Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem

Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (2):251-269 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to the Disjunction Problem, teleological theories of perceptual content are unable to explain why it is that a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past. Without an adequate explanation these theories are stuck without an account of how non-veridical representation is possible, which would be an unsettling result. In this paper I defend Burge’s teleological theory of perception against the Disjunction Problem, arguing that a perceptual state’s representing what I call an error-prohibiting disjunctive property is incompatible with the truth of perceptual anti-individualism. And because perceptual anti-individualism is at the heart of Burge’s theory, I conclude that Burgeans need not be concerned with the Disjunction Problem.

Author's Profile

Jon Altschul
PhD: University of California at Santa Barbara; Last affiliation: Loyola University, New Orleans

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-07-17

Downloads
579 (#25,236)

6 months
80 (#46,951)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?