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Is Perception Inferential?
In Johan Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. XII. Niederosterreichkultur. pp. 80-82 (2004)
Abstract
Applying a theory of psychological modularity, I argue for a theory of defeasibility conditions for the epistemic justification of perceptual beliefs. My theory avoids the extremes of holism (e.g., coherentism and confirmation holism) and of foundationalist theories of non-inferential justification.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2009-01-28
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274 (#55,328)
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45 (#79,897)
2009-01-28
Downloads
274 (#55,328)
6 months
45 (#79,897)
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