Representationalism, First-person Authority, and Second-order Knowledge

In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-52 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper argues that, given the representational theory of mind, one cannot know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to being incapable of having any knowledge states; but one can know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to some other proposition q.

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Sven Bernecker
University of Cologne

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