Abstract

The Value Alignment Problem (VAP) presupposes that artificial general intelligence (AGI) is desirable and perhaps inevitable. As usually conceived, it is one side of the more general issue of mutual control between agonistic agents. To be fully autonomous, an AI must be an autopoietic system (an agent), with its own purposiveness. In the case of such systems, Bostrom’s orthogonality thesis is untrue. The VAP reflects the more general problem of interfering in complex systems, entraining the possibility of unforeseen consequences. Instead of consolidating skill in an agent that acts on its own behalf, it would be safer and as effective to create ad hoc task-oriented software tools. What motivates the quest to create a superintelligence with a will of its own? Is a general intelligence even possible that is not an agent? Such questions point to the need to clarify what general intelligence is, what constitutes an agent, whose values and intentionality are to be aligned, and how feasible “friendliness” is.