Getting Accurate About Knowledge

Mind:1-28 (2022)
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Abstract
There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by introducing a simple hypothesis: increases in the accuracy of an agent’s evidence never lead to decreases in what the agent knows. We explore various precise formulations of this principle, consider arguments in its favor, and explain how it interacts with different conceptions of evidence and accuracy. As we show, the principle has some noteworthy consequences for the wider theory of knowledge. First, it implies that an agent cannot be justified in believing a set of mutually inconsistent claims. Second, it implies the existence of a kind of epistemic blindspot: it is not possible to know that one’s evidence is misleading.
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Archival date: 2022-06-16
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2022-06-16

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