Tu Quoque: The Strong AI Challenge to Selfhood, Intentionality and Meaning and Some Artistic Responses

Abstract

This paper offers a "tu quoque" defense of strong AI, based on the argument that phenomena of self-consciousness and intentionality are nothing but the "negative space" drawn around the concrete phenomena of brain states and causally connected utterances and objects. Any machine that was capable of concretely implementing the positive phenomena would automatically inherit the negative space around these that we call self-consciousness and intention. Because this paper was written for a literary audience, some examples from Greek tragedy, noir fiction, science fiction and Dada are deployed to illustrate the view.

Author's Profile

Erik C. Banks
Wright State University

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-06-29

Downloads
204 (#66,923)

6 months
50 (#75,574)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?