Warum intellektuelle Toleranz nicht irrational ist

Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):51-78 (2020)
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Abstract

When it comes to disagreements about religious, moral or political questions, many people consider a tolerant ‘live-and-let-live’ attitude to be the best reaction toward conflicting opinions. However, many epistemologists are rather skeptical about the epistemic acceptability of such a tolerant attitude. More specifically, the worry is that a tolerant reaction toward recognized disagreement is necessarily epistemically irrational. After setting out this worry in a little more detail, I will present and discuss three different arguments for the epistemic irrationality of a tolerant attitude toward disagreement. I will argue that while all these arguments ultimately fail, they still reveal some substantial limitations to the epistemic adequacy of intellectual tolerance.

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Dominik Balg
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz

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