Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer

Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):605-625 (2015)
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Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
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Justice for Hedgehogs.Dworkin, Ronald
Vagueness.Williamson, Timothy

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