Deliberating in the presence of manipulation

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):85-105 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to deliberation compatibilism, rational deliberation is compatible with the belief that one’s actions are causally determined by factors beyond one’s control. This paper offers a counterexample to recent accounts of rational deliberation that entail deliberation compatibilism. The counterexample involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation. It is further argued that there is no relevant difference between the purported counterexample and ordinary doxastic circumstances in which a determinist deliberates.

Author's Profile

Yishai Cohen
University of Southern Maine

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-06-17

Downloads
429 (#35,819)

6 months
98 (#35,613)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?