50.

"Une Maitresse Imperieuse"

Woman in Rousseau's Semiotic Republic

Linda Zerilli

Nature's most charming object, the one most able to touch a sensitive heart and to lead it to the good, is, I admit, an agreeable and virtuous woman. But where is this celestial object hiding itself? Is it not cruel to contemplate it with so much pleasure in the theatre, only to find such a different sort in society?

—Letter to D'Alembert

To quest for the celestial object, to unmask its earthly referent, such was the task for the writer whose texts bear the manly signature "Jean-Jacques Rousseau, citizen of Geneva." The former he found in the imaginary world of reverie, the latter everywhere else, and above all in the theater—representational site of the unauthentic, performative site of female power. Indeed, for Rousseau the theater is a woman in masquerade, a cunning coquette who courts the look of a captive male audience bewitched by the spectacle of female self-display. Thus fixated on the simulacrum of womanly virtue, thus beguiled by a "counterfeited sweetness,"

Reprinted from Linda M. G. Zerilli, *Signifying Women: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill*. Copyright © 1994 by Cornell University. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.

men are lured away from their civic duties and toward that other sort of woman in society: the disorderly and disordering woman who is without modesty, utterly without shame, and whose illicit desire for mastery confounds the natural order of an active masculinity and a passive femininity.

The theater is a female space in which nothing is as it seems, a topsy-turvy world of disguise and deception presided over by "the sex that ought to obey."¹ And yet gender inversion on the stage, says Rousseau, is but a dramatic rendering of the everyday scene of the salon, where a similar overvaluation of the feminine object translates into a counter-spectacle in which it is the man who masquerades, the man who plays to the female gaze, the man who loses his "constitution" by "amusing women."

Every woman at Paris gathers in her apartment a harem of men more womanish than she. . . . But observe these same men, always constrained in these *voluntary prisons*, get up, sit down, pace continually back and forth to the fireplace, to the window, pick up and set down a fan a hundred times, leaf through books, glance at pictures, turn and pirouette about the room, while the idol, stretched out motionlessly on her couch, has only her eyes and her tongue active.²

In the very next sentence, Rousseau contains this "perversion of natural relations" by reading his own representation of counterfeit masculinity as clear evidence of the gallant's "restlessness," of this rustic virility in revolt against the "sedentary and homebound life" that nature imposes on woman, and that woman then imposes on man. The natural man is still discernable under the vile ornaments of the courtier, says the Genevan, still visible under the feminine artifice of our vaunted urbanity. This is the citizen who refuses the command of a female idol and heeds only the call of Mother Nature. Not content to be passive and beautiful, he wants to be active and useful. Perhaps. Then again—the phrase "voluntary prisons" suggests an alternative meaning: the male voyeur in the female space of the theater shares with the exhibitionist in that of the salon a "feminine" passivity and even subservience all the more terrifying to the extent that it is not in fact refused but rather desired.

That men might take no little pleasure in gender inversion and in submission to a dominatrix was the remarkable psychological insight of a theorist who confessed his own mixed delight in self-display, not to mention his "strange taste" in erotic fantasy: "To fall on my knees before a

masterful mistress, to obey her commands, to have to beg for her forgiveness, have been to me the most delicate of pleasures." Could it be that, just as the autobiographer "was preserved by that very perversity which," as he says, "might have been my undoing,"³ a crime against nature that gave rise to the godsend of his sexual temerity with women and his overactive imagination, so too might the man or the citizen be saved by keeping him on his knees before the one who gives the law in love? But saved from what? From women, it would seem. On his knees before whom? Not before women but before woman: that celestial object, that magnificent fetish, the imperious and mute woman of the male imaginary who protects man against that other sort of woman and all her sex, against the speaking woman of the theater and the salon, but also, indeed especially, against that uncanny other woman in himself.

Exploring the possibility that it is not fidelity to nature but a crime against nature, a perverse desire, that emerges as the central issue in Rousseau's political theory, I should at once highlight his challenge to the binarism of masculinity and femininity and his quick retreat into a rigid conception of sexual difference. What Rousseau teaches and fears is that natural man and woman are pedagogical constructions and highly unstable ones at that. There is a profound sense in his writings that gender boundaries must be carefully fabricated and maintained because they have no solid foundation in nature, because what announces "man" or "woman" is not anatomical difference but instead an arbitrary system of signs that stands in permanent danger of collapsing into a frightening ambiguity of meaning and a loss of manly constitution.⁴ For what haunts the writer Rousseau above all else is the similitude of his sexual other, his dread of becoming woman—his own terrible recognition that, to borrow Shoshana Felman's words, "femininity inhabits masculinity, inhabits it as otherness, as its own disruption."⁵

Rousseau's repeated and familiar warnings against the "disorder of women" evince his fear that, if the code of gender difference is not strictly adhered to at each and every moment, all is lost.⁶ There will not be any citizens because there will not be any men. Contesting the critical consensus that Rousseau presents us with the choice of making either a man or a citizen (since one cannot make both at once), I show that to be the latter one must, in the first place, be the former, and that to be a man is to be no more a product of nature than is to be a citizen to be a "denatured" man.⁷ To represent themselves as members of the republic, men must first contract to represent themselves as members of their own

sex. They must renounce the elegant discourse and elaborate dress of the demimonde, those signifiers of class privilege and counterfeit masculinity. The social contract, it turns out, is a linguistic and sartorial contract, an agreement about the proper symbolic forms of communication among citizens. Simple attire and direct speech are to function as outward signs of men's devotion to each other and to the universalistic principles of the patrie.

Excluded from the social contract, of course, is woman. But her absence is the foundation of the social pact. For woman is the "scapegoat," in Kristeva's words, "charged with the evil of which the community duly constituted can then purge itself."⁸ Even as the trope of the disorderly woman carries powerful rhetorical effects that lend urgency to Rousseau's case for the contract, the figure who leads mankind into the abyss, I argue, is a scapegoat precipitated by the disorder in men: that feminine other within the citizen-subject who, despite his almost phobic avoidance of woman, "will always be marked by the uncertainty of his borders and of his affective valency as well."⁹

There is something curious about the frontispiece to the *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men*. The image is of a Hottentot male, scantily dressed, carrying a large cutlass at his side and wearing a long V-shaped necklace. Beneath it stand the words "He goes back to his equals."¹⁰ The Hottentot is departing, as Rousseau explains in a note to the reader, from the Dutch missionaries who had raised him at the Cape of Good Hope as a Christian and in the practice of European customs. "He was richly dressed, he was taught several languages." Then comes the day when, while visiting Hottentot relatives, he makes "the decision to divest himself of his European finery in order to clothe himself in a sheepskin." He returns to the mission, hands over to the governor of the Cape a bundle that contains the vile artifice of his past and makes this speech: "Be so kind, sir, as to understand that I renounce this paraphernalia forever. . . . The sole favor I ask of you is to let me keep the necklace and cutlass I am wearing; I shall keep them for love of you" (my emphasis). To which Rousseau adds, the civil-savage awaited no reply but immediately ran away and "was never seen again at the Cape" (225–26).

The frontispiece captures in an image what Flugel calls "The Great Masculine Renunciation" that occurred toward the end of the eighteenth century: man's abandonment of his claim to be beautiful—his renunciation of "all the brighter, gayer, more elaborate, and more varied forms of ornamentation"—in favor of being useful.¹¹ Foregrounding this associa-

tion of democracy with the democratization of dress, Rousseau tells us that men must eschew the luxurious attire that is a divisive and dissimulating signifier of rank, status, and wealth. Whereas the sartorial signifiers of excess "announce a wealthy man," says Rousseau, "the healthy, robust man is known by other signs. It is in the rustic clothes of a farmer and not beneath the gilt of a courtier that strength and vigor of the body will be found."¹² To communicate proper political meaning, the body of the citizen must be clothed in simple and functional attire. As Flugel observes, "the whole relatively 'fixed' system of his clothing is, in fact, an outward and visible sign of the strictness of his adherence to the social code."¹³ Immorality attaches to the man who retains a taste for finery, but it is woman, as we see next, who comes to stand for the self-display that is the driving force behind dissimulation in human affairs.

The Field of Female Voice and Vision

The *Letter to D'Alembert on the Theatre* is obsessed with the dissimulatress who puts sartorial and linguistic signifiers in the service of other than referential functions. Realm of deception, the theater is the field of female voice and vision. Voice is crucial. It is only through "the successive impression made by discourse, striking with cumulative impact," as the *Essay on the Origin of Languages* argues, that "the scenes of tragedy produce their effect. The passions have their gestures but also their accents; and these accents, which cause us to shudder, these accents to which one cannot close one's ear and which by way of it penetrate to the very depths of the heart, in spite of ourselves convey to it the [e]motions that wring them [from us], and cause us to feel what we hear."¹⁴ Invasive and irresistible, the voice carries to our ears sounds we are unable to shut out (as unable, as *Emile* shows, as the infant is to shut out the voice of the mother). As the vehicle of staged tragedies, the voice heard in the theater is the antithesis of the gentle voice: it communicates not genuine sentiments but rather "feigned miseries."¹⁵ Artificial and secondary, the female voice stands in the *Letter* for the degeneration of "natural" language into the counterfeit meanings Rousseau associates with civilization, commerce, and luxury, with an excess he tries to contain by depriving women of any discursive authority.¹⁶

The female signifying practices of the theater and the salon "pose a

sort of problem" for Rousseau. The ancients "had as their maxim that the land where morals [manners] were purest was the one where they spoke the least of women, and that the best woman was the one about whom the least was said."¹⁷ They preserved the value of women, of the sign, by restraining the circulation of women as signs. In an age when "what was said most vividly was expressed not by words but by signs,"¹⁸ to speak of women was to rob them of their intrinsic value, namely, their purity or virtue.¹⁹ To talk about women is scandalous. Far more scandalous, however, is the woman who talks, who steps out of her function as sign, as the signifier of a "common brotherhood." "It is possible that there are in the world a few women worthy of being listened to by a serious man," concedes Rousseau, but the question is whether it is possible to listen to women without "abasing" one's own sex (47). Masculinity dissipates in the acoustic field of female voice.²⁰ The "most esteemed woman" among us moderns, says Rousseau, is the one "about whom the most is said" and the one who says the most: "who most imperiously sets the tone, who judges, resolves, decides, pronounces, assigns talents, merit, and virtues their degrees and places, and whose favor is most ignominiously begged for by humble, learned men" (49).

Rousseau's complaint against this "perversion of natural relations" (50) was hardly novel. As Joan Landes argues, Montesquieu and Fenelon (among numerous others) had criticized the salon as the site of bourgeois ennoblement and the salonnières as the instructors of aristocratic values. In an age in which "not birth but commerce, venality of office, and intrigue at court became the new coins of power," she writes, "salon women were particularly important in teaching the appropriate style, dress, manners, language, art, and literature" to non-nobles who sought entry into the culture of polite society. If Rousseau linked the salon to the theater, moreover, it was because the line between them was indistinct. "In this aristocratic world of spectacular relations," Landes observes, "where seeing and being seen was an overriding concern, a favorite sport was to play dress up," to stage "amateur theatrical productions," and generally to revel in the art of the masquerade.²¹

Although Rousseau's critique of the salon merely extends these denunciations of women as the arbiters of aristocratic culture and as the driving force behind luxury, and although his attack on the theater advances well-known arguments about women as the agents of masquerade and imposture, he complicates these debates by infusing them with a sense of urgency that belies his recognition that performance is crucial in

the constitution of social and sexual identity, and that it has everything to do with political identity. What Rousseau sees and fears, moreover, is that the "perversion of natural [sexual] relations" is possible because pleasurable. Apart from the woman who assumes a position of mastery in the salon, the men who "weep like women" in the theater and throw themselves at the feet of women outside it are a political problem of the highest order. The major threat to the man and the citizen, in short, is the masculine desire to give oneself over to the imperious woman who seeks to overturn the system of exchange between men.

To explain how it is that a man becomes a woman's "thing," Rousseau shows that identity, especially masculine identity, dissipates in the fields of acoustic and scopic pleasure. The theater is condemned because the spectator loses himself in the spectacle: "Who does not himself become a thief for a minute in being concerned about him" (46)? Such identification is possible because "the stage is, in general, a painting of the human passions, the original of which is in every heart" (18); it is dangerous because we spectators do not have to account for our vicarious pleasure. But such pleasure is itself unthinkable without imagination, the faculty that transports us outside ourselves. Imagination is what makes us human and, Rousseau being Rousseau, what makes us perverse. It is not only that some men "pervert the use of this consoling faculty"²² but also that perversion attends the imagination when it guards the masculine subject against the female and the abyss.

The imagination protects this subject against what Rousseau's prose constructs as a universal female threat to masculinity and social order. Female desire, as we are told in *Emile* and the *Letter* confirms, is an excess that "drag[s] [men] to death without ever being able to defend themselves."²³ To change the natural "order of attack and defense," to remove the "veil" of female chastity, Rousseau warns, is to unleash the fury of female desire, before which the male goes instantly and utterly limp. What is this chastity, this veil? It is a ruse, a fake, an imaginary good that substitutes for the real good that has never the power to excite but always the power to horrify and destroy. It is the uneasy solution to male performance anxiety and a certain lack of desire. "The apparent obstacle, which seems to keep this object at a distance, is in reality what brings it nearer. The desires, veiled by shame, become only the more seductive; in hindering them, chasteness inflames them. Its fears, its tricks, its reserves, its timid avowals," says Rousseau, "say better what chasteness thinks to hide than passion could have said it without chasteness." So male desire

is created in the space of the imagination, which is also the female space of the theater; both require props, masks, veils, obstacles. To be a (certain kind of) woman is to say no so that man can say yes—can say anything—to love. It is to create male desire by hiding that one is a subject of desire; it is to misrepresent oneself. The modest woman is like the actor. “What is the talent of the actor? It is the art of counterfeiting himself, of putting on another character than his own, of appearing different than he is.” If the actor “annihilates himself” in a role, the woman who does not act annihilates everything: “Love would no longer be the support of nature but its destroyer and plague” (79–84).

Yet not even the feminine artifice of modesty can ward off the threat of disorder. Perversion inheres in the very faculty of the imagination, “which scandalizes the eye in revealing to it what it sees not only as naked but as something that ought to be clothed. There is no garment so modest that a glance inflamed by imagination does not penetrate with its desires.” The irrepressible scopophilic drive will always seek to reach its erotic object: the “absolute nudity [of the female sex]” which, we are told, would create “indifference and perhaps [that is, certainly] distaste”—another way of saying that danger attaches to the immodest woman who hides “part of the object. . . . only to set off what is exposed,” but also to the modest woman who must play at the game of the veil (134–35). Whatever Rousseau says about the modest woman, she (like the immodest one) is in the last instance an actress implicated in that greatest of crimes. Supplementing herself (“the real good”), the modest woman puts the sign in place of the thing, the signifier in place of the signified. Then, since on this reading the chaste woman herself is nothing but a simulacrum, she opens up the abyss of signification: the copy that is really a copy of a copy of . . . Enter the professional actress, that “counterfeited sweetness” who lures her unwitting admirer to his destruction at the hands of that other simulacrum of womanly virtue in society. If the *Letter* all but spins out of control, as it so often does, it is because danger (the danger of appearing other than one is, of using all manner of signs to effect a no when one wants to say yes) is written into the Rousseauist ideal of woman. The modest woman as masquerade, the actress as masquerade, the idol of the salon as masquerade. Where does the woman-as-spectacle end?

In the circles, in the space where there is no masquerade because there are no women. (They too have their little societies but—thank heaven—one does not often find men there, and the man who does frequent them

is a disgrace to his sex.) Where there is no woman there is no female voice to excite unmanly emotions. The circles preserve a space in which men, because they do not have “to clothe reason in gallantry, can devote themselves to grave and serious discourse” (105). They are the site, in Landes’s words, where Rousseau can uphold “the fiction of a ‘natural language’ against the artificial stylized discourse [of *le monde*]” and its feminized culture. The salonnières—and let us not forget that they, like actresses, existed as public women outside the institution of marriage—are guilty, in the Genevan’s view, of tampering with language and thus with the natural order.²⁴ Whereas women of the salons employ artificial signifiers that do violence to truth, the men of the circles, as Thomas Crow puts it, speak “the language of the truth . . . [as found] *dans la Nature toute seule*.”²⁵ Still, even though the “citizen of Geneva” projects all that is culturally debased onto the female voice, he knows that this voice commands and the masculine subject all too happily obeys. That is why, for Rousseau, “the two sexes ought to come together sometimes and to live separated ordinarily.” In “a commerce that is too intimate,” he warns, men “lose not only their morals [manners], but we lose our morals [manners] and our constitution; . . . the women make us into women” (100).

Such is the danger, such is the scandal. But how exactly does the theater figure in the loss of manly constitution? Once again, by means of a spectatorial identification (as with the thief), only now with the simulacrum of a simulacrum: the modest woman played by the actress in a romance. Her art is to “dispos[e] the soul to feelings which are too tender”—much too tender. Since “however love is depicted for us, it seduces or it is not love,” cautions Rousseau, one admires “decent love” in the theater only to find oneself in the grip of “criminal love” in society. “The theater is a treasury of perfect women,” and therein lies the danger (51–56). Indeed the power of the actress is at its height when she appropriates the signs of the modest woman and sends out, as it were, false messages from the theatrical place of virtue. In this chaste disguise she effects the most profound subversion of the moral order. For, by the time the male spectator discovers the fake (if he ever does), he is already at the mercy of that other fake in society. But the problem runs even deeper, for the man puts himself at the feet of the imperious woman outside the theater not only because he mistakes her for the passive feminine figure on stage but also, if not precisely, because he identifies with that figure.

Consider Rousseau’s reading of Racine’s *Berenice*. Here, says the “citi-

zen of Geneva," we have a Roman (Titus) who sways between his duty to country and his love of a mistress. Although the spectator leaves the theater "pitying this sensitive man whom he despised," it is Berenice who claims his heart. At the moment when Berenice can cry no more, the spectators usurp her place and shed volumes of tears at her fate. The result: "The queen departs without the leave of the audience. The Emperor sends her away *invitus invitam* [against his will, against hers]; one might add *invito spectatore* [against the spectator's will]. Titus can very well remain a Roman; he is the only one on his side; all the spectators have married Berenice" (53). One might add, all the spectators have become Berenice, including the male spectators.

Only the sex-segregated circles and societies can protect the masculine subject against his feminine double. "But the moment there is drama, goodbye to the *circles*, goodbye to the *societies*!"—more exactly, goodbye to the citizen because goodbye to the man. "In a republic, *men* are needed" (100—101, my emphasis). That is why the theater must never be allowed inside the gates of Geneva, city of Calvin, of the circles of sumptuary laws.

The mere institution of a theater in Geneva would destroy the republic. The moment actors and actresses so much as enter the city, "the taste for luxury, adornment, and dissipation" will take hold. Not only are sumptuary laws useless in uprooting luxury where it already exists, the mere sight of "the costumes and jewelry of the players" will immediately introduce luxury as excess where it does not yet exist, an excess that no law could ever contain (57). Then, since luxury is a woman,

the wives of the Mountaineers, going first to see and then to be seen, will want to be dressed and dressed with distinction. The wife of the chief magistrate will not want to present herself at the theater attired like the schoolmaster's. The schoolmaster's wife will strive to be attired like the chief magistrate's. Out of this will soon emerge a competition in dress which will ruin the husbands, will perhaps win them over, and which will find countless new ways to get around the sumptuary laws. (63)

Danger threatens from inside the walls of the republic: in a flash, wives will want to be seen, men will want to see them, "all the rest is easy to imagine" (63). It appears at first that only constant motion, strenuous work, and strict adherence to the laws can keep this excess at bay, but it

turns out that to vanquish the desire for woman-as-spectacle the republic must erect another kind of spectacle.

Rousseau outlines a variety of entertainments (*spectacles*) that would be fitting for citizens. For one thing, socially sanctioned forms of pleasure are necessary so that men "fulfill their duties better, that they torment themselves less over changing their stations" (126n). Rousseau criticizes extreme differences in wealth, but it is less material equality than the sentiment of equality he endorses and wishes to nurture in the republican festivities. Since woman is the master signifier of rank according to the "citizen of Geneva," it is she who must be recoded in the *Letter* as a signifier of fraternity. In the place of the sumptuous idol of the salon stretched out on her couch and the actress passing herself off as the modest woman, Rousseau puts the "Queen of the Ball": the young girl who, at the yearly gathering that brings young persons together to dance under the eyes of the public, is crowned for having "comported herself most decently, most modestly." Since every girl will naturally aspire to be Queen, "the attentions to the adornment of their daughters would be an object of amusement of the women which, in turn, would provide diversion for many others"—pleasure, that is to say, for the men. In this way, observes Rousseau, one "can content vanity without offending virtue" (130—31).

Whose vanity? Women's vanity certainly, but also if not especially men's. Rousseau retains and contains not only feminine but also masculine narcissistic and exhibitionist desires in the festivities he recommends: "Why should we not found, on the model of the military prizes, other prizes for gymnastics, wrestling, runnings, discus, and the various bodily exercises? Why should we not animate our boatmen by contests on the lake? Could there be an entertainment in the world more brilliant than seeing, on this vast and superb body of water, hundreds of boats?" So "magnificent" is this spectacle of men, that it will extinguish man's fatal desire to gaze at that other blazing magnificence: the sumptuous body of the salonnière or the actress (127).

The most appealing image of manly pleasure for Rousseau, however, is without doubt the military spectacle he remembers from his childhood. The scene is in the square of Saint-Gervais where, after a day of military exercises, officers and soldiers have begun to dance together around a fountain: "A dance of men would seem to present nothing very interesting to see," he writes,

however, the harmony of five or six hundred men in uniform, holding one another by the hand and forming a long ribbon

which wound around, serpent-like, in cadence and without confusion, with countless turns and returns, countless sorts of figured evolutions, the excellence of the tunes which animated them, the sound of the drums, the glare of the torches, a certain military pomp in the midst of pleasure, all this created a very lively sensation that could not be experienced coldly. It was late; the women were in bed; all of them got up. Soon the windows were full of female spectators who gave a new zeal to the actors; . . . they came down; the wives came to their husbands. . . . *The dance was suspended.* . . . My father, embracing me, was seized with trembling which I think I still feel and share: "Jean-Jacques," he said to me, "love your country. Do you see these good Genevans? They are all friends, they are all brothers; . . . You are a Genevan." (135n, my emphasis)

In this image of hundreds of men in uniform, holding hands, dancing in a serpentlike (necklacelike) formation around a fountain—recall that other fountain, that other scene of unbounded desire in the *Essay on the Origin of Languages*—in a state of orderly rapture we have the republican spectacle par excellence. Here the author Rousseau reenacts the moment his father spoke his fraternal name and promotes a spectacle in which "the spectators become an entertainment [*spectacle*] to themselves." Instead of being "suffocat[ed] . . . in sound rooms well closed" (the salon, 102), instead of being buried alive in the "gloomy cavern" of the theater (deadly maternal space), men will take part in festivities "in the open air, under the sky" (125–26). Uniforms, swords (cutlasses), and whatever else accompanies a "certain military pomp" will guard against the feminine threat yet preserve the masculine pleasure in self-adornment and self-display. At once spectator and spectacle, man sees himself seeing himself.

What of the female spectators peering out their windows? It is the female gaze, as Rousseau tells us, that animates the male pleasure in self-display. And so it does. But it is a gaze whose power is circumscribed by the domestic sphere, a domesticated gaze that knows its proper place and specular function, which, like the ruse of chastity, is to reflect man back to himself at twice his original size. And let us not neglect that the presence of the women who come down to join the men (each woman joins her husband) guards against another threat: the manly dance that might very well have transgressed itself in homoerotic ecstasy. The dance

was halted at the moment women entered the square, as Rousseau himself says, and could not be taken up anymore.

The *Letter* would efface the gap between spectacle and spectator, representor and represented, signifier and signified. Yet it is inadequate to assert, as Derrida does, that the text evinces Rousseau's "dream of a mute society, of a society before the origin of languages."²⁶ His dream, rather, is of a society without female voice, one in which woman remains within her proper function as sign. Rousseau's critique of the signifier, in fact, explicitly links the deadly play of signification (the effacement of the referent or the speaker in the signifier) to woman as signifying subject. That the modest woman masquerades, indeed must masquerade, however, means that there is, finally, no stable referent outside the play of signification that could possibly ground woman as (unified, stable) sign and therefore the natural binarism of masculinity and femininity Rousseau claims to be essential to moral order. This is why the pedagogical construction of gender difference in *Emile* is supplemented by the image of woman in the male imagination: the celestial object that has no earthly referent and, for that very reason, protects man against woman and all her sex.

Making a Man

The educational project of *Emile* is straightforward: to raise a child who "will, in the first place, be a man."²⁷ Perhaps *Emile* will be a citizen as well. But he has not the slightest chance of becoming a member of the political community if he does not first become a member of his own sex. Noticeable immediately in the text, as Mary Jacobus observes, is that the man-child "comes into being on the basis of a missing mother."²⁸ Rousseau himself declares, "Emile is an orphan" (52)—or, more exactly and for all pedagogical purposes, he is orphaned by being placed in infancy in the hands of the tutor. *Emile* has a mother (as fictive as her son), but apart from her biological function she is redundant. Even her first and most sacred duty to nurse (should she consent to it) is supplemented with a Rousseauist script: "She will be given written instruction, for this advantage has its counter-poise and keeps the governor at something more of a distance from his pupil" (56). The mother-child dyad, in other words, can be overclose, dangerous.

Thus emerges the other face to the nursing mother whom Rousseau raises to the status of a secular idol and contrasts to those big-city mothers who deposit their children with a wet nurse in the country. Rousseau rails for pages in Book I against the "mercenary" practice of wet-nursing, which symbolizes the economy of the supplement and the cash nexus.²⁹ The child who is farmed out to a hired nurse is swaddled, "hung from a nail like a sack of clothes," and deprived of the maternal breast. And lacking this real good (which Rousseau credits as the source of all felicity, peace, and morals), the child will cry and then fantasize: he will substitute the first of an endless number of imaginary goods that mark the gap between his desires and powers. But if Rousseau holds neglectful mothers to be the cause of all unhappiness, he is just as, if not more, worried by loving mothers who carry their first duty to excess. "Plunging their children into softness," these equally "cruel mothers" prepare them for the sedentary life of a eunuch, lived with women or in their manner (44, 47).³⁰

In the place of all mothers, Rousseau puts "Thetis [who], to make her son [Achilles] invulnerable, plunged him . . . in the water of the Styx" (47), then puts himself as tutor in the place of the mythical mother. This "lovely" fable is the subject of the frontispiece of *Emile*. It depicts Rousseauist pedagogy as military strategy. To make a man, the sacred mother-child bond must be closely supervised, if not drastically and symbolically severed, in order to prepare the child for battle with "the enemy" who will appear in Book V: the desire for a woman, to be at the feet of a woman if not to be a woman. But just as the mythical Achilles had one weak point (his heel, by which his mother held him when she dipped him in the water, which connected him to his maternal origin), so too is Emile at risk by virtue of being born of woman. The tutor/author, however, knows his mythology well enough to devise safeguards to delay the impending disaster.

The first of these deferral strategies is to replace the mother with a wet nurse, whom the tutor then subjects to relentless visual surveillance in order to ensure that the child be made dependent on things and not on wills. For the very first thing the helpless infant encounters is, of course, absolutely inseparable from human will—that is, a woman's will: the breast is inseparable from her who gives or withholds it and who is, for that reason, the child's first master. Double danger: the infant is not only dependent on the will of a woman but also caught in the sonorous envelope of the (substitute) maternal voice. "I do not disapprove of the nurse's

entertaining the child with songs and very gay and varied accents," remarks Rousseau. "But I do disapprove of her making him constantly giddy with a multitude of useless words of which he understands nothing other than the tone she gives them." The child who listens "in swaddling clothes to the prattle of his nurse" confuses the words uttered by the female speaker with reality and soon comes to speak like a woman. The nurse or mother "serve[s] as an interpreter for the city child," whose voice she reduces to mimicry.³¹ It is a weak and indistinct voice: "A man who learns to speak only in his bedroom will fail to make himself understood at the head of a battalion," warns the "citizen of Geneva." "First teach children to speak to men; they will know how to speak to women when they have to" (70–73).

The maternal voice is disorienting. "I would want the first articulations which he [the child] is made to hear to be rare, easy, distinct, often repeated," advises the tutor, "and that the words they express relate only to objects of the senses which can in the first place be shown to the child" (70). The child who is taught representative signs before he understands their relation to things loses his originary wholeness in the arbitrary relation between signifier and signified. Thus weakened, he is doomed to become a mouthpiece or actor and to take up his place in the salon or theater amusing women: he can be made to "say whatever one wants" (250)—whatever women want. Double maxim: keep the maternal voice at a distance and keep the child away from books. There is only one book the child needs to learn, "the book of the world" (451). If "we absolutely must have books," says Rousseau, "there exists one which, to my taste, provides the most felicitous treatise on natural education" (184): *Robinson Crusoe*—"that bourgeois parable of masculine self sufficiency," as Jacobus puts it.³² Let Emile imagine that "he is Robinson himself, . . . dressed in skins, wearing a large cap, carrying a large saber and all the rest of the character's grotesque equipment," muses Rousseau, "with the exception of the parasol, which he will not need" (185)—of course.

And so (properly attired like that other manly civil-savage of the *Discourse on Inequality*) the child is ready to be taught the value of manual labor. "I absolutely want Emile to learn a trade," declares the tutor. "I do not want him to be an embroiderer, a gilder, or a varnisher, like Locke's gentleman." He should be given a trade that suits his sex and forbidden any that would soften his body. Since we have a choice, says Rousseau, let us choose a trade for its "cleanliness." Let us choose, then, carpentry:

"It is clean; it is useful." Whatever trade one prefers, always remember that big manly hands were not made to handle "ribbons, tassels, net, and chenille." So contaminating is such paraphernalia, so fragile is the whole pedagogical code of gender difference by trade, that such crimes against nature should be forbidden by royal decree: "If I were sovereign," declares Rousseau, "I would permit sewing and the needle trades only to women and to cripples reduced to occupations like theirs"; or, if necessary, such crimes should be punished by castration: "And if there absolutely must be true eunuchs, let men who dishonor their sex by taking jobs which do not suit it be reduced to this condition" (197–200).

Immersed in the book of the world, Emile's powers and desires are kept in equilibrium. Another maxim: "the real world has its limits; the imaginary world is infinite. Unable to enlarge the one, let us restrict the other, for it is from the difference between the two alone that are born all the pains which make us truly unhappy" (81). Then, since language operates in the realm of the imagination (the child needs words to signify the real objects it lacks), "in general, never substitute the sign for the thing except when it is impossible for you to show the latter, for the sign absorbs the child's attention and makes him forget the thing represented" (170). Still, it is not quite accurate to say, as Starobinski does, that in *Emile* "discourse . . . follows encounters with real objects."³³ There is one crucial exception to the Rousseauist rule governing the related uses of discourse and the imagination. Not every thing can be shown more safely than the sign, not every "real good" is less dangerous than the imaginary one; one sign is of value precisely because it absorbs the child's attention: "Sophie or the woman."

In Book IV, Emile comes into danger. The moment of crisis has arrived, the decisive moment of his confused sexual awakening. Let us note that this was the moment when the autobiographer's own objectless desires "took a false turn"; the moment when the young Jean-Jacques developed his abject wish to be beaten by a masterful mistress.³⁴ Warns the tutor, if the child's "pulse rises and his eye is inflamed; if the hand of a woman placed on his makes him shiver; if he gets flustered or is intimidated near her—Ulysses, O wise Ulysses, be careful. The goatskins you closed with so much care are open. The winds are already loose. No longer leave the tiller for an instant, or all is lost." Not about to jump ship, the tutor will play midwife at "the second birth" (212).

Let us reflect on the first appearance of the mythical Ulysses at this point in the text, where *amour-propre* (or "the relative I," 243) comes

into play. Everything in Emile's education has thus far been addressed to his *amour de soi* alone. "He has said, 'I love you,' to no one" (222); "He does not feel himself to be of any sex, of any species. Man and woman are equally alien to him" (219). In love only with himself but unable to recognize himself (because he recognizes and is recognized by no other), Emile is, so to speak, like the mythical Narcissus, who is entirely within himself and, as Kristeva writes, "does not, in fact, know who he is": "He Loves, he loves Himself—active and passive, subject and object."³⁵ But the ego of narcissism, says Kristeva, is fragile and uncertain because it lacks an object, indeed only barely maintains its borders in relation to a nonobject (the maternal voice, gaze, breast).³⁶ Emile was dipped in the Styx, but he is not invulnerable. Narcissus, as the fable says, drowned in the pool of his own reflection, fell into the watery maternal element. Ulysses too is on a quest, not of his own image but rather, as Kristeva quotes the *Enneads*, of "the 'fatherland,' for 'it is there that dwells our Father.'" The trajectory "from Narcissus to Ulysses," she writes, "proceeds through *love* and the exclusion of the impure"—the abject.³⁷ Ulysses does not heed the seductive voice of the Sirens that lured others before him into the abyss, and, as the symbolically appropriate frontispiece to Book V of *Emile* shows us, he triumphs over Circe, who gives herself to the one man she could not debase.³⁸ Emile too will be sent on a quest for the fatherland, but first he must confront the enemy in himself.

Emile's objectless desires do not arise out of hormonal changes, they "are awakened by the imagination alone. Their need is not properly a physical need. It is not true that it is a true need. If *no lewd object* had ever struck our eyes, if *no indecent idea* had ever entered our minds, perhaps this alleged need would never have made itself felt to us, and we would have remained chaste without temptation, without effort, and without merit" (333, my emphasis). It is true that *Emile*, as Allan Bloom maintains, advances the idea of sublimated sex, but what is sublimated is no instinctual drive; it is rather a perverse desire that is excited by "the memory of objects" from childhood (the nurse, books, women).³⁹

"You do not know the fury with which the senses, by the lure of pleasure, drag young men like you into the abyss of the vices," the tutor tells Emile. "Just as Ulysses, moved by the Sirens' song and seduced by the lure of the pleasures, cried out to his crew to unchain him, so you will want to break the bonds which hinder you." To be saved by his guardian, the pupil must first give his duly considered consent. Once "he has, so to

speak, signed the contract," the tutor sets about reinforcing the fortress around his young charge. "Removing dangerous objects is nothing, if I do not also remove the memory of them." The tutor comes thus upon the idea of sending Emile on the hunt. "He will lose in it—at least for a time—the dangerous inclinations born of softness. The hunt hardens the heart as well as the body. It accustoms one to blood, to cruelty" (326, 320). It purges the male subject, as Kristeva would say, of the feminine, the abject.

The primary means for erasing the kind of memories that "engend[er] monsters" (325), however, is to plant in Emile's imagination the chaste image of woman. The search for the celestial object begins thus:

It is unimportant whether the object I depict for him [Emile] is imaginary; it suffices that it make him disgusted with those that could tempt him; it suffices that he everywhere find comparisons which make him prefer his chimera to the real objects that strike his eye. And what is true love itself if it is not chimera, lie, and illusion? We love the image we make for ourselves far more than we love the object to which we apply it. . . . The magic veil drops, and love disappears. (329)

Few knew better than Rousseau that, thanks to the imaginary object, one sex ceases to be anything for the other. In the *Confessions*, the autobiographer tells us that the image of the mother substitute (Madame de Warens) "safeguarded me against her and all her sex." "Fondling her image in my secret heart," writes Rousseau, "and surrounded at night by objects to remind me of her" was not "my undoing" but rather "my salvation."⁴⁰ Alfred Binet credits Rousseau with the invention of a form of fetishism that substituted the relic for and preferred it to the woman to whom it originally belonged.⁴¹ Rousseau himself admitted: "It's not at all the vanity produced by estate or rank that attracts me, its sensual delight; a better preserved complexion; a finer, better-made dress, a daintier shoe, ribbons, lace, hair better dressed. I would always prefer the less pretty one as long as she had more of all of that."⁴²

Binet's observations help explain why the author Rousseau is immersed in "voluptuous reveries," as Mary Wollstonecraft so astutely put it, "when he describes the pretty foot and enticing airs of his little favourite,"⁴³ and why Sophie must master "the art of dressing oneself up" (368),

of "getting looked at" (373). Sophie "loves adornment" (393). Her natural desire to please begins, as does every girl's, with

what presents itself to sight and is useful for ornamentation; mirrors, jewels, dresses, particularly dolls. . . . Observe a little girl spending the day around her doll, constantly changing its clothes, dressing and undressing it hundreds and hundreds of times, continuously seeking new combinations of ornaments. . . . you will say, she adorns her doll and not her person. Doubtless. She sees her doll and does not see herself. . . . She is entirely in her doll, and she puts all her coquetry into it. She will not always leave it there. She awaits the moment when she will be her own doll. (367)

If *Emile* can be read as foregrounding "the Great Masculine Renunciation" (and all the psychic inhibitions it entailed for the citizen-subject), then it is more than female vanity that is being gratified in this scene. The narcissistic pleasures the masculine subject denies himself (the tutor forbids his pupil) are projected onto the feminine other who is compelled to love adornment, to make herself a fetish, to become "her own doll." Woman must bear the double burden of *his* desire to see and to be seen, must gratify *his* pleasure in looking and self-display.

Since the pedagogical project of *Emile* is to make a man who renounces aristocratic affectation, not just any kind of female adornment will do. The doll-woman who struts in her elaborate and rich finery stands accused of trafficking in counterfeit goods, of trying "to hide some defects": "I have also noticed that the most sumptuous adornment usually marks ugly women" (372), informs Rousseau.⁴⁴ These fakes deceive men and impose the class law of fashion on beautiful women. Attractive or not, the dangerous woman, it turns out, is not so much dissembling as self-sufficient: caught up in her own image, she only appears to please the men who must please her. She is the aristocratic idol who holds court "in the ceremony of the dressing table" surrounded by "the merchants, the salesmen, the fops, the scribblers, the poems, the songs, the pamphlets" (373). Then, since all women are natural coquettes, proper femininity too operates in the realm of deception. But there are two "species of dissimulation," says Rousseau: natural and unnatural, chaste and unchaste, dependent and independent. Women who practice the former kind are commended for "disguising the sentiments that they have";

those who practice the latter are condemned for "feigning those they do not have" (430n).⁴⁵ What fascinates and terrifies Rousseau are the narcissistic women who dress up and gaze at their own image but are indifferent to male desire, who "never love [or desire] anything but themselves" (430n). That these women are nothing but the scapegoats of "the Great Masculine Renunciation" is suggested by Flugel's remark that "men with strong exhibitionist desires"—like the autobiographical subject of the *Confessions*—"admire women and at the same time envy their opportunity for bodily and sartorial self-display."⁴⁶ That is why the little girl who dresses her doll must be inscribed in the economy of male pleasure, and why Sophie must be made into a dependent coquette who is solicitous of Emile's gaze.

The author/tutor proceeds with his reverie on the imaginary object, telling both reader and pupil that Sophie's "adornment is very modest in appearance and very coquettish in fact." The man whose eyes "roam over her whole person," muses the tutor, cannot help but think that her "very simple attire was put on only to be taken off piece by piece by the imagination" (394). And so female self-representation plays (once again) to the male gaze, to the perverse scopic drive, which means (once again) that it carries the risk of exciting unpleasure. The chaste woman must sustain the endless play of sartorial signifiers, for they alone inhibit the drive from reaching (as we saw in the *Letter*) its erotic object. Female presence is tolerable only as a kind of absence; there must always be one more piece of clothing, one more veil, yet one more obstacle to keep alive the lifesaving economy of the fetish, the signifying chain of synecdoches.

Even though the modest woman's great art of the lie is her sacred duty,⁴⁷ she may never signify herself as subject, as speaking subject, as a producer of signs—that is, if she is to remain in her function as sign.⁴⁸ Thus woman must conceal the production of her femininity, of herself as coquette. Sophie's "art is apparent nowhere" (394), she makes artifice appear natural.⁴⁹ So it is that woman effaces herself as subject and thereby upholds herself as referent, as the ground of masculinist self-representation.⁵⁰ Men find in Sophie not a radical speaking other, as Joel Schwartz would have it,⁵¹ but rather, as Rousseau tells us time and again, "more or less what they find in their own minds."⁵² Indeed Sophie, to borrow Luce Irigaray's account of woman's function in a masculinist symbolic economy, is "the foundation for this specular duplication, giving man back 'his' image and repeating it as the 'same'."⁵³

To reflect back to the masculine speaking subject the stable, self-iden-

tical image of himself, the symbolic oneness of the I, Sophie must guard him against whatever threatens to encroach on the fragile borders of his identity: the chaste woman must secure the borders of the clean and proper. Proper femininity keeps at bay the abject: that which is opposed to I, that which, in Kristeva's words, "establishes intermixture and disorder," that frightful mingling or confusion.⁵⁴ This is why Sophie, as Rousseau tells us, is obsessed with cleanliness. Learned from her mother, she demands it in her "person, her things, her room, her work, her grooming." Sophie's first maxim is to do everything "cleanly," but without any trace of "vain affectation or softness." Of course, Emile too likes things clean, likes his wife-to-be clean. After all, "nothing in the world is more disgusting than an unclean woman, and the husband who is disgusted by her is never wrong."⁵⁵ Sophie, fortunately, "is much more than clean. She is pure" (395).

When Emile finally encounters his imaginary object in all her pure and fictive flesh, he barely notices her (although she is sitting at the dinner table with him)—that is, until the mother utters Sophie's name. It is love not at first sight but at first sound. In a matter of moments Emile is ready to camp out in a ditch near her abode, to give "his lessons on his knees before her," to crawl before her. He wants to adorn her, "he needs to adorn her": "As the idolater enriches the object of his worship with treasures that he esteems and adorns on the altar the God he adores, so the lover," writes the tutor, "constantly wants to add new ornaments to her [his mistress Sophie]" (425). Then again, perhaps he wants to add a few of those ornaments to himself. Having renounced masculine self-adornment as a disgrace to his sex, the Rousseauist lover settles for vicarious pleasure, indeed rechannels his desire to be seen into the desire to see.⁵⁶ There is always the possibility, however, that the lover may find himself caught in a kind of psychic cross-dressing, that is to say, in a destabilizing identification with his own woman-as-spectacle.⁵⁷

"Dear Emile," implores the tutor, "it is in vain that I have dipped your soul in the Styx; I was not able to make it everywhere invulnerable. A new enemy is arising which you have not learned to conquer and from which I can no longer save you. This enemy is yourself" (443). Emile "lets himself be governed by women" and is becoming one of them, "softened by an idle life" (431). The tutor has tried all manly means at his disposal to hold off the fatal metamorphosis. But woman's "empire" consists precisely in her power to turn man into his sexual other: "Hercules who believed he raped the fifty daughters of Thespius was nevertheless

constrained to weave [and, in fact to dress as a woman] while he was with Omphale" (360–61). Rousseau leaves little doubt that the only way to avoid Hercules' fate (not to mention Narcissus's) is to follow the example of Ulysses, and thus to set out on a quest for the fatherland. "Do you know what government, laws, and fatherland are?" the tutor asks his pupil. The answer is clear, the consequence obvious: "Emile, you must leave Sophie" (448).

And so the reluctant pupil is dragged off on a two-year journey and given a crash course in the social contract. He learns the meaning of the body politic, the people, the sovereign, the laws. But he does not, in fact, find the fatherland because it does not exist. Emile declares his choice to remain a man to whom place is irrelevant; a nomad in spirit, he is equally at home among men or without them. The young man has his passions, however, and thus implores the tutor to give him back his "one chain," Sophie (472). The governor restrains his pupil, reminding him that, even though the "social contract has not been observed," "he who does not have a fatherland at least has a country." Should the state call him he must "fulfill the honorable function of citizen" (473–74).

Even though *Emile*, as Judith Shklar rightly argues, is primarily about making not a citizen but rather a man, domestic education would be doomed in the absence of some civic education.⁵⁸ Indeed, the chimera of the fatherland comes to the rescue at the moment Emile is most vulnerable (ready to marry and take to the nuptial bed); it is a supplement to that other chimera, the celestial object; and both chimeras are imaginary props whose purpose is to ensure that Emile attain the status of a man—that is, a non-woman. The man and the citizen (like domestic education and civic education) are, in fact, two sides of the same coin to the extent that both entail the renunciation of that which signifies at once the feminine and the aristocratic, and to the extent that neither can succeed in that renunciation alone. Each requires the supplement of the other. Sophie is no Spartan mother, but her modest attire and natural speech are the bedrock of Emile's own forswearing of luxury and strict adherence to the abstract principles of the fatherland, even in its absence: the values of work, duty, and simplicity and the sentiments of fraternity and equality.⁵⁹

What *Emile* teaches, finally, is that cohabitation with women can be lived only with woman: that fiction within a fiction, the chaste image of Sophie that protects Emile against Sophie and all her sex. But the celestial object's earthly referent remains the wild card in Rousseau's pedagogical

cal project. Quite apart from Sophie's unsurprising infidelity in the unfinished sequel to *Emile*—which leads her, as Susan Okin has shown, to the familiar, suicidal "fate of Rousseau's heroines"⁶⁰—her status as a kind of compromise solution to the masterful mistress of the *Confessions* places "the woman" beyond the law. Indeed male pleasure and danger attend the "imperious Sophie," "the severe Sophie," as Rousseau repeatedly describes her. Having learned that the man wants to be on his knees at her feet and how to keep him there, that "imperious girl" (478) makes poor Emile sleep in a separate bed on their wedding night. She is admonished by the tutor for giving her husband cause to complain of her "coldness" (478–79). Her empire, in other words, might very well turn into that of those big-city women, who practice a false species of dissimulation and never love anything but themselves. Whatever its species, however, dissimulation is always just that. There is never any guarantee that men will correctly read the signs of femininity qua coquetry. The latter may be sincere or insincere, put in the service of woman's "natural empire" or "unnatural" female power. The whole foundation of the man or citizen stands on nothing but quicksand. Then again, there is always the social contract: chimera of the fatherland made sacred law.

The Semiotic Republic

Why is woman missing in the *Social Contract*? Leaving aside, for a moment, her unsurprising absence as citizen, let us reflect on her remarkable absence as a topic for political debate in a text that was published almost simultaneously with *Emile*.⁶¹ Indeed, of woman (for once) hardly a word is said; the word itself appears only three times in the entire text.⁶² And if we consider that the opening line addressed to men in this treatise on political right ("Man was/is born free, and everywhere he is in chains"; 46) finds its analogue in a line addressed to mothers in that treatise on education ("The first gifts they receive from you are chains"),⁶³ it seems even more incredible that a blank should mark the place of man's very first master. Taking up the analogy, however, we may speculate that the *Social Contract*, which argues that chains can be made "legitimate" (46), works surreptitiously on the problem of those other chains in *Emile* (and in the *Letter* and the *Discourse*). The Rousseauist citizen-subject will be in "a [desired] condition of bondage," as Hilail Gilden aptly puts it.⁶⁴ But

the question is, who will be his master? with whom will he contract? with "une maitresse imperieuse" or with other men?

With the preceding remarks in mind, we may speculate that the absence of woman marks her spatial exclusion from the political site of meaning (the enactment and reenactment of the sociosymbolic pact, of legitimate chains), and that woman's permanent exile constitutes an absent presence, and a potentially disruptive one at that. To locate the paradigmatic and unnamed feminine threat, we have only to turn to the second chapter of the text, "On the First Societies": it is Circe, the sorceress. Contesting Aristotle's claim that "some [men] are born for slavery and others for domination," Rousseau observes: "Aristotle was right, but he mistook the effect for the cause. Slaves lose everything in their chains, even the desire to be rid of them. They love their servitude as the companions of Ulysses loved their brutishness. If there are slaves by nature, therefore, it is because there have been slaves contrary to nature. Force made the first slaves; their cowardice perpetuated them" (48). The reference to Ulysses, as Gilden notes, is taken from a work by Plutarch in which the hero "asks Circe to liberate his companions as well as other Greeks whom she had bewitched and transformed into brutes. Circe refuses to do so without their consent. She restores the power of speech to one of her victims and leaves Ulysses alone to speak to him. The beast to whom he speaks argues for the superiority of his transformed condition and refuses to become a man again."⁶⁵ Because Ulysses remains a man, says Gilden, he is the model mortal who points to the legislator. Perhaps. But clearly his contented companions—if not the "men as they are" who point to the Rousseauist problem of forming "laws as they can be" (46)—are the men as they might easily become (i.e., as speechless as infants) who point to the very necessity of the laws. And before accepting Gilden's suggestion that the legislator is a man like Ulysses, let us not forget that, in Homer's telling at least, even the famed hero is not invulnerable to Circe's charms and in fact barely escapes with his life. He all but forgets his goals of return, Ithaca and the fatherland. If he had not been later tied to the mast, moreover, he would have most surely succumbed to the sweet voices of the Sirens and fallen into the abyss. This feminine call from the beyond can be kept at bay only by the most extraordinary means, including that most extraordinary of human beings, the legislator.

Simply put, the sacred task of those whom Rousseau calls "Pères de Nations" is to make men aware of what they themselves desire but are

often unable to discern; it is to articulate the unified inner voice of reason in every man's heart: the general will that is immutable, impartial, and never errs. The lawgiver is a quasi-divine figure who, because he knows all men's passions but feels none of them, can serve as the "organ" with which the body politic can "enunciate its will" (67). He is neither Robert Filmer's patriarch nor Thomas Hobbes's sovereign; he does not have that kind of monopoly on power and meaning. Let us be clear as well that the wholly conventional voice of the lawgiver bears no resemblance whatsoever to the original maternal voice. Indeed "Nature's voice" is now deemed, as the first version of the *Social Contract* (*Geneva Manuscript*) tells us, a "false guide, working continuously to separate him [the lawgiver] from his people, and bringing him sooner or later to his downfall or to that of the State."⁶⁶

Rather than heed Nature, then, the lawgiver must oppose her, separate his people from her: in short, codify the social pact or "oath" such that the voice of duty replaces physical impulse, right replaces appetite.⁶⁷ What looks like the Freudian superego is a fragile achievement at best. Because men are "constantly reminded of their primitive condition by nature,"⁶⁸ all it takes is a small miscalculation on the part of the legislator as to the type of laws a people can bear, or the slightest division in the "artificial social body," for the whole political edifice to collapse, whereby "invincible nature" regains her "dominion" (76). And if we now note that the "sacred right that serves as a basis for all the others" (47) assumes but does not name the sacred law we found buried in the *Essay on the Origin of Languages*,⁶⁹ we can glimpse the magnitude of the lawgiver's sacred task. To separate men from their "common mother," to wrest from each individual the *moi humain* and transform it into the *moi commune*, the lawgiver must, as the *Geneva Manuscript* puts it, "in a sense mutilate man's constitution in order to strengthen it,"⁷⁰ substitute "a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence we have all received from nature." He must, so to speak, build a fortress around the citizen-subject by ensuring that "natural forces are dead and destroyed" (68).

The importance of this act, first of separating and then of keeping separate (that is, of establishing and maintaining a series of symbolic and psychic oppositions: inside/outside, citizen/foreigner, culture/nature, masculine/feminine) can be seen clearly in Rousseau's unbounded admiration for Moses. In *The Government of Poland*—where the author tries his own hand at the role of the great legislator, in accordance with many

of the principles of the *Social Contract*—Moses is celebrated for having transformed a “herd of servile emigrants [‘wandering about in the wilderness’] into a political society, a free people.” Just as the Genevan would secure the Poles against the impending Russian domination and cultural intermixture, so did Moses secure the Israelites against the hostile Philistines, pagan reengulfment:

Determined that his people should never be *absorbed* by other peoples, Moses devised for them customs and practices that could not be *blended* into those of other nations and weighted them down with rites and peculiar ceremonies. He put countless prohibitions upon them, all calculated to *keep them constantly on their toes*, and to make them, with respect to the rest of mankind, outsiders forever. Each fraternal bond that he established among the individual members of his republic became a *further barrier*, separating them from their neighbors and keeping them from becoming one with those neighbors.⁷¹

The rites, ceremonies, and prohibitions that kept the Israelites vigilant or “on their toes” kept them distinct and separate, prevented the kind of cultural intermingling whereby their identity would have dissipated (as it often came close to doing) into the indistinct pagan environment. These rites included, among numerous others, circumcision (the sign of the covenant for which women cannot be marked and which symbolically separates men from the feminine, the maternal)⁷² and the taboo on idols (representation of an invisible God). As Kristeva writes, Moses imposed on his people “a *strategy of identity*, which is, in all strictness, that of monotheism”: aimed “to guarantee the place and law of the One God.” And “the place *and* law of the One,” she adds, “do not exist without a *series of separations* . . . [which relate in the last analysis] to fusion with the mother.” Those rites testify to “the harsh combat Judaism, in order to constitute itself, must wage against paganism and its maternal cults.” What is more, they carry “into the private lives of everyone the brunt of the struggle each subject must wage during the entire length of his personal history in order to become [and remain] separate, that is to say, to become [and remain] a speaking subject and/or subject to Law.”⁷³

Like Moses, Rousseau’s secular lawgiver must create a subject who consents to law, a subject who unites himself with others to create the one: the unity of the artificial social body, its common ego and vice. That is

why it is not enough for the great legislator to draft the laws; he must also communicate them such that they penetrate to the very hearts of the citizens, who will then preserve them in their cultural practices. This he does, in part, not by employing force or reason, both of which Rousseau strictly forbids him, but rather by speaking in the mute eloquence of Signs, those “crude but august monuments of the sanctity of contracts.”⁷⁴ The Jews’ prophets, says Rousseau, were masters of this archaic language,⁷⁵ but the political uses of Signs are not in any way exclusive to biblical or ecclesiastical communities. Indeed, as Rousseau indicates in *Emile*, the Sign is the very lifeblood of monarchies and, not least, of republics. To cite one example, the genius of Antony was to eschew the letter for the Sign when he had the bloody corpse of Caesar “brought in” for all to see: “What rhetoric!”⁷⁶

Of particular interest, however, is a less gruesome version of the Sign, in which the law is engraved on the hearts of citizens, the image of the fatherland kept constantly before their eyes, through “spectacular display,”⁷⁷ better known as the secular ceremonies and rites of manly passage in which the social is secured through the sartorial contract: “How great was the attention that the Romans paid to the language of signs! Different clothing according to ages and according to stations—togas, sagums, praetexts, bullas, laticlaves; thrones, lictors, fasces, axes; crowns of gold or of herbs or of leaves; ovations, triumphs. Everything with them was display, show, ceremony, and everything made an impression on the hearts of citizens.”⁷⁸ The hierarchic features of dress mark and sustain differences among men in the midst of unity; the individual identifies with but is not lost within the manly crowd; the masculine pleasure in self-adornment is indulged without betraying any effeminacy. Finally, let us note and reserve comment on a more sexually ambiguous version of the Sign: “The Doge of Venice [is] without power, without authority, but rendered sacred by his pomp and dressed up in a woman’s hairdo under his ducal bonnet.”⁷⁹

One place where the semiotics of the Roman republic and those of the Jewish state meet those of the social contract, where the Sign prevents the kind of mingling that is the death of the body politic and the citizen-subject, is in Rousseau’s detailed proposal for preserving Poland against the foreign threat. Above all, the citizenry must develop “an instinctive distaste for mingling with the peoples of other countries.” Therefore, Rousseau advises, all national customs must “be purely Polish.” For example, “the Poles [should] have a distinctive mode of dress. . . . See to it that

your king, your senators, everyone in public life, never wear anything but distinctively Polish clothing."⁸⁰ And, to guard against class mingling, "I should like each rank, each employment, each honorific reward, to be dignified with its own external badge or emblem. I should like you to permit no officeholder to move about *incognito*, so that the marks of a man's rank or position shall accompany him wherever he goes."⁸¹ And so forth.

Even as this amazingly precise semiotics evinces the "dream of a transparent society, visible and legible in each of its parts," in Michel Foucault's words, it also contests inherited class position, the signifying economy of landed property.⁸² All "active members of the republic," advises Rousseau, are to be divided into three classes, each of which is to have "a distinctive emblem that its members will wear on their persons." These emblems, however, are to "be struck out of distinct metals, whose intrinsic value would be in inverse proportion to the wearer's rank." Then, since signifiers of aristocratic privilege are also those of counterfeit masculinity, "the ribbons and jewels" that have served as the insignia of "knighthoods"—and were conferred on the basis of "royal favor"—are to be strictly forbidden: they "have overtones of finery and womanish adornment that we must avoid in the institution we are creating."⁸³

In the place of such unmanly marks, Rousseau puts "the stamp of the knightly tournaments," which are to reconfigure the male body as the spectacular site of republican virtue and individual merit. Because "delight in physical exercise discourages the dangerous kind of idleness, unmanly pleasures, and luxury of spirit," Poland should promote a variety of "open-air spectacles" in which men of all classes compete for prizes (yet other emblems) and display their "bodily-strength and skill." These public games—in which "different ranks would be carefully distinguished," "the people never actually mingle with the rulers"—would challenge those of noble birth to prove their worth in a communal scopic field. All claims to superior rank would be evidenced by "external signs," which must be legible enough to be read by the people, public enough to prevent those who govern from becoming "unmanly and corrupt."⁸⁴

"Spectacular display," then, makes at once the man *and* the citizen; the citizen *and* the man are produced at once through the republican spectacle.⁸⁵ This is why the masculine pleasure in self-display is not in any way forbidden by Rousseau but rather strictly regulated: "Let us look with a tolerant eye on military display, which is a matter of weapons and horses [not to mention the rest of the martial paraphernalia that characterized the festive scene in the square of Saint-Gervais]. But let all

kinds of womanish adornment be held in contempt. And if you cannot bring women themselves to renounce it [or rather men to renounce their vicarious pleasure in it], let them at least be taught to disapprove of it, and view it with disdain, in men."⁸⁶ At stake is "The Great Masculine Renunciation," which is to say the man, the citizen, the republic. Sumptuary laws alone are powerless against the masculine desire for sumptuous self-display. No law could possibly contain that kind of excess, that kind of disorder in men; not even the prohibition on "gambling, the theater, comedies, operas—everything that makes men unmanly."⁸⁷

To be in any way effective—effective at keeping the feminine other at bay—sumptuary laws and the taboo on disgraceful spectacles must be combined, at each and every moment, with hard work, strict adherence to the laws, constant vigilance, in a word, obstacles to dangerous idleness and unmanly pleasures. That is why freedom for Rousseau, as Benjamin Barber writes, "entails permanent and necessary tension, ineluctable conflict. It requires not the absence but the presence of obstacles; for without them there can be no tension, no overcoming, and consequently, no freedom."⁸⁸ In the absence of all obstacles there is only the permeability of the ego or, as the *Social Contract* tells us, of the "moral and collective body," its "unity" and "common self" (53).

Thus, in addition to the natural obstacles to self-preservation that bring men together in the first place, there is the obstacle of private wills: "If there were no different interests, the common interest, which would never encounter any obstacle, would scarcely be felt" (61). Invincible Nature would take its place; the abject feminine other would take its place. Then there is the obstacle of the weather that guards men against the ravages of luxury: "In climates where seasonal changes are abrupt and violent, clothes are better and simpler" (94). A certain deprivation is necessary in the republic, not so much to foment revolution, but enough to keep men on their toes.⁸⁹

Above all, the republic must regulate the use of money, that secular idol—the other being woman—that "merely supplements men." For one thing, "that which supplements is never so valuable as that which is supplemented."⁹⁰ For another, what is supplemented soon ceases to exist. "Is it necessary to march to battle? They [the citizens] pay troops and stay home. Is it necessary to attend the council? They name deputies and stay home." Money promotes "softness and the love of comforts." It is the beginning of the end: "Give money and you will soon have chains." With his purse in the place of himself, the masculine subject vanishes as a citizen, vanishes as a man. He forgoes active participation in the public

duties and ceremonies that alone safeguard against the feminine threat: military service (masculinist self-display) and the "periodic assemblies" (reenactment of the contract, 106–7). Money breeds the fatal economy of the representative, the parasite that is the "death of the body politic." Fact: The moment a people allows itself to be represented, "it is no longer free, it no longer exists." Reason: "Sovereignty cannot be represented. . . . It consists essentially in the general will [the one, the I], and the will cannot be represented. Either it is itself [the one, the I] or it is something else; there is no middle ground." None at all—that is, nothing short of the something else, the chaos or abyss of the unmanly passions. Indeed, the slightest spacing between the citizen-subject and his political voice introduces a momentary noncoincidence that is nothing less than calamitous: "The general will becomes mute" (98–109).

The republic, then, must be small, tight, fortresslike. Since any slackening of the social bond spells disaster, each citizen must remain, as Derrida observes, "within earshot" of all the others, within the acoustic field of the one, the celestial voice.⁹¹ A man is either with the community or against it, a citizen or a foreigner. There is nothing in between short of the dissolution of the social pact. And let us not forget, "Whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body which means only that he will be forced to be free. For this is the condition that, by giving each citizen to the homeland, guarantees him against all personal dependence" (55). This contentious Rousseauist maxim makes profound sense inasmuch as one state of bondage substitutes for another; compared to enslavement to a feminine authority, not to mention one's own femininity, it is an act of secular grace when the republic compels a man to be free—to be a citizen qua man.

Woman is not simply missing in the *Social Contract*; she is, rather, the absent presence that constitutes but mostly unsettles the boundaries of the semiotic republic. She is, in fact, as dangerous as money (if not more so): a supplement, simulacrum, or idol. Inscribed in the very crime of representation, compelled to make of herself a fetish, woman always exceeds the Rousseauist terms of her containment. Like money, woman is that which, in Kristeva's words, "impinges on symbolic oneness,"⁹² the I of the masculine speaking subject, the I of the *moi commune*. The celestial object undercuts the celestial voice. Inhabiting the citizen-subject as otherness, woman haunts a social (sartorial/linguistic) contract which is as unstable as the masculinist signs that constitute it are arbitrary. Rousseau may insist that "we are not our clothes,"⁹³ but his version of "The Great

Masculine Renunciation" teaches just that. And, "if it is clothes alone, i.e., a cultural sign, an institution, which determine our reading of . . . masculinity and femininity and insure sexual opposition," as Shoshana Felman asks; "if indeed clothes make the *man*—or the woman—, are not sex roles as such, inherently, but travesties?"⁹⁴ "Jean-Jacques Rousseau, citizen of Geneva," has already given us his insightful if fearful answer to that very rhetorical question.

Notes

1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men*, in *The First and Second Discourses*, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 135.

2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D'Alcembert on the Theatre*, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 101, my emphasis. As Paul Thomas interprets this passage, "the eroticism of female idleness is unmistakable and implies that women are at all costs to be kept busy. The alternative is too horrible to contemplate." "Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Sexist?" *Feminist Studies* 17 (Summer 1991): 213.

3. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Confessions*, trans. J. M. Cohen (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1953), 27–28. There are variations on this figure of a masterful mistress throughout Rousseau's work. Following Gilles Deleuze's study of masochism, one could argue that it is not the father but rather the mother who gives the law in Rousseau's thought. The masochist, argues Deleuze, aligns himself with the mother against the father. He "experiences the symbolic order as an intermaternal order in which the mother represents the law under certain prescribed conditions," whence the notion of the contract that is crucial to the masochism. *Masochism*, trans. Jean McNeil (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 63. For a study of Rousseau's masochism from within the political theory tradition, see William H. Blanchard, *Rousseau and the Spirit of Revolt* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967). Blanchard argues convincingly that Rousseau's desire to give himself over to a masterful mistress shaped his entire social thought. For a psychobiography of Rousseau's personal relations to women, see Maurice Cranston, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Prophetic Voice, 1758–1778*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), and *Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712–1754* (New York: Norton, 1982). Whereas these works focus on the writing self, Huntington Williams has treated Rousseau's autobiographical writings as constructions of the written self. *Rousseau and Romantic Autobiography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). For a convincing reading of the *Confessions* as a work of political theory, see Christopher Kelly, *Rousseau's Exemplary Life: The Confessions as Political Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

4. The reading I advance draws on and departs from those offered by Joel Schwartz and Penny Weiss, both of whom have done much to situate gender at the center of the scholarly debate on Rousseau. Although Schwartz rightly argues that sexual difference is a political issue, he errs in asserting that Rousseau is a "materialist" who believes that "the bodily differences between men and women unalterably differentiate women from men." *The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 85. For a similar, if somewhat more qualified and critical, version of this argument, see Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 160–161. On the contrary, for Rousseau anatomical difference is nothing apart from the signifiers of sexual difference, from linguistic and sartorial signifiers. In con-

trast to Schwartz, Penny Weiss has shown that for Rousseau gender difference is not in any way natural but rather "should be created, encouraged, and enforced because of what he considers to be their necessary and beneficial consequences." She correctly insists, moreover, that "Rousseau's rhetoric [about "natural" sexual difference] is consistently undercut by his theoretical argument." "Rousseau, Antifeminism, and Woman's Nature," *Political Theory* 15 (February 1987): 83, 94. His rhetoric is undercut as well, I argue, by the vicissitudes of male desire and by his own claim that gender is performative: nothing more than a way of speaking and of dressing, simply a cultural matter of words and clothes.

5. Shoshana Felman, "Rereading Femininity," *Yale French Studies* 62 (1981): 42.

6. Rousseau, *Letter to D'Alembert*, 109.

7. The best-known example of this argument is given by Judith Shklar, who maintains that Rousseau presents us with the man and the citizen as two possible models for living, "and the two were meant to stand in polar opposition to each other." The citizen is the radically denatured man. *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 3. Shklar's thesis has been accepted (or has remained uncontested) throughout most of the scholarly literature. Susan Okin has suggested that in *Emile* Rousseau tries to create the man and the citizen at once. *Women in Western Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 168–69. In the pages that follow, I take up and complicate this insight.

8. Julia Kristeva, "Women's Time," in *The Kristeva Reader*, ed. Toril Moi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 202.

9. Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 63.

10. Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, 76.

11. J. C. Flugel, *The Psychology of Clothes* (New York: International Universities Press, 1930), 110–11.

12. Rousseau, *Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts*, 37.

13. Flugel, *The Psychology of Clothes*, 113.

14. Rousseau, *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, 242, 243.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Women are blamed for the degeneration of "natural" language, "the plain tongue of common sense," as Norman Jacobson puts it, into "metaphysical double-talk." *Pride and Solace: The Functions and Limits of Political Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 107. Paul Thomas argues that, for Rousseau, "women, in their capacity as bearers or agents of civilization, are also necessarily the bearers or agents of corruption too." Thomas shows that women are "in effect stand-ins or surrogates for civilization and [human] perfectibility." "Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Sexist?" 212.

17. Rousseau, *Letter to D'Alembert*, 48. Further page references are cited in the text.

18. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, or On Education*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 322.

19. "It is on this principle that a Spartan, hearing a foreigner singing the praises of a lady of his acquaintance, interrupted him in anger: 'Won't you stop,' he said to him, 'slandering a virtuous woman.'" *Letter to D'Alembert*, 48.

20. As Elshain rightly notes, "The depth of Rousseau's mistrust of women is apparent in the fact that those closer to original nature, by his own logic, are not allowed to speak in the always-to-be-trusted voice of that nature." The result is an attempt to shut up not only salon women and actresses but also the natural woman par excellence, Sophie. *Public Man, Private Woman*, 164.

21. Joan Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 24–25. On gender inversion and the masquerade, see Terry Castle, *Masquerade and Civilization: The Carnivalesque in Eighteenth-Century English Culture and Fiction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986).

22. Rousseau, *Rousseau juge de Jean Jaques—Dialogues, Oeuvres Complètes*, 1:815 (my translation).

23. Rousseau, *Emile*, 359.

24. See Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere*, 30; Domna Stanon, "The Fiction of Préciosité and the Fear of Women," *Yale French Studies* 62 (1981): 129. On women's place in the public spaces of the theater and the salon, see Barbara G. Mittman, "Women and Theater Arts," in *French Women and the Age of Enlightenment*, ed. Samia I. Spencer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 155–169. On public debates about actresses as agents of cultural chaos, see Kristina Straub, *Sexual Suspects: Eighteenth-Century Players and Sexual Ideology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

25. Thomas Crow, "The Oath of the Horatii in 1785: Painting and Pre-Revolutionary Radicalism in France," *Art History* 1 (December 1978): 442.

26. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 240.

27. Rousseau, *Emile*, 42. Further page references are cited in the text.

28. Mary Jacobus, *Romanticism, Writing, and Sexual Difference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 242.

29. Rousseau's critique of wet-nursing was neither wholly novel nor accurate. As George Sussman has shown, the overwhelming majority of the children who were given over to wet nurses came not from the nobility (that is, not, as Rousseau would have it, from families in which the mothers "devote themselves gaily to the entertainments of the city"; *Emile*, 44) but rather from the preindustrial urban class of independent artisans and shop-keepers. It was, moreover, especially poor but not indigent urban families who were most affected by "the polemical campaign against wet-nursing that began around 1760." *Selling Mother's Milk: The Wet-Nursing Business in France, 1715–1914* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 24, 30.

30. The result of such cruel mothering? Nothing less than the chaos of intermingling or intermixture which opens *Emile*: "Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of our being; everything degenerates in the hands of man. He forces one soil to nourish the products of another, one tree to bear the fruit of another. He mixes and confuses the climates, the elements, the seasons. He mutilates his dog, his horse, his slave. He turns everything upside down; he disfigures everything; he loves deformity, monsters" (37).

31. The peasant child, in contrast, is kept at a distance from, and therefore does not imitate the voice of, the mother, who is hard at work in the fields. Peasant children, says Rousseau, speak in a clear and accented voice, their speech is that of "sentiment and truth." *Emile*, 71, 72.

32. Jacobus, *Romanticism, Writing, and Sexual Difference*, 246.

33. Szarobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, 146.

34. Rousseau's first masterful mistress was his childhood governess, Mlle Lambercier. *Confessions*, 26.

35. Kristeva, *Tales of Love*, 107, 116. Kristeva observes further that primary narcissism (what Rousseau calls *l'amour de soi*, "being far from ordinary," is rather a "supplement" to the "autoerotism of the mother-child dyad" (22). It therefore marks the very first stage of primal differentiation. Narcissism, she argues, is necessary to maintain that space of "empriness" between self and mother, "lest chaos prevail and borders dissolve" (24). Rousseau, in his own way, knows this too, which is why distancing the child from the nurse/mother and strengthening his love of self are the pedagogical goals of Books I–III, indeed, why *l'amour de soi* is for Rousseau the very source of man's strength.

36. See especially Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 62–63.

37. Kristeva, *Tales of Love*, 109–10.

38. On the frontispiece to Book V of *Emile*, see Patricia Parker, *Literary Fat Ladies: Rhetoric, Gender, Property* (New York: Methuen, 1987), 207.

39. Allan Bloom, Introduction to *Emile*, 15–16. Even though Bloom recognizes that the imagination plays a large part in Rousseau's discussion of sexuality, he also assumes that sexual desire is merely a rechanneling of sexual instinct. Bloom's reading of Rousseau fits the familiar image of the

political theorist as the tamer of eros. Once so-called heterosexual instinct is posited as just that, an instinct, it can be treated as if it were a universal and potential chaos that has to be contained in the interests of social order. Rousseau himself shows that all sexual desire, indeed any form of desire, is culturally created through the boundless play of the imagination; it has nothing to do with instinct. "I am persuaded that solitary man raised in a desert, without books, without instruction, and without women, would die there a virgin at whatever age he had reached" *Emile*, 333).

40. Rousseau, *Confessions*, 109.

41. Writes Binet: "Amorous fetishism has a tendency to detach completely, to isolate (the object) from anything separating it from its cult-worship, and when the object is part of a living person, the fetishist tries to render this part an independent entity." "La Fétichisme dans l'amour" [1887], quoted in Emily Apter, *Feminizing the Fetish: Psychoanalysis and Narrative Obsession in Turn-of-the-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 21. Deleuze observes that "fetishism, as defined by the process of disavowal and suspension of belief, belongs essentially to masochism. . . . There can be no masochism without fetishism in the primary sense." The masochist employs the fetish to preserve the masterful mistress, the phallic mother, the mother who lacks nothing. The fetish is also crucial to the world of reverie and the art of delay that characterize Rousseau's amorous accounts. See *Masochism*, 32.

42. The citation from Rousseau is quoted by Binet. See Apter, *Feminizing the Fetish*, 21.

43. Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, ed. Miriam Brody Kramnick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 107.

44. Rousseau's strict semiotics for female adornment relate to the place of the fetish in this thought. The purpose of the fetish, on the psychoanalytic account, is to disavow female sexual difference. See Apter, *Feminizing the Fetish*, esp. 13; Deleuze, *Masochism*, 31. Even though woman in Rousseau's texts is duty-bound to conceal her lack (with the adornment he prescribes), she is also duty-bound to reveal it (in ways that uphold rather than undercut the masculine subject, of course). The trick is to find the right quality and quantity of adornment: a disguise that signifies that woman lacks, in order for the masculine subject to deny his own symbolic castration and affirm symbolic wholeness; but also a disguise that does not signify that she lacks too much, in order not to confront the masculine subject with castration (the sin of the "ugly woman").

45. Rousseau's logic yields such mind-boggling statements as the following: "We are told that women are false. They become so. Their particular gift is skill and not falseness. According to the true inclination of their sex, even when they are lying they are not false." *Emile*, 385.

46. Freud, *The Psychology of Clothes*, 119. On Rousseau's penchant for self-display and exhibitionism, see Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, 170-77.

47. As Nannerl O. Keohane puts it, "In fitting Sophie for her fate, Rousseau employs a panoply of artifices indistinguishable from those he excoriated in the second *Discourse*: dissimulation, dependence, reliance on the opinions of others as a guide for behavior and as a source for one's very own sense of self." "'But for Her Sex . . .': The Domestication of Sophie," *University of Ottawa Quarterly* 49, nos. 3-4 (1979): 397. Wollstonecraft argued the same point in the *Vindication*.

48. This is one reason the natural woman must remain, as Clément argued and as Rousseau himself says, a child all her life (*Emile*, 211)—speaking little but causing men's talk.

49. For another example of woman's duty to efface the trace of her own artifice, see Rousseau's description of Julie's garden in the novel *La nouvelle Héloïse*, *Oeuvres Complètes*, 2:472.

50. "The moral of Sophie's education," as Jacobus puts it, "is that women must be the guarantors and safe-keepers, not only of masculinity, but of language made chaste, naturalized, and brought into imaginary correspondence with reality." *Romanticism, Writing, and Sexual Difference*, 249.

51. Schwartz argues that Rousseau creates Sophie as a complement to Emile and as a subject in her own right. Contrasting Emile with the hero (Valere) of Rousseau's play *Narcisse, ou l'amant de lui-même*, Schwartz writes that, whereas Valere "falls in love with a girl whom he can only imagine," Emile falls in love with a girl who "actually is a girl, and not Emile's male self dressed to resemble a

girl." It is Emile who, when he does love, "loves another." *The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, 81. On the contrary, I maintain that, inasmuch as Sophie is the scapegoat of the masculine desire to dress like a girl (not to mention to play with "jewels, mirrors, and dolls"), she is not Emile's sexual other but his specular double.

52. The "whole art [of coquetry] depend[s] . . . on sharp and continuous observations which make her [woman] see what is going on in men's hearts at every instant, and which dispose her to bring to each secret movement that she notices the force needed to suspend or accelerate it." *Emile*, 385.

53. Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 54. If it is true that Sophie or the woman is the specular double of Emile or the man, then the argument advanced, albeit in different ways, by Weiss and Schwartz (i.e., that Rousseau aims to create interdependence between the sexes) seems highly debatable to say the least.

54. Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 98, 99.

55. Like uncleanness, "extreme ugliness" in a woman is "disgusting," and both are at bottom the relation with the abject, that is, with death: "Ugliness which produces disgust is the greatest of misfortunes. This sentiment, far from fading away, increases constantly and turns into hatred. Such a marriage is hell. It would be better to be dead than to be thus united." *Emile*, 409. On the subject of Sophie's cleanliness, see Keohane, "'But for Her Sex,'" 396.

56. Freud writes, "In the case of the [male] exhibitionistic desires connected with self-display, a particularly easy form of conversation may be found in a change from (passive) exhibitionism to (active) scopophilia (erotic pleasure in the use of vision)—the desire to be seen being transformed into the desire to see. This desire to see may itself remain unsublimated and find its appropriate satisfaction in the contemplation of the other sex, or it may be sublimated and find expression in the more general desire to see and know." *The Psychology of Clothes*, 118. That it is the powerful and dangerous desire to be seen that subtends the masculine subject's desire to see helps to explain the character of Wolmar, in *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, who wanted to "become a living eye," seeing without being seen; *Oeuvres Complètes*, 2:491. It also explains why Rousseau, in the *Reveries*, expressed his wish to own the magic ring of Gyges, which would have given him the power to render himself invisible at will; *ibid.* 1:1057-58.

57. Freud again: "In such cases there is clearly some element of identification with the woman. . . . We incline in general to identify ourselves with such persons as we admire or envy [for their opportunity for bodily and sartorial display]." This identification is obviously dangerous for the masculine subject, but not nearly as threatening as the following: if the woman does not accept her role as adorned object, then the man's desire for exhibitionism could seek satisfaction in transvestitism, whereby "the man may consciously seek to identify himself with a woman by wearing feminine attire." *The Psychology of Clothes*, 118-19.

58. Shklar reads *Emile* as the model for making a man and associates it with Rousseau's ideal of the Golden Age. See *Men and Citizens*, esp. 11, 147-48. Okin argues, "Rousseau clearly tries to make of Emile a citizen, as well a natural and independent man." *Women in Western Political Thought*, 168.

59. If Emile has to travel to avoid becoming his sexual other, why does he have to fall in love before he travels? This question is answered by Rousseau himself, who tells us that he got the idea while visiting the governor of a young Englishman. The governor was reading a letter to his pupil (Lord John) when suddenly, says Rousseau, "I saw the young man tear off the very fine lace cuffs he was wearing and throw them one after the other into the fire." *Emile*, 470. It turned out that the cuffs were a present given to Lord John by a "city lady," and that the letter described his country fiancée hard at work making him a quite different set of cuffs with her own hands. This incident reveals, once again, the place of Sophie or the woman in the masculine renunciation of aristocratic finery, not to mention his own femininity.

60. Okin argues that Rousseau places incomparable demands on his female characters. The chaste coquette is doomed right from the start because she must excite and restrain male desire.

What is more, "no woman educated and confined as Julie [of *La Nouvelle Héloïse*] and Sophie are would ever be able to behave like the Spartan mother whose patriotism Rousseau so much admired." These women are "even more vulnerable than men to the conflicts of loyalties" that Rousseau showed to exist between the state and the family. And thus women as mothers become a problem for men as citizens. *Women in Western Political Thought*, 193. Likewise, Zillah Eisenstein maintains that, in *Emile*, the dependent woman creates significant problems for the independent man. *The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism* (New York: Longman, 1981), 80–83.

61. Okin (*Women in Western Political Thought*), Elshtain (*Public Man, Private Woman*), and Pate-man (*The Sexual Contract*) have shown quite clearly that women cannot be added to the social contract. As Landes puts it, "the very generality of the [general] will is predicated on the silent but tacit consent of women." *Women and the Public Sphere*, 66. Schwartz, for his part, has tried to track women down in the supplement to written law: the morals, customs, and public opinion that form the basis of the impersonal authority Rousseau seems to credit as the ultimate source of social stability. "Because Rousseau acknowledges the necessity of hidden and personal rule, he can also acknowledge and admire the political power of women (even as he advocates their formal political powerlessness)." *Rousseau's Sexual Politics*, 43–44. On the contrary, as we see in this section, this informal power is not the good to be preserved but rather the problem to be solved by the social contract.

62. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, published together with *Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy*, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978). Further page references are cited in the text. Actually, it is not the word "woman" but "women" that appears three times in Rousseau's text: twice in connection with the fecundity of a people (73, 74) and once in connection with "foreigners," "children," and "slaves" (99).

63. Rousseau, *Emile*, 43.

64. Hilail Gilden, *Rousseau's Social Contract: The Design of the Argument* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 27.

65. *Ibid.*, 23.

66. Rousseau, *Geneva Manuscript*, 171; see also 158.

67. See Shklar, *Men and Citizens*, 155.

68. Rousseau, *Geneva Manuscript*, 177.

69. On this point, see Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 264–65.

70. Rousseau, *Geneva Manuscript*, 180. "Qu'il mutile en quelque sorte la constitution de l'homme pour la renforcer." *Oeuvres Complètes* 3:313.

71. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland*, trans. and ed. Willmoore Kendall (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), 6, my emphasis.

72. Kristeva writes: "Circumcision would thus separate one from maternal, feminine impurity and defilement; it stands instead of sacrifice, meaning not only that it [circumcision] replaces it [sacrifice] but is its equivalent—a sign of the alliance with God. . . . [What] circumcision carves out on his [the masculine subject's] very sex, is the other sex, impure, defiled." *Powers of Horror*, 99–100.

73. *Ibid.*, 94.

74. Rousseau, *Emile*, 321.

75. Rousseau, *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, 242. Rousseau gives a particularly telling example from the Old Testament, which reveals the use of woman as Sign, the Sign that transforms a fleeting bond into something durable, the oath into a people, the voices of the many into that of the one: "When the Levite of Ephraim wanted to avenge the death of his wife he did not write to the Tribes of Israel: he divided her body into twelve pieces which he sent to them. At this ghastly sight they rushed to arms, crying with one voice: No, never has anything like this happened in Israel, from the day when our fathers left Egypt until this day! And the Tribe of Benjamin was exterminated. Nowadays it would have been turned into lawsuits, debates, perhaps even jokes; it would have dragged on, and the most ghastly crime would finally have remained unpunished" (*ibid.*).

Actually—and this must have been known to Rousseau—what spurred the eleven tribes of Israel to revenge against the twelfth (the Benjamites) was the mutilated body of the concubine (the second or third wife) of the polygamous Levite, who had given her over to a mob of Benjamite men to save himself from being sodomized. It was her raped and brutalized corpse that the Levite then cut into pieces and sent to the other tribes, who promptly put aside their differences and united as a people to avenge her murder. Out of the Benjamite tribe, as Rousseau says, "only six hundred of its men, without any women or children, were left" (*ibid.*). These men fled into the desert and, in time, were called back by the Israelite elders, who grieved deeply for them and felt duty bound to ensure their continued existence. Fratricide led to mourning and then to reparation through another bloody act: having vowed never to give their daughters to any of the Benjamites, the elders sent an army to Jabash-gilead, which seized four hundred virgins and slaughtered the rest of the population. Then, because there were still not enough women for the Benjamites, the elders advised the remaining bachelors to go to the town of Shiloh where each should abduct a girl at the annual festival. This they did and were thus saved from extinction (see Judges 19:2–21:35).

The Book of Judges, which concludes with the line, "In those days Israel had no King; everyone did as he saw fit" (21:25), points up the moral depravity, intertribal disputes, and pagan ways into which the Israelites had fallen since the deaths of Moses and Joshua. The story Rousseau cites also shows that woman is the visible sacrifice that recalls to the Israelites the fading memory of their covenant with an invisible God. One could read the rape of the concubine, not to mention the abduction of women at the festival, as confirming Pate-man's thesis that violence and male sex-right subtend the fraternal social contract. One could read the woman's dismembered body as sign as confirming Kristeva's thesis that the sociosymbolic contract is a sacrificial contract. And one could confirm both with Rousseau's claim that, at the sight of a piece of the woman's corpse, the Israelites all began "crying in one voice," the "celestial voice" of the general will.

76. Rousseau, *Emile*, 323.

77. Rousseau, *The Government of Poland*, 15. One must see always and everywhere the image of the fatherland, beginning at birth: "The newly-born infant, upon first opening his eyes, must gaze upon the fatherland, and until his dying day should behold nothing else" (19). Needless to say, the very first gaze he beholds is that of the mother.

78. Rousseau, *Emile*, 322.

79. *Ibid.*

80. Rousseau, *The Government of Poland*, 14.

81. *Ibid.*, 72.

82. Michel Foucault, "The Eye of Power," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Collin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 152.

83. Rousseau, *The Government of Poland*, 89.

84. *Ibid.*, 15–16. For a thoughtful discussion of how Rousseau's critique of inherited property intersects with his attack on idleness, see Eisenstein, *The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism*, 68–71.

85. That spectacular display is constitutive of masculinity suggests that Rousseau does not depart from what Landes calls "the iconic spectacularity of the Old Regime." *Women and the Public Sphere*, 67. In fact, Rousseau is much closer to that mode of self-representation than Landes allows.

86. Rousseau, *The Government of Poland*, 18.

87. *Ibid.*, 14. "One does not stamp out luxury with sumptuary laws. You must reach deep into men's hearts and uproot it by implanting there healthier and nobler tastes" (18).

88. Benjamin R. Barber, *Supermen and Common Men* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 61. As Thomas puts this point, "The articulation of the general will may depend upon an overcoming of distinctions among the (male) citizenry, but these distinctions have first to exist if they are to be overcome." "Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Sexist?" 202.

89. Compare my argument with Marshall Berman's thesis that the social contract is a "maternal state" in which child-citizens bask in the warmth of an unmediated "flow of nourishment, affection,

[and] love." *The Politics of Authenticity: Radical Individualism and the Emergence of Modern Society* (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 204. Berman draws largely on Rousseau's maternal images of the state in *Discourse on Political Economy*.

90. Rousseau, *The Government of Poland*, 69.

91. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 136.

92. Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 104.

93. Rousseau, *Emile*, 372.

94. Felman, "Rereading Femininity," 28.

13

Republican Romance

Elizabeth Wingrove

On the death of Caesar I imagine one of our orators wishing to move the people; he exhausts all the commonplaces of his art to present a pathetic description of Caesar's wounds, his blood, his corpse. Antony, although eloquent, does not say all that. He has the body brought in. What rhetoric!

—*Emile*, 322–23¹

Jean-Jacques Rousseau frankly acknowledged the sexual imperatives of his republicanism. Whether in *Emile's* extended analyses or in fictional depictions like *La nouvelle Héloïse*, he regularly reiterates the close connection between his politics rightly instituted and masculinity and femininity rightly lived. Otherwise put, Rousseau's is a most intriguing sexism, a complex and even insightful account of the ways political agendas support, constrain, and construct sexual identities. And nowhere is that sexism and its intrigues more spectacular than in one erotic, perhaps pornographic, story that he composed, *Le Lévitte d'Ephraïm*. It is a story of political fracture and (re)union, of retribution and justice, and of individual freedom and community loyalty, and it poses these problems and their solutions in terms of rape, murder, marriage, dismemberment, and

markable essay on consciousness, made it clear that it is not because we remain silent that we consent.⁷ And how can we consent to a social contract that reduces us, by obligation, to sexual beings meaningful only through their reproductive activities or, to quote the French writer Jean Paulhan, to beings in whom everything, even their minds, is sex?⁸

In conclusion I will say that only by running away from their class can women achieve the social contract (that is, a new one), even if they have to do it like the fugitive serfs, one by one. We are doing it. Lesbians are runaways, fugitive slaves; runaway wives are the same case, and they exist in all countries, because the political regime of heterosexuality represents all cultures. So that breaking off the heterosexual social contract is a necessity for those who do not consent to it. For if there is something real in the ideas of Rousseau, it is that we can form "voluntary associations" here and now, and here and now reformulate the social contract as a new one, although we are not princes or legislators. Is this mere utopia? Then I will stay with Socrates's view and also Glaucon's: If ultimately we are denied a new social order, which therefore can exist only in words, I will find it in myself.

Notes

1. *The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right* (1762), by J. J. Rousseau, citizen of Geneva.
2. Colette Guillaumin, "Pratique du pouvoir et idée de Nature: 1. L'appropriation des femmes: 2. Le discours de la Nature," *Questions féministes* n°2 et n°3 (1978). Translated as "The Practice of Power and Belief in Nature: 1. The Appropriation of Women; 2. The Naturalist Discourse," *Feminist Issues* 1, nos. 2 and 3 (Winter and Summer 1981).
3. See Colette Capitan Peter, "A Historical Precedent for Patriarchal Oppression: 'The Old Regime' and the French Revolution," *Feminist Issues*, 4, no. 1 (Spring 1984): 83-89.
4. See my "The Straight Mind" and "One Is Not Born a Woman," in *The Straight Mind and other Essays* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992).
5. This statement by Marx and Engels is particularly relevant to the modern situation.
6. See Aristotle, *The Politics*.
7. Nicole-Claude Mathieu, "Quand céder n'est pas consentir. Des déterminants matériels et psychiques de la conscience dominée des femmes, et de quelques-unes de leurs interprétations en ethnologie," in *L'Arraînement des femmes. Essais en anthropologie des sexes* (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1985). Translated as "When Yielding Is Not Consenting: Material and Psychic Determinants of Women's Dominated Consciousness and Some of Their Interpretation in Ethnology," *Feminist Issues* 9, no. 2 (1989), part 1.
8. Jean Paulhan, "Happiness in Slavery," preface to *The Story of O*, by Pauline de Réage.

Select Bibliography

- Bloch, M., and J. H. Bloch, "Women and the Dialectics of Nature in Eighteenth-Century French Thought." In *Nature, Culture, and Gender*, edited by Carol P. MacCormack and Marilyn Strathern. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Bloom, Allan. "Rousseau on the Equality of the Sexes." In *Justice and Equality Here and Now*, edited by Frank S. Lucash. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Blum, Carol. *Rousseau and the Politics of Virtue*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Brown, Wendy. *Manhood and Politics: A Feminist Reading in Political Theory*. Totawa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988.
- Butler, Melissa. "Early Liberal Roots of Feminism." *American Political Science Review* 72, no. 1:135-50.
- Canovan, Margaret. "Rousseau's Two Concepts of Citizenship." In *Women in Western Political Philosophy*, edited by Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.
- Colmo, Ann Charney. "What Sophie Knew: Rousseau's *Emile et Sophie, ou Les Solitaires*." In *Finding a New Feminism: Rethinking the Woman Question for Liberal Democracy*, edited by Pamela Grande Jensen. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996.
- Coole, Diana. *Women in Political Theory*. Sussex, Eng.: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988.
- Disch, Lisa. "Claire Loves Julie": Reading the Story of Women's Friendship in *La Nouvelle Héloïse*." *Hypatia* 9, no. 3 (1994): 19-45.
- Eisenstein, Zillah. *The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981.
- Elshtain, Jean. *Public Man, Private Woman*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Emberley, Peter. "Rousseau and the Domestication of Virtue." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 17, no. 4 (1984).
- Falco, Maria, ed. *Feminist Interpretations of Mary Wollstonecraft*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.
- Fauré, Christine. *Democracy Without Women: Feminism and the Rise of Liberal Individualism in France*. Translated by Claudia Gorbman and John Berks. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.
- Fermon, Nicole. *Domesticating Passions: Rousseau, Women, and Nation*. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997.
- . "The Female Fulcrum: Rousseau and the Birth of Nationalism." *Philosophical Forum* 28, nos. 1-2 (1997): 21-41.
- Gatens, Moira. *Feminism and Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.

- . "Rousseau and Wollstonecraft: Nature vs. Reason." In *Women and Philosophy*, edited by Janna L. Thompson. Bundoora, Aus.: Australian Association of Philosophy, 1986.
- Graham, Ruth. "Rousseau's Sexism Revolutionized." In *Woman in the Eighteenth Century and Other Essays*, edited by Paul Fritz and Richard Morton. Toronto: Hakkert, 1976.
- Keohane, Nannerl O. "But For Her Sex": The Domestication of Sophie." *University of Ottawa Review* 49 (1979): 390–400.
- Kofman, Sarah. *Le respect des femmes: (Kant et Rousseau)*. Paris: Editions Galilee, 1982.
- Kukla, Rebecca. "Making and Masking Human Nature: Rousseau's Aesthetics of Education." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 29, no. 3 (1998): 228–51.
- . "Performing Nature in the Letter to M. D'Alembert." In *Rousseau on Arts and Politics: Autour de la Letter d'Alembert*, edited by M. Butler. Ottawa: Pensées Libres, 1998.
- Landes, Joan. *Feminism, the Public, and the Private*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- . *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
- Lange, Lynda. "A Feminist Reads Rousseau: Thoughts on Justice, Love, and the Patriarchal Family." *APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy*, June 1989.
- . "Rousseau and Modern Feminism." *Social Theory and Practice* 7, no. 3 (1981): 245–77. Also in *Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory*, edited by Carole Pateman and Mary Lyndon Shanley. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991.
- . "Women and the General Will." In *The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche*, edited by Lorenne Clark and Lynda Lange. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.
- . "Women and Rousseau's Democratic Theory: Philosopher Monsters and Authoritarian Equality." In *Modern Engendering*, edited by Bat-Ami Bar On. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
- Le Doeuff, Michèle. "Women, Reason, Etc." *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 2, no. 3 (1990).
- Lloyd, Genevieve. *The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy*. 2d ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
- . "Rousseau on Reason, Nature, and Women." *Metaphilosophy* 14 (1983): 308–26.
- McMillan, Carole. *Women, Reason, and Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
- Makus, Ingrid. *Women, Politics, and Reproduction: The Liberal Legacy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.
- Marso, Lori. *(Un)Manly Citizens: J.-J. Rousseau's and Germaine de Staël's Subversive Women*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- Martin, Jane Roland. *Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.
- . "Sophie and Emile: A Case Study of Sex Bias in the History of Educational Thought." *Harvard Educational Review* 51 (1981): 357–72.
- Matthes, Melissa M. *The Rape of Lucretia and the Founding of Republics: Readings in Livy, Machiavelli, and Rousseau*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.
- May, Gita. "Rousseau's Anti-Feminism Reconsidered." In *French Women in the Age of Enlightenment*, edited by Samia Spencr. Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1984.
- Misenheimer, Helen Evans. *Rousseau on the Education of Women*. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981.
- Morgenstern, Mira. *Rousseau and the Politics of Ambiguity: Self, Culture, and Society*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.
- Ogrodnick, Margaret. *Instinct and Intimacy: Political Philosophy and Autobiography in Rousseau*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.
- Okin, Susan Moller. "Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 11, no. 1 (1982).
- . *Women in Western Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. (2d ed., 1992).
- Pateman, Carole. "'The Disorder of Women': Women, Love, and the Sense of Justice." *Ethics* 91 (1980): 20–34.
- . *The Sexual Contract*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
- Pope, Barbara Corrado. "The Influence of Rousseau's Ideology of Domesticity." In *Connecting Spheres: Women in the Western World, 1500–the Present*, edited by Marilyn Boxer and Jean Quataert. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Rapaport, Elizabeth. "On the Future of Love: Rousseau and the Radical Feminists." *Philosophical Forum* 5 (1973): 185–205.
- Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. "Rousseau's Therapeutic Experiments." *Philosophy* 66 (1991): 413–34.
- Schwartz, Joel. *The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
- Shanley, Mary Lyndon, and Carole Pateman, eds. *Feminist Interpretations of Political Theory*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991.
- Shklar, Judith. *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Simon-Ingram, Julia. "Expanding the Social Contract: Rousseau, Gender, and the Problem of Judgment." *Comparative Literature* 43 (Spring 1991).
- Still, Judith. *Justice and Difference in the Works of Rousseau: Bienfaisance and Pudeur*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Tuana, Nancy. *Women and the History of Philosophy*. New York: Paragon House, 1992.
- Weiss, Penny A. *Gendered Community: Rousseau, Sex, and Politics*. New York: New York University Press, 1993.
- . "Rousseau, Antifeminism, and Women's Nature." *Political Theory* 15, no. 1 (1987): 81–98.
- . "Wollstonecraft and Rousseau: The Gendered Fate of Political Theorists." In *Feminist Interpretations of Mary Wollstonecraft*, edited by Maria Falco. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.
- Weiss, Penny A., and Gina Shapiro. "Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Mary Wollstonecraft: A (Live) Conversation." In Penny A. Weiss, *Conversations with Feminism: Political Theory and Practice*. Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
- Wexler, Victor. "Made for Man's Delight: Rousseau as Antifeminist." *American Historical Review* 81 (1976): 266–91.
- Wingrove, Elizabeth. *Rousseau's Republican Romance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

- . "Sexual Performance as Political Performance in *Lettre a M. D'Alembert*." *Political Theory* 23 (1995): 585–616.
- Wollstonecraft, Mary. *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. Edited by Carol H. Poston. New York: W. W. Norton, 1988.
- Zerilli, Linda. *Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.

Contributors

LEAH BRADSHAW is associate professor and chair in the Department of Political Science at Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, where she has been known to teach an entire course on Rousseau's *Emile*. She is the author of *Acting and Thinking: The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt* and has published articles and review essays in *Interpretation*, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, *Review of Politics*, and *Queen's Quarterly*. Current research interests are tyranny in Western political thought, and emotivism as the basis of judgment.

MELISSA BUTLER is professor of political science and chair of the Division of Social Science at Wabash College in Crawfordsville, Indiana. She is the editor of *Politics and the Arts: Autour de la Lettre à d'Alembert* and of numerous articles on modern political theory and feminist thought.

SARAH KOFMAN is agrégée de philosophie et assistante at the Sorbonne in Paris. She is the author of numerous books in feminist thought and cultural and literary studies. Her books translated and published in English include *The Enigma of Woman: Woman in Freud's Writings*; *Nietzsche and Metaphor*; and *Smothered Words*.

REBECCA KUKLA is associate professor of philosophy and political science at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. She has published on Rousseau, Hegel, feminist theory, aesthetics, media studies, epistemology, and philosophy of mind, in journals such as *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, and *British Journal of the Philosophy of Science*. She is currently working on two monographs: one on Rousseau's aesthetics and one on the role of myth, memory, and misrecognition in enabling the possibility of objective judgment.

LYNDA LANGE is in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. She is a co-editor of *The Sexism of Social and Political Thought* (1979), and numerous essays on Jean-Jacques Rousseau and feminist philosophy. Besides feminist political philosophy, her current work includes postcolonial studies in philosophy. An essay in this area appeared in *Thinking from the Underside of History*, edited by Eduardo Mendieta and Linda Alcoff.

INGRID MAKUS is associate professor in the Department of Politics at Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario. She is the author of *Women, Politics, and Reproduction: The Liberal Legacy*. Her most recent article is "Community, Birth, and Citizenship," in *Can-*

dian *Political Philosophy*, edited by Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman. Current interests include debates over identity politics and rights discourse, as well as questions about political continuity through the education of citizens and the establishment of justice between generations.

LORI JO MARSO is the author of *(Un)Manly Citizens: J. J. Rousseau's and Germaine de Staël's Subversive Women* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). She teaches feminist theory and political philosophy at Union College in Schenectady, New York, and is currently at work on a book titled *Dilemmas of Difference: Feminist Thinkers and the Demands of Feminine Desire*.

MIRA MORGENSTERN received her Ph.D. in political theory from Princeton University. She is author of *Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Politics of Ambiguity*. Her recent writings have included a consideration of Rousseau and postmodernism in *Historical Reflections/Reflexions historiques*, as well as a consideration of Rousseau's theories of the self in *Essays on the Modern Identity*. She is currently working on a study highlighting the creation of political discourse in the Bible.

SUSAN MOLLER OKIN is professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. She is the author of *Women in Western Political Thought and Justice; Gender and the Family*; and *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* as well as many articles in political theory and feminist thought.

ALICE ORMISTON has her Ph.D. in political theory from the University of Toronto. Her dissertation was written on Hegel. She is currently teaching at Brandon University, Manitoba, Canada.

PENNY WEISS is associate professor of political science at Purdue University. She is author of *Gendered Community: Rousseau, Sex, and Politics*; and *Conversations with Feminism: Political Theory and Practice*; and is co-editor with Marilyn Friedman of *Feminism and Community*. She is a "master gardener" and soccer coach, and her specialty is the history of feminist theory.

ELSE WIESTAD is a member of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Oslo, Norway. She is the author of *The Great Hundred Year Waves: Gender Debate in the Last 300 Years* (Oslo: Emilia Press, 1994 [published in Norwegian]). Her specialty is gender theory in early and late modernity.

ELIZABETH WINGROVE is associate professor of political science and women's studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She is the author of *Rousseau's Republican Romance* and of articles in *Political Theory*, *Signs*, *Representations* and elsewhere. She is currently at work on a project concerning eighteenth-century epistolary culture.

MONIQUE WITTIG is a novelist and the author of several books of theory, including *The Lesbian Body* and *The Straight Mind and Other Essays*. She is winner of the Prix Medicis and a professor in the Department of French and Italian at the University of Arizona.

LINDA ZERILLI is associate professor of political science and associate director of the Walt Whitman Center for the Culture and Politics of Democracy at Rutgers University. She is the author of *Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill*.

Index

- abortion, Rousseau's discussion of, 193–94, 208 nn. 45–46
- academic world, pressures on families within, 168 n. 34
- adornment, Rousseau's discussion of, 295–99, 310 n. 44
- adultery, Rousseau's discussion of, 57–59, 92–93, 259–60
- aidez-moi* concept, 350–51
- aimez-moi* concept, 350–52
- Allen, Woody, 168 n. 36
- ambiguity: of gender, in Rousseau's work, 12, 349–57, 380 n. 15; politics of, 16
- amour de soi*. See self-interest
- amour-propre*: censorship and civil religion and, 160–62; citizenship in context of, 146–47; democratic feminism and, 38–39; desire and, 75–80; duty versus passion and, 156, 167 n. 27; in *Emile*, 73–74, 253–56, 293–99, 309 n. 35; feminist theory concerning, 162–66; gender differences in, 18–19, 152–55, 355–57; love and effects of, 190–93; politics in context of, 198–203; power and, 32–33; Rousseau's rationalization of, 17; rule of law and, 34–36; rule of nature and, 149–52; sexuality and, 26–31
- ancient regime: arranged marriages of, 56–59; family life in, 48–50, 114; fraternity as antidote to, 274; parent-child relations in, 50–56; public women of, 336–41
- androgyny, in Rousseau's work, 85 n. 24
- Anet, Claude, 359, 381 n. 38
- anti-feminism, Rousseau's sex-ruled family and, 60–62
- Arendt, Hannah, 252
- Aristotle, 19, 173, 224, 231, 300; gender discussed by, 233–43; social contract theory and, 385–87, 390
- atomism, civic virtue and, 67
- attachment. See love
- Austin, J. L., 342 n. 16
- authenticity: family as keeper of, 114–17, 135–39; illusion of love and, 125–29, 142 n. 41; in *Le Léviote D'Ephraïm*, 331–33
- authority: natural morality and, 119–21, 140 n. 8; power system for women and, 183–85; through eroticism, 177–80
- autonomy, value of, in *Emile*, 253–56
- Baier, Annette, 228 n. 9
- Barber, Benjamin, 305, 313 n. 88
- Bartky, Sandra, 171
- Beauvoir, Simone de, 166 n. 1
- Berence, 285–86
- Berman, Marshall, 228 n. 20, 313 n. 89
- Bérubé, Michael, x
- Bickford, Susan, 270–71
- Binet, Alfred, 261–62, 294–95, 310 n. 41
- biological function, sexual inequality and, 27, 40 n. 9
- birth control, Rousseau's opposition to, 58–59
- bisexuality, social contract in context of, 376–79
- Blanchard, William H., 307 n. 3
- Bloom, Allan, 24, 35, 43, 63 n. 3, 83 n. 13, 86 n. 25, 207 n. 21, 293, 309 n. 39
- body image: empowerment of women and, 171; sexual politics and, 315–16, 319–20, 337–41, 341 n. 12, 344 n. 72
- Boling, Robert, 342 n. 31
- Book of Judges, 313 n. 75, 323–24, 330
- bourgeois: family life among, 48–50, 63 n. 3;