Rational Epistemic Akrasia

American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24 (2012)
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Abstract
Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. The paper will show that it can. More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically rational in the sense that both are supported by sufficient evidence.
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Archival date: 2011-10-26
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References found in this work BETA
Practical Induction.Millgram, Elijah
Access Externalism.Gibbons, John

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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Akrasia.Horowitz, Sophie
The Normativity of Rationality.Kiesewetter, Benjamin

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2011-10-26

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