Event Horizon of the Mind: Wittgenstein, Black Holes, and the Limits of Determinism in Neuroscience

Abstract

This paper identifies and explores a structural parallel between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s private language argument and Stephen Hawking’s black hole information paradox, focusing specifically on their shared implications for determinism through the concept of one-to-many mapping. Determinism fundamentally relies upon unique reconstructability—one-to-one mapping between initial states and observable outcomes. Thus, any scenario exhibiting structural one-to-many mapping inherently undermines deterministic coherence. Wittgenstein shows that concepts like meaning something and intending are context-dependent, governed by shared normative practices (“forms of life”) rather than fixed by physical states or deterministic rules. This inherent contextual indeterminacy creates a logical structure analogous to Hawking’s paradox—where multiple distinct initial states yield indistinguishable empirical results. This analogy reveals a deeper logical challenge to determinism within consciousness itself. If subjective experiences are structurally non-deterministic, then our traditional conceptions of cause and effect and predictability must expand accordingly. Using Wittgenstein’s examples as conceptual first principles, this paper proposes a novel synthesis at the intersection of philosophy, physics, and neuroscience. This synthesis has significant philosophical implications for ongoing research into consciousness and our understanding of moral agency.

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