Objective Bayesianism and the Abductivist Response to Scepticism

Episteme 1:1-15 (2021)
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An important line of response to scepticism appeals to the best explanation. But anti-sceptics have not engaged much with work on explanation in the philosophy of science. I plan to investigate whether plausible assumptions about best explanations really do favour anti-scepticism. I will argue that there are ways of constructing sceptical hypotheses in which the assumptions do favour anti-scepticism, but the size of the support for anti-scepticism is small.

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Darren Bradley
University of Leeds


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