Learning through Simulation

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Abstract
Mental simulation – such as imagining tilting a glass to figure out the angle at which water would spill – can be a way of coming to know the answer to an internally or externally posed query. Is this form of learning a species of inference or a form of observation? We argue that it is neither: learning through simulation is a genuinely distinct form of learning. On our account, simulation can support learning the answer to a query even when the basis for that answer is opaque to the learner. Moreover, through repeated simulation, the learner can reduce this opacity, supporting self-training and the acquisition of more accurate models of the world. Simulation is thus an essential part of the story of how creatures like us become effective learners and knowers.
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First archival date: 2019-08-06
Latest version: 2 (2019-08-07)
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2019-08-06

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