The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism

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Abstract
We argue that contrary to received wisdom, non-naturalist moral realism has an advantage over its naturalist rivals with respect to at least one thorny problem in moral epistemology. We call this problem 'the projectability challenge'. It is the challenge of explaining how it is possible for individuals to apply their moral knowledge to a variety of kinds of new (to them) cases and also how it is possible for individuals to learn from moral experience. By developing an account of and carefully examining what we take to be the underlying metaphysics and psychology behind traditional moral non-naturalism, we show that the non-naturalist is able to meet the projectability challenge. While we do not claim to show that the naturalist cannot meet the projectability challenge, we argue that it will be difficult for them to do so.
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CUNTPC-2
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Archival date: 2019-06-24
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2019-06-24

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