Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context of assertion V was bivalent. This theory requires a theory of assertion that is a form of cognitive expressivism
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BARCEF-2
Revision history
First archival date: 2010-03-09
Latest version: 2 (2014-12-08)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Wright, Crispin

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2010-03-09

Total views
648 ( #3,187 of 38,962 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
49 ( #8,596 of 38,962 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.