Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision

Erkenntnis:1-17 (2018)
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Abstract
I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.
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First archival date: 2018-03-21
Latest version: 2 (2018-08-19)
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References found in this work BETA
Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.Alchourrón, Carlos E.; Gärdenfors, Peter & Makinson, David
Index.Yablo, Stephen

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2018-02-06

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