Foreknowledge and Free Will

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):55-57 (2012)
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Abstract

We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant

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Alex Blum
New York University (PhD)

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