El post-cognitivismo en cuestión: extensión, corporización y enactivismo

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 3 (19):475-495 (2015)
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Abstract

In this paper I look into a problem concerning the characterization of the main conceptual commitments of the ‘post-cognitivist’ theoretical framework. I first consider critically a proposal put forward by Rowlands (2010), which identifies the theoretical nucleus of post-cognitivism with a convergence of the theses of the extended and the embodied mind. The shortcomings I find in this proposal lead me to an indepedent and wider issue concerning the apparent tensions between functionalism and the embodied and enactive approaches.

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Federico Burdman
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

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