Affect: Representationalists' Headache

Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198 (2014)
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Abstract

Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it

Author Profiles

Murat Aydede
University of British Columbia
Matthew Fulkerson
University of California, San Diego

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