An Argument Against Spanking

Public Affairs Quarterly 24 (1):65-78 (2010)
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Abstract

I sketch a non-rights-based grounding for the impermissibility of spanking. Even if children have no right against being spanked, I contend that spanking can be seen to be impermissible without appeal to such a right. My approach is primarily consequentialist but also has affinities with virtue ethics, for it emphasizes the moral importance of avoiding bad habits in one’s behavior toward one’s children.

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Gary Bartlett
Central Washington University

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