Abstract
Kant repeatedly stresses that moral philosophy shall find completion in the shape of a system. The present chapter focuses on three main aspects that characterise his view of the need of a system of ethics, suggesting
that Kant's view should be construed in contrast with the current assumptions on the role of a system
in moral philosophy. First, I argue that, in Kant’s view, the system of ethics does not pursue the coherentist project of systematising moral beliefs. Systematicity in ethics is, for him, about unfolding the obligations that are justified by the fundamental principle, according to a Pufendorfian paradigm widespread in the eighteenth century. Second, I show that, in contrast not only to current assumptions, but also to the Pufendorfian paradigm, Kant’s systematic treatment of ethics is neither a logically consistent arrangement of demands, nor a complete collection of ethical duties, but a system of ends that yields an open-ended system of duty types. Third, I suggest that in Kant’s view a systematic treatment of ethics is supposed to provide orientation to moral thinking through a broader perspective from which perplexing cases should be considered by emphasizing the holistic character of ethical demands and clarifying their connections.