Imparcialidad y particularismo moral

Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 56:365-392 (2018)
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Abstract

This article aims to present that moral particularism is a viable alternative to the dominant ethics of modernity to the present (i.e., Kantian and utilitarian ethics); theories that have been criticized during the last decades, especially, by the requirement of moral impartiality. The agent in these ethics deliberates impartially due to the universalism of moral principles. I will suggest that moral particularism, insofar as it excludes impartiality as a relevant factor in the agents' deliberations, presents reasons to be a plausible ethics.

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Daniela Alegría
University of Chile

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