Moral Luck and Deviant Causation

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):151-161 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper discusses a puzzling tension in attributions of moral responsibility in cases of resultant moral luck: we seem to hold agents fully morally responsible for unlucky outcomes, but less-than-fully-responsible for unlucky outcomes brought about differently than intended. This tension cannot be easily discharged or explained, but it does shed light on a famous puzzle about causation and responsibility, the Thirsty Traveler.

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Sara Bernstein
University of Notre Dame

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