Communication and rational responsiveness to the world

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):135-159 (2007)
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Abstract
Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson’s central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not necessary to engage in the practice of interpersonal reasoning because possession of the concept is independently integral to the practice of intrapersonal reasoning.
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Archival date: 2013-03-17
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The Intentional Stance.Dennett, Daniel C.
Mind and World.McDowell, John

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