Ought-contextualism and reasoning

Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999 (2021)
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What does logic tells us how about we ought to reason? If P entails Q, and I believe P, should I believe Q? I will argue that we should embed the issue in an independently motivated contextualist semantics for ‘ought’, with parameters for a standard and set of propositions. With the contextualist machinery in hand, we can defend a strong principle expressing how agents ought to reason while accommodating conflicting intuitions. I then show how our judgments about blame and guidance can be handled by this machinery.

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Darren Bradley
University of Leeds


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