Virtue is a Great Moral Good

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Abstract
According to Aristotelian virtue ethicists, virtue is a great moral good that contributes to, but cannot be reduced to, an agent's welfare. In addition, they hold that the value of virtue is different from, and in some sense greater than, the agent-neutral intrinsic goodness that consequentialists attribute to states of affair. According to Thomas Hurka (1998, 2003, 2011), these fundamental Aristotelian views are indefensible. In this paper, I rebuff Hurka's skepticism and identify an Aristotelian view that stands fast in the face of his criticisms.
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First archival date: 2014-11-04
Latest version: 3 (2015-12-14)
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2014-11-04

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