Against Hard Determinism: Compatibilism from Phenomenological Knowledge

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper revisits the classical case of determinism and free will. This explication argues for compatibilism while accounting for what has been most often dismissed in the classic philosophical literature: knowledge. Although philosophy is engrossed with epistemology, it seems that we have overlooked the relevance of knowledge when speaking of free will and determinism. When analyzing the nature of knowledge, in adequate depth, we ultimately find an illustration of what we know as free will. Simultaneously, this illustration also renders hard determinism untenable. It is concluded that knowledge relates to free will as follows: 1. Having knowledge and not having knowledge are not equivalent statements. 2. That is to say, there is a difference between having knowledge and not having knowledge. 3. A difference in knowledge can occur in an agent from moment to moment. 4. A difference in knowledge for an agent can only be manifested if and only if such an agent has the capacity to acquire or lose such knowledge; to move from not having to having or vice versa. 5. We have the capacity to acquire knowledge. 6. Knowledge allows things to occur to you. 7. That which does occur to you to choose, you can be free to choose. 8. You can be free to choose. 9. Therefore, you can have free will.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ANDAHD-2
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-04-24
Latest version: 6 (2019-05-07)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-04-24

Total views
59 ( #30,029 of 40,150 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
59 ( #8,597 of 40,150 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.