Negation, expressivism, and intentionality

Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):246-267 (2020)
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Abstract

Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of intentionality, ‘no’.

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Alejandro Pérez Carballo
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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