Melis Erdur’s Moral Argument Against Moral Realism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2):371-377 (2019)
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Abstract
In a previous volume of Ethical Theory & Moral Practice, Melis Erdur defends the provocative claim that postulating a stance-independent ground for morality constitutes a substantive moral mistake that is isomorphic to the substantive moral mistake that many realists attribute to antirealists. In this discussion paper I reconstruct Erdur’s argument and raise two objections to the general framework in which it arises. I close by explaining why rejecting Erdur’s approach doesn’t preclude normative criticism of metaethical theories.
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Archival date: 2020-07-29
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2019-04-10

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