A oposição de Berkeley ao ceticismo

Cadernos de História de Filosofia da Ciência 18 (2):3225-355 (2008)
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Abstract

One of Berkeley’s main goals in the Principles and in the Three Dialogues, as expressly stated in the full titles these two works, as well as in the Philosophical Commen-taries, is the refutation of skepticism. This article aims to elucidate what Berkeley means by skepticism and to indicate which principles or doctrines, according to him, are at the root of the skeptics’ doubts. An attempt is made to show how Berkeley elaborated his opposition to skepticism. Finally, it is suggested that Berkeley’s (alleged) refutation of the skepticism, given his doctrine of immaterialism, is not based only on the esse est percipi principle, but also on the thesis that the objects and their sensible qualities are immedi-ately perceived. It is pointed out that, in Berkeley’s view, this thesis is compatible with common sense, what makes it plausible to consider his theory of perception as a form of direct realism.

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Jaimir Conte
Federal University of Santa Catarina

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