Anti-exceptionalism about logic and the a priori/a posteriori divide

Revista Perspectiva Filosófica (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Anti‐exceptionalism about logic is the view that logic is not special; it is just like empirical sci‐ ence in many respects. In particular, it is thought that an anti‐exceptionalist must also hold that logical theories are completely a posteriori. However, it is not clear what it means to say that logical theories are a posteriori, for the a priori/a posteriori divide has been explored from different perspectives in contemporary philosophy. The central claim of this paper is to argue that logical anti‐exceptionalism is quite compatible with the a priori, if the a priori/a posteriori divide is understood in the lines recently developed by Tuomas Tahko. The con‐ ception advanced by Tahko is characterized by an interplay between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, generating a bootstrapping relation in which one kind of knowledge constantly substantiates the other. We further present some of the advantages of the bootstrapping approach over the current epistemology associated with anti‐exceptionalism.

Author Profiles

Jonas R. B. Arenhart
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

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