If You Believe You Believe, You Believe. A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own Beliefs

Logos and Episteme:389-416 (2017)
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Abstract

Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that p without believing that one believes that p.

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Peter Baumann
Swarthmore College

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