Racionalidad práctica: Phronesis y sindéresis para una teoría de la decisión moral

Stoa 8 (16):63-77 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this article the concepts of prudence and synderesis are contrasted, the first from the Aristotelian point of view and the second from the School of Paris. Prudence is defined as the method for achieving the desired ends and synderesis as the natural ability to judge rightly. Although it has been thought that they are two concepts unequipable, in this work I argue that ( Φρόνησις - phronesis) prudence and (Συντήρηοη - synderesis) synderresis are two moments which are part of a theory of decision, with the condition that there are rational elements involved in moral deliberation, but, mostly,that is the product of an intuitive deliberation of person, based on first principles.

Author's Profile

Fabio Morandín-Ahuerma
Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla México

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-08-21

Downloads
183 (#68,362)

6 months
41 (#80,729)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?