Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155 (2016)
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Abstract
Robust Virtue Epistemology maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti-luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck.
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2016
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CARRVE-3
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Archival date: 2013-11-11
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan

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Citations of this work BETA
Purifying Impure Virtue Epistemology.Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando
Varieties of Cognitive Achievement.Carter, J. Adam; Jarvis, Benjamin W. & Rubin, Katherine
(Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis.Carter, J. Adam & Czarnecki, Bolesław

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