Omniscience, the Incarnation, and Knowledge de se

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):59--71 (2012)
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Abstract

A knowledge argument is offered that presents unique difficulties for Christians who wish to assert that God is essentially omniscient. The difficulties arise from the doctrine of the incarnation. Assuming that God the Son did not necessarily have to become incarnate, then God cannot necessarily have knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind. If this is right, then God’s epistemic powers are not fixed across possible worlds and God is not essentially omniscient. Some options for Christian theists are discussed, including rejecting traditional theism in favour of some version of pantheism or panentheism.

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Andrei Buckareff
Marist College

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