50 Years of Successful Predictive Modeling Should Be Enough: Lessons for Philosophy of Science

Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S197-S208 (2002)
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Abstract

Our aim in this paper is to bring the woefully neglected literature on predictive modeling to bear on some central questions in the philosophy of science. The lesson of this literature is straightforward: For a very wide range of prediction problems, statistical prediction rules (SPRs), often rules that are very easy to implement, make predictions than are as reliable as, and typically more reliable than, human experts. We will argue that the success of SPRs forces us to reconsider our views about what is involved in understanding, explanation, good reasoning, and about how we ought to do philosophy of science

Author Profiles

Michael Bishop
Florida State University
J. D. Trout
Loyola University, Chicago

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