Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck

Noûs 49 (3):440-453 (2015)
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Reductive intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement.Carter, J. Adam & Pritchard, Duncan
(Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis.Carter, J. Adam & Czarnecki, Bolesław
Knowledge-How, Understanding-Why, and Epistemic Luck: An Experimental Study.Carter, J. Adam; Pritchard, Duncan & Shepherd, Joshua
Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value.Adam Carter, J. & Pritchard, Duncan

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