Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume's Manners of Disposition

Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):47-63 (2007)
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Abstract

The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume's comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist accounts. Hume's theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas

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Adrian Bardon
Wake Forest University

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