Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts
Logos and Episteme 1 (2):211-219 (2010)
Abstract
An intuitive view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement says that when epistemic peers disagree, they should suspend judgment. This abstemious view seems to embody a kind of detachment appropriate for rational beings; moreover, it seems to promote a kind of conciliatory inclination that makes for irenic and cooperative further discussion. Like many strategies for cooperation, however, the abstemious view creates opportunities for free-riding. In this essay, the authors argue that the believer who suspends judgment in the face of peer disagreement is vulnerable to a kind of manipulation on the part of more tenacious peers. The result is that the abstemious view can have the effect of encouraging dogmatism.
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ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
AIKEAE-3
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2011-07-03
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280 ( #19,455 of 57,145 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #30,238 of 57,145 )
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