Primitivism about Truth

In Michael Lynch, Nathan Kellen, Junyeol Kim & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), The Nature of Truth (2nd Edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 525-538 (2021)
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Abstract

This essay offers an account and defense of conceptual primitivism about truth: the view that the concept of truth is a fundamental concept that cannot be analyzed or defined in terms of concepts that are more fundamental. It considers three arguments in defense of primitivism, and meets a familiar objection that fundamental concepts are by their nature obscure and mysterious. It concludes by considering the ways in which primitivism is similar to and different from other theories of truth, both substantive and deflationary.

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Jamin Asay
Purdue University

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