Contempt's Evaluative Presentation and Connection to Accountability

In Michelle Mason (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Contempt. Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 131-150 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this chapter, I defend a novel account of contempt’s evaluative presentation by synthesizing relevant psychological work (Rozin et al. 1999; Fischer and Roseman 2007; Fischer 2011; Hutcherson and Gross 2011) with philosophical insights (Mason 2003; Bell 2005; Abramson 2009; Bell 2013). I then show how a concern about contempt’s status as an emotion involved in holding people accountable can be helpfully addressed. Finally, I gesture at an account of why, when we feel contemptuous toward people, our accountability responses involve withdrawal and exclusion rather than approach and confrontation.

Author's Profile

Zac Cogley
Ohio State University (PhD)

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-04-22

Downloads
407 (#37,863)

6 months
71 (#53,787)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?