Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Non-cognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the presence of a belief, even though the intention is not even partly the belief. The result is a form of what Sarah Paul calls Non-Inferential Weak Cognitivism, a view that, as she notes, has no prominent defenders.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CLAIIA-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-04-28
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-04-28

Total views
113 ( #35,967 of 55,966 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
62 ( #11,543 of 55,966 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.