Rationality and Future Discounting

Topoi:1-12 (2018)
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Abstract
The best justification of time-discounting is roughly that it is rational to care less about your more distant future because there is less of you around to have it. I argue that the standard version of this argument, which treats both psychological continuity and psychological connectedness as reasons to care about your future, can only rationalize an irrational—because exploitable—form of future discounting.
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AHMRAF-2
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Archival date: 2018-02-26
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2018-02-20

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