Internalism and Properly Basic Belief

Matthew Davidson & Gordon Barnes

In David Werther Mark Linville (ed.), Philosophy and the Christian Worldview : Analysis, Assessment and Development. Continuum (2012) Copy BIBT_EX

Abstract

In this paper we set out a view on which internalist proper basicality is secured by sensory experience.

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Author Profiles

State University of New York (SUNY)

Matthew Davidson

California State University, San Bernardino

Archival history

First archival date: 2018-10-24
Latest version: 5 (2023-10-05)
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Categories

Epistemic Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology

Justification, Misc in Epistemology

Perceptual Justification in Philosophy of Mind

Keywords

Internalism Justification Basic Beliefs Properly Basic Beliefs access internalism Acquaintance

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