Priority monism and essentiality of fundamentality: a reply to Steinberg

Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1983-1990 (2017)
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Abstract

Steinberg has recently proposed an argument against Schaffer’s priority monism. The argument assumes the principle of Necessity of Monism, which states that if priority monism is true, then it is necessarily true. In this paper, I argue that Steinberg’s objection can be eluded by giving up Necessity of Monism for an alternative principle, that I call Essentiality of Fundamentality, and that such a principle is to be preferred to Necessity of Monism on other grounds as well.

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Matteo Benocci
University of Reading

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