Temporal Parts And Temporary Intrinsics

Metaphysica 5 (2):5-23 (2004)
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Abstract

In this paper I consider an objection that friends of the Metaphysic of Temporal Parts (MTP) press against other solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics and turn it against the MTP itself. I do not argue that the MTP must be false, nor do I argue that there are no arguments in favor of the MTP. Rather, the conclusion I draw is conditional: if the MTP provides an adequate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics, then the MTP provides no reason to reject our commonsense view of the nature of material objects

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Andrew Botterell
University of Western Ontario

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